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ABSTRACT 
This problem of hell is a specific form of the problem of evil that can be 
expressed in terms of a set of putatively incompatible statements:  
1. An omnipotent God could create a world in which all moral 
agents freely choose life with God.  
2. An omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the 
foreknowledge that some (perhaps a significant proportion) of 
God’s creatures would end up in hell. 
3. An omniscient God would know which people will end up in 
hell. 
4. Some people will end up forever in hell.  
Since the late twentieth century, a number of British and North American 
philosophical theologians, inspired by C.S. Lewis, have developed a new 
approach to answering the problem of hell. Very little work has been done to 
systematize this category of perspectives on the duration, quality, purpose 
and finality of hell. Indeed, there is no consensus among scholars as to what 
such an approach should be called. In this work, however, I call this 
perspective issuantism. 
Starting from the works of a wide range of issuantist scholars, I distill what 
I believe to be the essence of issuantist perspectives on hell: hell is a state that 
does not result in universal salvation and is characterized by the insistance 
that both heaven and hell must issue from the love of God, an affirmation of 
libertarian human freedom and a rejection of retributive interpretations of 
hell. These sine qua non characteristics form what I have labeled basic 
issuantism. I proceed to show that basic issuantism by itself does not provide 
an adequate answer to the problem of hell. The issuantist scholars themselves, 
however, recognize this weakness and add a wide range of possible 
supplements to their basic issuantism. Some of these supplemented versions 
of issuantism succeed in presenting reasonable answers to the problem of 
hell.  
One of the key reasons for the development of issuantist views of hell is a 
perceived failure on the part of conditionalists, universalists and defenders of 
hell as eternal conscious torment to give adequate answers to the problem of 
hell. It is my conclusion, however, that with the addition of some of the same 
supplements, versions of conditionalism and hell as eternal conscious 
torment can be advanced that succeed just as well in presenting answers to 
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the problem of hell as those advanced by issuantists, thus rendering some of 
the issuantist critique of non-issuantist perspectives on hell unfounded.  
  iii 
ABSTRAKT 
Helvetets problem är en specifik form av ondskans problem som kan 
uttryckas med hjälp av följande till synes oförenliga påståenden:  
1. En allsmäktig Gud skulle kunna skapa en värld där alla 
moraliska varelser frivilligt väljer att leva i gemenskap med 
Gud.  
2. En fullständigt god Gud skulle inte skapa en värld där Gud 
redan på förhand vet att somliga (kanske rent av en stor andel) 
människor kommer att hamna i helvetet.  
3. En allvetande Gud skulle veta vilka människor som kommer att 
hamna i helvetet.  
4. Somliga människor kommer att hamna för evigt i helvetet.  
Sedan slutet av 1900-talet har ett antal brittiska och nordamerikanska 
filosofiska teologer, inspirerade av C.S. Lewis, utvecklat ett nytt sätt att nalkas 
helvetets problem. Väldigt lite forskning har ägnats åt att systematisera den 
här sortens uppfattningar om helvetets varaktighet, beskaffenhet, ändamål 
och slutgiltighet. Forskare har inte ens kunnat enas om vad detta sätt att 
nalkas problemet ska kallas. I denna avhandling har jag valt att kalla det för 
issuantism.  
Med utgångspunkt i en mängd issuantisters skriftliga källor har jag 
renodlat vad jag betraktar som issuantismens kärna, nämligen att helvetet är 
ett tillstånd som inte leder till universell frälsning, och som kännetecknas av 
övertygelsen om att både himmel och helvete måste ha sitt ursprung i (”issue 
from”) Guds kärlek, i en libertariansk definition av mänsklig frihet och i en 
avvisning av alla tolkningar av helvetet som vedergällning. Dessa absolut 
nödvändiga egenskaper bildar tillsammans vad jag kallar ”grundläggande 
issuantism”. Jag går vidare och visar hur den grundläggande issuantismen på 
egen hand inte lyckas ge en tillfredsställande lösning på helvetets problem. 
Issuantistiska forskare inser dock själva denna svaghet och stärker sin teori 
med ett antal möjliga tillägg. Några av dessa stärkta versioner av issuantism 
lyckas ge hållbara lösningar på helvetets problem.  
En av huvudanledningarna till issuantismens utveckling har varit att 
somliga har upplevt att företrädare för konditionalismen, universalismen och 
helvetet som oändligt straff i medvetet tillstånd inte har lyckats ge 
tillfredsställande lösningar på helvetets problem. Det är emellertid min 
slutsats att konditionalister och forskare som försvarar helvetet som oändligt 
straff i medvetet tillstånd med hjälp av samma tillägg kan utveckla teorier som 
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löser helvetets problem lika bra som de olika issuantistiska teorierna. En del 
av issuantisternas kritik mot icke-issuantistiska uppfattningar om helvetet 
framstår därmed som ogrundad. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
I am persuaded that the phrase ‘child abuse’ is no exaggeration 
when used to describe what teachers and priests are doing to 
children whom they encourage to believe in something like the 
punishment of unshriven mortal sins in an eternal hell. – Richard 
Dawkins1 
How can Christians possibly project a deity of such cruelty and 
vindictiveness whose ways include inflicting everlasting torture 
upon his creatures, however sinful they may have been? Surely a 
God who would do such a thing is more nearly like Satan than like 
God… – Clark Pinnock2  
There is one very serious defect to my mind in Christ’s moral 
character, and that is that He believed in hell. I do not myself feel 
that any person who is really profoundly humane can believe in 
everlasting punishment. – Bertrand Russell3 
I believe that endless torment is a hideous and unscriptural doctrine 
which has been a terrible burden on the mind of the church for 
many centuries and a terrible blot on her presentation of the gospel. 
I should indeed be happy if, before I die, I could help in sweeping it 
away. – John Wenham4 
[T]he image of saints delighting in the sufferings of the damned is 
misguided and might reasonably be equated with a sadist watching 
a cat squirm in a microwave. – William V. Crockett5 
                                                
1 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 318. 
2 Clark H. Pinnock, “The Destruction of the Finally Impenitent” Criswell Theological 
Review 4 (1990): 246-247. 
3 Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), 
12. 
4 John W. Wenham, “The Case for Conditional Immortality” in Cameron 1992, 190. 
5 William V. Crockett, “Response to Clark H. Pinnock” in William Crockett (ed.), Four 
Views on Hell (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 171. 
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These quotes illustrate some of the strong reactions the doctrine of hell or 
eternal punishment generates all along the philosophical and theological 
spectrum. Some atheist critics of religious faith find the doctrine of 
everlasting torment in a conscious state of mind as both illogical and 
immoral.6 Even within the Christian community, there is no consensus on the 
duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell. Some scholars like John 
Walvoord7 and Robert Vincent8 defend belief in a literal hell with real fire 
where the ungodly9 will suffer unending conscious torment. Others like 
Robert A. Peterson10 and J.I. Packer11 defend belief in unending torment in a 
conscious state of mind, but view the biblical images of unquenched fire and 
undying worm as symbolic of a spiritual reality that is more horrid than the 
physical descriptions. A number of authors like Thomas Talbott12 and Robin 
Parry13 follow Origen in emphasizing the purifying or rehabilitating nature of 
hell with a hope of final restoration for all. At the same time, an ever-
                                                
6 Of course atheists like Russell and Dawkins are not alone in these concerns. Most of 
the various theories of hell presented in this dissertation have been developed at least partially 
in response to the challenges of harmonizing God’s love, justice, foreknowledge and 
omnipotence with the potential suffering of free moral agents in hell. 
7 John Walvoord, “The Literal View” in Crockett 1992, 11-28. 
8 Robert Vincent, The Mitigation of Hell (Greenville SC: Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Bob Jones University, 1999). 
9 Fully aware of the difficulties in such as designation, I shall use the term the ungodly 
to signify those people who will end up in hell. I believe that this term succeeds at overcoming 
most of the pitfalls of alternative terms. For instance, to speak of “the damned” or “the 
condemned” is incompatible with issuant views of hell. Likewise, “The unregenerate” is an 
unsatisfactory term for certain confessions where all the baptized are regenerate. The terms 
godly and ungodly refer respectively to those who end up in heaven or in hell, regardless of the 
conditions under which they reach their final destinations.  
10 Edward William Fudge and Robert A. Peterson, Two Views of Hell: A Biblical and 
Theological Dialogue (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 147. Robert A. Peterson, Hell 
on Trial: The Case for Eternal Punishment (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 
1995). 
11 “… the mistake is to take such pictures as physical descriptions, when in fact they are 
imagery symbolizing realities … far worse than the symbols themselves.” J.I. Packer, “The 
Problem of Eternal Punishment” Crux 26/3 (1990): 25. 
12 Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God (Salem, OR: Willamette University / 
Universal Publishers, 1999). 
13 Robin A. Parry and Christopher H. Partridge (eds), Universal Salvation: The Current 
Debate (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2003). Parry has also published several books under the 
pseudonym Gregory MacDonald (after two famous universalists Gregory of Nyssa and George 
MacDonald). These are The Evangelical Universalist (London: SPCK, 2008) and All Shall Be 
Well: Explorations in Universal Salvation and Christian Theology from Origen to Moltmann 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010). 
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increasing number of Anglo-American, Protestant, evangelical scholars are 
publicly questioning interpretations of biblical texts which regard the destiny 
of the ungodly as unending punishment in a conscious state of mind. These, 
like John Wenham,14 John Stott,15 Clark Pinnock16 and Edward William 
Fudge,17 have come to espouse a view of postmortem punishment that can be 
called conditionalism – the idea that eternal life for the blessed is conditional 
and that the natural end of the ungodly is ultimate annihilation. Others like 
Jerry L. Walls,18 Jonathan Kvanvig19 and Richard Swinburne20 defend the 
possibility of an unending hell, but question whether the nature of hell is 
retributive or simply the consistent end of the free choices a person makes in 
life and in death. 
Definition of Terms 
There is a great diversity of opinion on the exact nature and purpose of the 
postmortem fate of the ungodly. David J. Powys21 presents a helpful 
taxonomy in which twelve major views are delineated based on the answers 
one provides to a number of underlying questions related to duration, 
quality, purpose and finality: Is one’s existence in hell unending or is there 
the prospect of final destruction? Once the human soul comes into existence, 
is it immortal? Do the sufferings of hell have a physical as well as a spiritual 
dimension? What is the purpose for one’s consignment to hell? Is 
consignment to hell a judgment meted out by God or is it somehow the 
choice of free moral agents who choose an existence separated from God? Is 
there opportunity for an eventual escape or release from hell? 
                                                
14 John W. Wenham, The Enigma of Evil (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1985) previously 
published under the title The Goodness of God (London: InterVarsity Press, 1974). 
15 David L. Edwards and John Stott, Essentials: A Liberal-Evangelical Dialogue 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), 312-329. 
16 Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992); 
Clark H. Pinnock, “The Conditional View” in Crockett 1992. 
17 Edward William Fudge, The Fire that Consumes (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.com, 1982, 
2001).  
18 Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992).  
19 Jonathan Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
20 Richard Swinburne, “A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell” in Alfred J. Freddoso (ed.), 
The Existence and Nature of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
21 David J. Powys, “The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Debates about Hell and 
Universalism” in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 1992), 93-138.  
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Powys’ taxonomy of twelve modern positions on the fate of the 
unrighteous is as follows.22 
1. Unrighteous will suffer everlasting physical punishment 
2. Unrighteous will suffer everlasting mental punishment 
3. Unrighteous will survive death but then be annihilated 
4. Unrighteous will undergo discipline and correction after death 
5. Unrighteous will be eternally separated from God 
6. Unrighteous will have continuing freedom and potential for 
repentance 
7. Unrighteous will be resurrected to learn their error and then 
suffer natural consequences – death 
8. Unrighteous will be resurrected for physical punishment, then 
die 
9. Unrighteous will be resurrected for mental punishment, then 
die 
10. Unrighteous will neither survive nor rise from death 
11. Unrighteous will survive death but not rise from death, 
suffering a hell of their own creation 
12. Unrighteous will be raised to eternal life. 
This taxonomy however is not wholly without problems. Some of the 
categories are not mutually exclusive, such as alternative 5, which can be 
combined with 1 and 2. One can regard separation from God as the cause of 
the greatest mental suffering, without necessarily denying the reality of 
physical suffering.23 Alternative 6 – the prospect of possible repentance and 
release from hell – can also be combined with a number of other positions, 
such as conditionalism in the case of Clark Pinnock or eternal conscious 
torment in the case of Charles Seymour.24 
In this work, unless further precision is warranted, I shall use the 
following broad categories: eternal conscious torment, annihilationism, 
conditionalism, universalism and issuantism. 
The eternal conscious torment view (ECT) of hell (alternatives 1 and 2 
above) is the idea that the ungodly dead will suffer an unending, conscious 
                                                
22 Powys 1992, 95. 
23 Evangelist Billy Graham comments in an interview: “The only thing I could say for 
sure is that hell means separation from God. We are separated from his light, from his 
fellowship. That is going to be hell. When it comes to a literal fire, I don’t preach it because I’m 
not sure about it. When the Scripture uses fire concerning hell, that is possibly an illustration 
of how terrible it’s going to be – not fire but something worse, a thirst for God that cannot be 
quenched.” Quoted in Fudge and Peterson 2000, 20. 
24 Pinnock 1992a; Charles Seymour, A Theodicy of Hell (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000). 
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punishment in hell. Some advocates of this view call this perspective the 
“traditional view” or “traditionalism.”25 Some scholars who critique ECT reject 
the term traditionalism on the grounds that other theories of hell such as 
universalism, conditionalism and annihilationism also have precedents 
throughout the history of Christian thought.26 The main idea behind ECT is 
that hell is a state in which the ungodly suffer unending punishment in a 
conscious state of mind. Hell has at least a mental dimension (poena damni) 
in the soul’s eternal separation from God. It may also be accompanied by 
physical suffering (poena sensus) rooted in the concept of the resurrection of 
the body.  
Traditionalists generally accept the immortality of the human soul. Once 
the human soul comes into existence, it will continue to exist sempiternally: 
experiencing after death either the blessings of eternal life with God or the 
torment of unending punishment in hell from which there is no possibility of 
release or escape.  
The term annihilationism has sometimes been applied to believers in 
conditionalism for their belief in the ultimate extinction of the ungodly.27 
Kendall S. Harmon writes of this confusion:  
Perhaps most confusing of all, Edward Fudge does not want to be 
described as an annihilationist but a conditionalist, whereas John 
Stott makes clear that he is an annihilationist not a conditionalist – 
                                                
25 Fudge and Peterson 2000; Powys 1992, 98. Since apologists for ECT use the term 
traditionalist to describe their view, I shall use the term in its adjectival form and as a 
designation for scholars who hold this perspective. Jonathan Kvanvig uses various terms to 
label this view, including “the strong view” of hell in Kvanvig 1993 and the “punishment 
model” in Jonathan L. Kvanvig, “Hell” in Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Eschatology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 413-427.  
26 Considerations from church history are valuable primarily for showing the breadth 
of opinion on the nature and duration of postmortem punishment. Their value is limited 
because much of the evidence from the patristic period is inconclusive. In general, the post-
apostolic fathers followed the language and imagery of the Bible itself in their descriptions of 
the postmortem fate of the ungodly. In many cases, the fate of the ungodly was often either 
taken for granted or not considered as important as the major issues of soteriology and 
christology. While certain historical precedents can be found for most of the contemporary 
perspectives on conditional immortality and universalism, proponents of these views were 
generally a minority within Christendom and were often marginalized by the mainstream of 
Western Christianity due to these (or other) views that did not square with Western Christian 
orthodoxy. 
27 This is even true of John Stott, who himself leans strongly towards conditionalism. 
Edwards and Stott 1988, 316. The terms annihilationism and conditionalism are also used 
nearly synonymously in Fudge and Peterson 2000. 
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yet in terms of the ultimate end of the wicked Fudge and Stott are 
both arguing for the same view!28  
Donald A. Carson explains the objection some conditionalists sense towards 
the term annihilationism.  
Many ‘annihilationists’ object to the term ‘annihilation,’ holding 
that it puts the emphasis on the wrong place and betrays a platonic 
worldview. They are annihilationists in the sense that they hold that 
there is finally a cessation of existence, but they are uncomfortable 
with the term because it sounds to them as if God is destroying 
what would otherwise have endured forever – and this they deny. 
They prefer an expression such as ‘conditional immortality’ – i.e., 
men and women are not ‘naturally’ or constitutionally immortal, 
but become immortal under certain conditions.29 
In this work I will define annihilationism as the view that the souls of the 
ungodly cease to exist at the death of the physical body (alternatives 3 and 10 
in Powys’ taxonomy) whether by divine fiat where God brings an end to the 
otherwise immortal soul (alternative 3) or as a natural quality of the mortal 
human soul which cannot survive apart from the physical body (alternative 
10). 
Conditionalism is the name for a variety of ideas (alternatives 7, 8 and 9) 
that have in common the notion that the human soul only has conditional 
immortality. That is, the human soul has a beginning and will have an end 
unless it receives eternal life through the gift of faith in God. In contrast to the 
annihilationist perspective (Powys’ alternative 3) where God confiscates the 
natural immortality of the ungodly person’s soul, conditionalists emphasize 
that immortality is a gift that God confers on people who exercise faith. 
Although annihilationists also reject the inherent immortality of the soul, 
conditionalists emphasize the possibility of attaining eternal life through faith 
in God.  
Harmon, in his critique of conditionalist Edward William Fudge, outlines 
two different understandings of individual eschatology that both reject the 
inherent immortality of the soul: conditionalist uniresurrectionism and 
conditionalist eventual extinctionism. Conditionalist uniresurrectionism is 
the view that “man is naturally mortal and immortality is given through the 
gospel only to the righteous in the next life; the wicked who do not respond to 
                                                
28 Kendall S. Harmon, “The Case Against Conditionalism” in Cameron 1992, 198-199. 
29 Donald A. Carson, The Gagging of God (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 516. 
Introduction 
7 
Christ are not resurrected since death is their judgment.”30 This is the view I 
have labeled as annihilationism (Powys’ alternative 10). Conditionalist 
eventual extinctionism is the view that “both the wicked and the good are 
resurrected, and that the wicked suffer God’s judgment until they are finally 
extinguished, the punishment being proportionate to their sin.”31  
Harmon states that part of the confusion of terminology stems from 
Stott’s failure to distinguish between conditionalist uniresurrectionism and 
conditional eventual extinctionism.32 
This view of conditionalism (or conditionalist eventual extinctionism) has 
traditionally best been represented by Seventh-Day Adventist theologians,33 
but in recent years has been espoused by a number of high-profile evangelical 
Protestant theologians.34 There is a divergence of opinion among 
conditionalists as to many details concerning the destiny of the ungodly: the 
nature of the intermediary state, the timing of the final annihilation, purpose 
(or lack thereof) of possible postmortem punishment and the “porosity of 
hell” i.e., the possibility of repentance or conversion after physical death. 
Universalism is the view that all of humanity will eventually be restored 
and will finally enjoy eternal life with God. Powys only delineates one form of 
universalism (alternative 12) based on the universalists’ answers to his 
questions regarding the duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell. There 
are nonetheless a number of forms of universalism in Christian theology that 
stem from differences in emphasis and historical context.  
First, there is a form with roots in nineteenth century liberal Protestant 
theology, where the fallenness or sinfulness of humanity is generally 
downplayed or denied. Rowell writes of the influence of Darwinism and 
utilitarianism in the growth of universalism in nineteenth century England. 
[T]he eschatology which nineteenth-century Christianity inherited 
was an eschatology of the immortality of the soul, though alongside 
this there had also developed a secular eschatology of the progress 
of the world. The notion of progress had also been taken up into 
                                                
30 Harmon 1992, 197. 
31 Harmon 1992, 197. 
32 Harmon 1992, 198n. 
33 L.E. Froom, The Conditionalist Faith of our Fathers (Washington: Review and 
Herald, 1965, 1966). 
34 Wenham 1974; Wenham 1985; John Stott in Edwards and Stott 1988; Michael Green, 
Evangelism through the Local Church (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), 69-70; Philip E. 
Hughes, The True Image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1989). 
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some of the thinking concerning immortality, where the destiny of 
man was conceived as an unending progress rather than an arrival 
at a static perfection. … It was an immortality of self-realization, 
rather than an immortality of salvation, to which man looked 
forward…35  
Richard Bauckham concurs: 
This widespread belief [in the possibility of repentance and 
conversion after death] was certainly influenced by the common 
nineteenth-century faith in evolutionary progress. Hell – or a 
modified version of purgatory – could be understood in this 
context as the pain and suffering necessary to moral growth. In this 
way evolutionary progress provides the new context for nineteenth-
century universalism, replacing the Platonic cycle of emanation and 
return which influenced the universalists of earlier centuries.36 
Because of the inherent goodness of humanity and God’s great love for 
creation, all human souls will eventually enjoy the blessing of salvation made 
possible through Jesus Christ.  
A second form of universalism relates to religious pluralism and seems to 
be endorsed by scholars like Ernst Troeltsch and the later works of John 
Hick.37 It is the idea that every person – regardless of religious affiliation or 
lack thereof – will ultimately receive the salvation or its equivalent that is the 
goal for one’s striving. Pluralism does not necessarily entail universalism. It is 
possible that a person within any faith tradition could fail to achieve salvation 
or its equivalents. Nor does universalism presuppose religious pluralism; the 
reconciliation of all humanity with God may take place through the universal 
scope of Christ’s atoning death and resurrection.38 
The hope that the universal scope of Christ’s atoning death on the cross 
and the ultimate irresistibility of God’s love and grace can be expressed in a 
number of forms of inclusivistic universalism. Several well-known 
representatives for this perspective include Paul Tillich,39 John Macquarrie,40 
                                                
35 Geoffrey Rowell, Hell and the Victorians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 
14-15. 
36 Richard Bauckham, “Universalism: A Historical Survey” Themelios 4/ 2 (1979): 51. 
37 John Hick, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (London, 1988); Ernst Troeltsch, Die 
Absolutheit des Christentums (Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr, 1929). 
38 Ray Baker, “Att känna på en elefant: John Hicks religiösa pluralism” Keryx 3 (2013): 
52-61. 
39 “From the point of view of human nature, the doctrine of a twofold eternal destiny 
contradicts the fact that no human being is unambiguously on one or the other side of divine 
judgment. … The doctrine of the ambiguity of all human goodness and of the dependence of 
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the early writings of John Hick,41 John A. T. Robinson,42 Jürgen Moltmann,43 
Hans Urs von Balthasar,44 Hans Küng,45 Kallistos Ware,46 and Sergei 
Bulgakov.47  
Finally, a growing number of conservative Protestant scholars are looking 
at the Scriptures with new eyes.48 Scholars like Thomas Talbott,49 Robin 
Parry50 and Jan Bonda51 conclude that in light of divine goodness and 
sovereignty, God’s purposes for all humanity will be fulfilled when God 
shows mercy to everyone (Romans 11:32) so that all should come to 
                                                                                                               
salvation on the divine grace alone either leads us back to the doctrine of double predestination 
or leads us forward to the doctrine of universal essentialization.” Paul Tillich, Systematic 
Theology III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 408. 
40 “[W]e utterly reject the idea of a hell where God everlastingly punishes the wicked, 
without hope of deliverance… Rather, we must believe that God will never cease from his quest 
for universal reconciliation.” John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM, 
1977), 366. See also John Macquarrie, Christian Hope (Oxford: Mowbray, 1978). 
41 John Hick, “Universal Salvation” chapter 13 in Death and Eternal Life (Louisville KY: 
Westminster / John Knox Press, 1994), 242-261. This book was originally published in 1976. 
42 J.A.T. Robinson, In the End, God (London: James Clark, 1950). 
43 Jürgen Moltmann, “The Logic of Hell” in Richard Bauckham (ed.), God Will Be All 
in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 43-47. 
44 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope “That All Men Be Saved”? David Kipp and 
Lothar Krauth, trans., (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988).  
45 “Individual New Testament texts, which are not balanced by others, suggest the 
consummation of a reconciliation of all, an all-embracing mercy.” Hans Küng, Eternal Life? 
(London: Collins, 1984), 175. 
 46 “Hell exists as a final possibility, but several of the Fathers have none the less believed 
that in the end all will be reconciled to God. It is heretical to say that all must be saved, for this 
is to deny free will; but it is legitimate to hope that all may be saved. Until the Last Day comes, 
we must not despair of anyone’s salvation, but must long and pray for the reconciliation of all 
without exception. No one must be excluded from our loving intercession.” Kallistos Ware, 
The Orthodox Church (London: Penguin, 1991), 262.   
 “Our belief in human freedom means that we have no right to categorically affirm, ‘All 
must be saved.’ But our faith in God’s love makes us dare to hope that all will be saved.” 
Kallistos Ware, The Inner Kingdom (Crestwood NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2000), 214-
215.  
47 Sergius Bulgakov, Unfading Light: Contemplations and Speculations, Thomas Allen 
Smith, trans., (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 435. 
48 Millard J. Erickson, “Is Universalistic Thinking Now Appearing among 
Evangelicals?” United Evangelical Action (1989): 4-6. 
49 Talbott 1999. 
50 Parry and Partridge 2003. See also Parry’s books published under the pseudonym 
Gregory MacDonald: MacDonald 2008 and MacDonald 2010.  
51 Jan Bonda, The One Purpose of God: An Answer to the Doctrine of Eternal 
Punishment (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). 
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repentance (2 Peter 3:9) and experience the justification that brings life to all 
(Romans 5:18).  
Issuantism52 is the term I shall use to designate a three-fold conception of 
hell where the end is not universal salvation. The first characteristic of 
issuantism is the belief that there is a fundamental inconsistency in claiming 
that heaven or eternal fellowship with God “issues” from (or is an expression 
of) God’s love while hell or eternal separation from God “issues” from God’s 
righteousness. For proponents of issuant views, both heaven and hell must 
“issue” from the same divine character quality, namely God’s love. The term 
issuantism takes its name primarily from this characteristic.  
The second characteristic of issuantism is the belief that humans have 
metaphysical libertarian freedom. Scholars who emphasize this aspect of 
issuantism sometimes call their perspective “the choice model of hell.”53  
A third characteristic of issuantism is the view that hell is non-retributive 
in nature. Rather, it is the natural consequences of the choices that free 
human beings make in life. Scholars who emphasize this aspect of issuantism 
sometimes call their perspective the “natural consequence” theory.54 
Although the term issuantism has its origins in the first of these three 
trademarks, issuantism is not limited to or defined exclusively in terms of the 
love of God as divine motivation for both heaven and hell. In the present 
work I shall use the term issuantist rather than any of the alternatives 
sometimes found in the relevant literature. My purpose in doing this is not in 
any way to give precedence to the first characteristic, the conviction that both 
heaven and hell must issue from the love of God. Rather, I make this choice 
for two reasons. First, issuantism is a term that is sometimes used by 
issuantists themselves without limiting the scope of issuantism to the single 
question of divine motivations for heaven and hell. Be that as it may, it would 
                                                
52 In addition to the titles “the choice model” and “the natural consequence model” of 
hell, issuantism is sometimes called “the separationist view of hell.” Charles Seymour, “Hell, 
Justice and Freedom” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43/2 (1998): 69-86 and 
Seymour 2000. In contrast to Kvanvig’s term “the strong view of hell” for ECT, Lindsey Hall 
calls issuantism “the weak view of hell” in Lindsey Hall, Swinburne’s Hell and Hick’s 
Universalism: Are We Free to Reject God? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 12. Eric Reitan calls 
issuantism the “progressive understanding of hell” in Eric Reitan, “Human Freedom and the 
Possibility of Eternal Damnation” in Parry and Partridge 2003, 125-142. 
53 Jonathan Kvanvig, “Heaven and Hell” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 
edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 562-568; Kvanvig 
2008, 413-427; Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Destiny and Deliberation (Oxford: Clarendon, 2011). 
54 Michael J. Murray, Reason for the Hope Within (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 
294-302. Justin D. Barnard, “Compatibilism, ‘Wantons,’ and the Natural Consequence Model 
of Hell” in Joel Buenting (ed.), The Problem of Hell (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 65-77. 
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seemingly be better to use one readily acknowledged term (among many) 
than to coin a new term for the view such as agapeic views of hell. My second 
reason is stylistic; it is much more convenient to write of issuant perspectives 
and the work of issuantist scholars than to use unwieldy phrases like 
“defenders of non-retributive theories of hell” or “natural consequentialist 
scholars”. Moreover, it is well known that the term libertarian can rightly be 
applied to many scholars who do not have an issuant view of hell.  
Powys relates the rise of issuant views to the revolution in penal theory 
associated with people like Jeremy Bentham.55 How could retributivism, a 
practice that came to be regarded as barbaric and unenlightened in a modern 
society, still be attributed to a loving, good God? In the spirit of nineteenth 
century utilitarianism, one could legitimately question the value of hell as a 
punishment when it apparently does not succeed in deterring sin.  
That God honors the free choices people make does not deny that one’s 
existence in hell is a horrendous experience. When one rejects God, one also 
rejects the good for which God is responsible: life, beauty, love, pleasure, 
friendship, security, etc. Proponents of issuant views of hell do not necessarily 
deny that a person will suffer in hell, only that the suffering is meted out by a 
putatively loving God. The sufferings of the ungodly are the natural 
consequences of one’s rejection of God.   
The Problem of Hell 
The question of the duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell is really a 
specific case-in-point for the wider question of the problem of evil.56 The 
classic formulation of the problem of evil is that an omnipotent God could do 
something about evil, an omnibenevolent God would do something about 
evil, but since evil exists, then God must either be limited in power, limited in 
goodness, limited in both power and goodness, or not exist at all.  
In a similar way, one could criticize the Christian doctrine of hell with a 
reformulation of the classic problem of evil called the soteriological problem 
of evil57 or the problem of hell. According to the problem of hell, there is a 
perceived inconsistency between the following statements: 
1. An omnipotent God could create a world in which all moral 
agents freely choose life with God.  
                                                
55 Powys 1992, 118. 
56 Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians” in 
Eleonore Stump (ed.), Reasoned Faith (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 301-327. 
57 David Basinger, “Divine omniscience and the soteriological problem of evil: is the 
type of knowledge God possesses relevant?” Religious Studies 28 (1992): 1-18. 
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2. An omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the 
foreknowledge that some (perhaps a significant proportion) of 
God’s creatures would end up in hell. 
3. An omniscient God would know which people will end up in 
hell. 
4. Some people will end up forever in hell.  
A satisfactory answer to the problem of hell must seek to explain the 
duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell in ways that harmonize with 
these four premises. This may be done by showing how all four statements 
form a coherent whole, or by redefining or rejecting at least one of the 
premises. The problem of hell may present a greater problem for Christian 
theology than does the related problem of evil, since one popular solution to 
the problem of evil states that suffering in this life can be justified by belief in 
a final justice after death. Another difference between the problem of evil and 
the problem of hell is that while there is little question that the existence of 
evil is empirically verifiable, the existence of hell has not been empirically 
verified despite certain mass-market religious publications where the author 
claims to have visited hell. 
Purpose Statement 
As a relatively recent conception of the duration, quality, purpose and finality 
of hell, little systematic work has been done in defining issuantism vis-à-vis 
other perspectives on hell. Indeed, some authors carelessly fail to distinguish 
issuantism from ECT.58 Even the lack of consensus as to the terminology used 
to describe what in essence is the same perspective on the duration, quality, 
purpose and finality of hell is indicative of the fact that further research is 
warranted.59 
In this present work, I shall first distill from the published works of a wide 
range of issuantist scholars what I believe to be the three sine qua non 
trademarks of basic issuantism. I shall then show that basic issuantism by 
itself does not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of hell. Because 
of the tacit failure of basic issuantism to solve the problem of hell, issuantist 
                                                
58 David Guevara, Hell, Belief and Justice (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of Utah, 2003). Likewise, David Basinger calls Jerry Walls a traditionalist in Basinger 1992, 5. 
59 Indeed, as I was putting the finishing touches on this manuscript, a new book on hell 
was released where the author presents a thorough comparison of ECT, conditionalism and 
universalism. Issuant views of hell and their main representatives are glaringly absent from the 
book. Steve Gregg, All You Wanted to Know About Hell: Three Christian Views of God’s Final 
Solution to the Problem of Sin (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2013). 
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scholars generally add one or more supplements to basic issuantism. I shall 
then show that while the addition of these supplements may succeed to 
varying degrees as solutions to the problem of hell, the addition of the same 
supplements to non-issuantist views of hell may succeed equally well in 
providing coherent answers to the problem of hell, thus rendering some of 
the issuantist critique of non-issuantist perspectives somewhat misguided.  
Methodological Considerations 
As the queen of the sciences, theological discourse has its own unique starting 
points and strategies. In contrast to the natural sciences, where discoveries 
made just a few decades ago have in many cases already become obsolete, 
theologians must often relate their theories and interpretations to several 
millennia of cumulative reflection and systematization in the creeds, councils 
and confessions of the church.  
Systematic theology is not an exact science. Nonetheless, systematic 
theologians have at their service a number of methodologies that can 
contribute to the scientific study of religion as a phenomenon and theology as 
a systematization of religious belief. These tools are to be used carefully, 
however, because even the choice of methodology will have a great impact on 
the results of the study.  
In this work, I shall not present an empirical study of the numbers of 
people who believe in hell or the numbers of theologians who represent the 
varying perspectives on hell. Nor is the perceived decline in belief in ECT or 
its impact in the lives of people the object of this study.  
 Another possible methodology open to the theologian is historical in 
nature. The application of historical methodology in theological research 
would include questions of the historical development of a religion as a whole 
or of the ideas, organization or praxis of a religion. A historical approach 
could also compare the diachronic development of different religions or 
examine the role of a central figure within a religion to its historical 
development. The historical method may also be used to provide causal or 
teleological explanations for the development of a religion or religious idea, 
organization or praxis within historical, cultural, social or socioeconomic 
contexts.60  
Questions of how the doctrine of hell has developed historically from its 
origins in the cultures of the ancient Near East are certainly both interesting 
and important fields of inquiry. Although my purpose is not to ignore the 
                                                
60 Carl-Henric Grenholm, Att förstå religion: Metoder för teologisk forskning (Lund: 
Studentlitteratur, 2006), 110-113. 
Issuantist Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
14 
past, I choose not to apply a historical methodology since it plays very little 
role in the methodologies employed by the Anglo-American issuantists who 
are the focus of this study.  
Rather, in this work, I shall apply a systematic methodology whose 
purpose is “to describe and clarify contemporary ideas and forms of 
expression within a specific religion.”61 
 The purpose for my choice of methodology is to approximate as closely as 
possible the methodology employed by the issuantist scholars themselves. 
One element of this methodology is the clear definition of terms, especially 
(but not limited to) what is meant by “issuant views of hell.” Another major 
part of this methodology is the interpretation and clarification of texts written 
by issuantist scholars, wherein I shall systematize and evaluate their 
contributions to the doctrine of hell. By these means I hope to test the logical 
consistency of issuantism against other beliefs that are part of the issuantists’ 
larger belief systems.  
Although it is by no means necessary for a researcher to share the 
methodological considerations of the scholars who are the objects of study, I 
shall nonetheless attempt to follow as closely as possible the methodology 
employed by issuantist scholars. As such, it would be fitting to mention a few 
basic assumptions made by the issuantists themselves. The first key 
assumption is the truth of Christian theism as a worldview and belief system. 
The issuantists under study share a belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, 
omnipresent, omniscient personal God who is worthy of worship and 
obedience. Second, the issuantist scholars assume a grammatical-historical 
hermeneutic whereby texts are understood in light of the natural meaning of 
words as used in the historical context in which the texts were written, 
including authorial intention. This entails the rejection of reader-response 
and intuitive hermeneutics that are not intersubjectively testable. A third 
basic belief is a form of critical realism, whereby there is an external, objective 
reality whose existence and nature are independent of human consciousness. 
This critical realism recognizes at the same time that one’s perceptions of 
reality are also to a large degree formed by other factors such as experience, 
language, gender, race, socioeconomic status, culture and worldview.  
In this endeavor, the correspondence theory of truth is of limited 
usefulness. We simply don’t know which theories of hell most closely 
correspond to the external reality of hell’s duration, quality, purpose and 
finality. As such, I shall place greater emphasis on the coherence of 
                                                
61 Grenholm 2006, 113. My translation. 
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issuantism as an answer to the problem of hell and within the broader 
framework of Christian theism.62 Coherentism is not, however, without 
limitations of its own. Coherence theory can first of all give us a basis for 
belief without necessarily showing a proposition or set of propositions to be 
true. Secondly, there may be more than one coherent system, a conclusion 
which I intend to show weakens the issuantist critique of non-issuantist views 
of hell.  
A theologian does not undertake such a task without a certain number of 
risks. Systematic theology is not an exact science and both biblical texts and 
the works of contemporary scholars are open to interpretation that begins 
with the choice of what information and quotes to include in summaries and 
systematic presentations.  
Another central problem is the role the researcher’s perspectives and 
assumptions play in interpreting texts. Joseph Ratzinger writes, “The 
elimination of the observer, never fully possible even in natural science, now 
becomes a mere chimera.”63 
 Here one must admit that bias is always a risk, all the while striving for 
objectivity in sometimes allowing representatives to speak for themselves 
even at the risk of providing too little analysis. 
Although admitting that bias is always a risk, scholarly discussion is not 
mortally flawed and useless; we are able to strive for objectivity by using 
scholarly reasoning. By this scholarly reasoning, we can attempt to transcend 
our internal, subjective perspectives to one that is open to intersubjective 
testability. By this means, the systematizations, analyses and conclusions 
made by one scholar are open to confirmation or rejection by others. This 
type of striving for objectivity makes it possible to broaden our knowledge 
about reality.  
Limitation of Scope 
The choice of methodology presents some natural limitations to the scope of 
the present work. Patristics scholars would doubtless like to see me relate 
these contemporary theories of hell to the writings of the church fathers. 
Experts in second temple Judaism would likely wish to see greater emphasis 
on the Jewish cultural background of early Christianity as the doctrine of hell 
took shape in the early church. Perhaps exegetes would prefer to see a deeper 
                                                
62 Indeed, this is the major theme of Swinburne’s now classic work The Coherence of 
Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). 
63 Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life (Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1988), 22. 
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analysis of the relevant biblical texts. Philosophers of religion may prefer to 
see more of an analytic approach to the material. In my systematic approach, 
it is my purpose to examine and evaluate issuant solutions to the problem of 
hell presented by contemporary, Anglo-American philosophical theologians.  
Although issuantist scholars are not always clear as to their methodology, 
most do not place much emphasis on exegesis of the biblical material. 
Scholars like Walls and Kvanvig nonetheless make a nod to exegesis when 
they maintain that the view presented is at least consistent with the biblical 
material, if not directly derived from it. 
Walls writes, “[T]his is neither a historical nor an exegetical essay, 
although I intend the conclusions I defend to be compatible with the results 
of careful biblical exegesis as well as other standards of historic orthodoxy.”64 
He expounds his thinking further by saying that since the biblical material 
cannot be interpreted in a theological or philosophical vacuum, theology 
should develop in the interplay of exegesis, experience, and theological and 
philosophical reasoning.65 
Kvanvig presents a similar idea. 
Does the philosophical account mesh well with the language of 
scripture, or does this account present yet another example of the 
conflict between reason and the faith of historical Christianity? I 
argue that the composite view is consonant both with the language 
of scripture and with the overall thrust of the eschatological 
dimension of Christianity as presented in the Bible.66 
As such, in my evaluation of issuant perspectives on hell, I shall not criticize 
issuantist scholars for lack of exegesis, since it is not part of their chosen 
methodology.67 I shall only present exegetical support for the various views of 
hell insofar as it is presented by representative scholars themselves.  
                                                
64 Walls 1992, 15. 
65 Walls 1992, 158. 
66 Kvanvig 1993, 153. The composite view to which Kvanvig makes reference in this 
quote is Kvanvig’s perspective on hell that combines basic issuantism with the supplements of 
the Middle Knowledge Thesis and the possibility of eventual annihilation for the ungodly. 
67 Works that focus on exegesis of the relevant biblical passages include Jean Cruvellier, 
La notion de châtiment éternel d’après le nouveau testament (Aix-en-Provence: Unpublished 
thesis, Licencié en Théologie, 1953); Fudge 1982, 2001; Walter Moberley, “Perdition: Some 
Reflections on a Difficult Doctrine” Anvil 3/1 (1986): 49-65; Pinnock 1990; Hans Scharen, 
“Gehenna in the Synoptics, Part 1” Bibliotheca Sacra 149/3 (1992): 454-470; Millard J. 
Erickson, “Is Hell Forever?” Biblioteca Sacra 152/607 1995): 259-272; Glenn Peoples, “Fallacies 
in the Annihilationism Debate: A Critique of Robert Peterson and Other Traditionalist 
Scholarship” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 50/2 (1997): 329-347; Bonda 1998; 
Trevor P. Craigen, “Eternal Punishment in John’s Revelation” The Master’s Seminary Journal 
9/2 (1998): 191-201; Richard Mayhew, “Hell: Never, Forever, or Just for Awhile?” The Master’s 
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One could say that issuantism is a fairly recent development in theological 
thinking on the doctrine of hell. Although no theological innovation takes 
place in a vacuum, one of the driving forces behind the development of 
issuantism is what issuantists believe to be the unsatisfactory answers to the 
problem of hell presented in the history of Christian theology.  
This being the case, I shall only refer to historical precedents as they are 
presented by issuantist scholars themselves as an integral part of their 
theories.  
I shall thus not give extensive consideration to the historical development 
of the doctrine of hell either in its ancient Near Eastern context nor within 
the Christian church.68 Nor shall I pay much attention to the many 
monographs that examine the doctrine of hell as it was understood and 
expressed at specific points of history.69 Likewise, an analysis of why 
                                                                                                               
Seminary Journal 9/2 (1998): 129-145; Hans Scharen, “Gehenna in the Synoptics, Part 2” 
Bibliotheca Sacra 155/1 (1998): 324-337; Ralph G. Bowles, “Does Revelation 14 Teach Eternal 
Punishment? Examining a Proof-text on Hell” The Evangelical Quarterly 73/1 (2001): 21-36; J. 
Gregory Crofford, The Dark Side of Destiny: Hell Re-examined (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 
2013); Martin Woodier, “Eternal Punishment?” Evangel 21/1 (2003): 2-10; Gregg 2013; Kim 
Papaioannou, The Geography of Hell in the Teaching of Jesus: Gehenna, Hades, the Abyss, the 
Outer Darkness Where There is Weeping and Gnashing of Teeth (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 
2013); R. Baker, “Vår Gud är en förtärande eld: den bibliska grunden för konditionalism, 
Theofilos 1 (2014), forthcoming.  
68 Several outstanding books have become standard works on the historical 
development of the doctrine, including Georges Minois, Histoire des enfers (Paris: Fayard, 
1991); Alan E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and 
Early Christian Worlds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Herbert Vorgrimler, 
Geschichte der Hölle (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1993); and Alice K. Turner, The History 
of Hell (London: Robert Hale, 1993). See also Richard Bauckham, “Early Jewish Visions of 
Hell” Journal of Theological Studies 41 (1990): 355-385; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Shape of Death: 
Death and Immortality in the Early Fathers (New York: Abingdon, 1961); Bernhard Lang, 
Himmel und Hölle: Jenseitsglaube von der Antike bis Heute (München: C.H. Beck, 2009) and 
Bengt Ankarloo, Helvetet: döden och de eviga straffen i Västerlandets kristna tradition (Lund: 
Historiska media, 2003).  
69 Philip C. Almond, Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jonathan M. Butler, Softly and Tenderly Jesus Is Calling: 
Heaven and Hell in American Revivalism, 1870-1920 (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1991); Piero 
Camporesi, Fear of Hell: Images of Damnation and Salvation in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990); Jean-Paul Duviols, Enfers et damnations dans le monde hispanique et hispano-
américain (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996); Rowell 1974; Nicholas J. Tromp, 
Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the Old Testament (Rome: Pontifical 
Biblical Institute, 1969); Jürgen Tubach et al. (eds) Sehnsucht nach der Hölle? Höllen- und 
Unterweltsvorstellungen in Orient und Okzident (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012); D.P. 
Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964); Michael Wheeler, Heaven, Hell and the Victorians 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Ricky H. Willis, Torments of Hell: 
Conditional Immortality and the Doctrine of Final Punishment Among 17th Century English 
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traditional understandings of the doctrine of hell have become less common 
in the Western Christian church70 lies outside the scope of this present work.  
Issuant views are largely unknown among Continental theologians and 
among Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox scholars, who to the degree 
they address the issue of hell at all, generally emphasize the existential-
kerygmatic intention of the biblical texts on hell rather than interpreting 
them as descriptions of the duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell.71 
That is to say, one may legitimately ask what role the doctrine of hell plays 
within the wider context of Christian life and praxis.  
Whereas the church fathers were very keen both to anchor theology in the 
life of the church and to see practical outworkings of theology in the lives of 
believers, much of the contemporary discussion in philosophical theology has 
relegated pastoral considerations to a position of secondary importance. The 
anchoring of theology in pastoral considerations is perhaps clearer in Roman 
Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologies where the biblical texts on hell 
serve more as an incentive to live a life of devotion than as a warning to those 
who persist in their sin.72 Avery Cardinal Dulles summarizes the view of Karl 
Rahner on this point: “The discourses of Jesus on the subject appear to be 
                                                                                                               
Baptists (Fort Worth: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 1995).  
70 Martin E. Marty, “Hell Disappeared. No One Noticed. A Civic Argument” Harvard 
Theological Review 78 (1985): 381-398; John Blanchard, Whatever Happened to Hell? (Durham: 
Evangelical Press, 1993); Vincent 1999. 
71 Henri Blocher, “Everlasting Punishment and the Problem of Evil” in Cameron 1992, 
291. This, along with the stated focus of this present work on Anglo-American theology, is the 
main reason for the preponderance of English-language source material. 
72 Although it does not present a complete issuant view of hell, the current Catechism of 
the Catholic Church (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994) does include in §1861 this clear 
statement of the Self-Determination Thesis as it relates to hell: “To die in mortal sin without 
repenting and accepting God’s merciful love means remaining separated from him for ever by 
our own free choice. This state of definitive self-exclusion from communion with God and the 
blessed is called ‘hell.’”  
The hortatory emphasis of the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on hell is seen in 
§1036: “The affirmations of Sacred Scripture and the teachings of the Church on the subject of 
hell are a call to responsibility incumbent upon man to make use of his freedom in view of his 
eternal destiny. They are at the same time an urgent call to conversion: ‘Enter by the narrow 
gate; for the gate is wide and the way is easy, that leads to destruction, and those who enter by 
it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard, that leads to life, and those who find it 
are few.’”  
Joseph Ratzinger expresses a similar hortatory sentiment: “For the saints, ‘Hell’ is not 
so much a threat to be hurled at other people but a challenge to oneself. It is a challenge to 
suffer in the dark night of faith, to experience communion with Christ in solidarity with his 
descent into the Night.” Ratzinger 1988, 217-218. 
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admonitory rather than predictive. Their aim is to persuade his hearers to 
pursue the better and safer path by alerting them to the danger of eternal 
perdition.”73 As such, the contributions by Roman Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox theologians to the current discussion of the doctrine of hell also lie 
generally outside the scope of the current dissertation. Of course no rule is 
complete without exception. In the course of my study I shall consider the 
contributions of Roman Catholic scholars like Eleonore Stump, Andrei 
Buckareff and Peter Kreeft and Orthodox believer Richard Swinburne.74 In 
various ways these scholars have all made significant contributions to the 
formation and defense of issuantism within contemporary Anglo-American 
theology. 
Finally, although much can be written about Satan and demons,75 I do not 
intend to address these issues here since the question of Satan is not raised by 
the issuantists who are the focus of this present study. Moreover, the question 
of Satan is only relevant to the doctrine of hell if one accepts extra-biblical 
notions of Satan as lord of the chthonic realms. 
Overview of the Present Work  
In the next chapter I shall highlight the main forms of non-issuant 
conceptions of hell. Special attention will be given to ECT, conditionalism and 
universalism. In each case I shall give special emphasis to the unique issues 
that have led to the formulation and/or defense of each position. This chapter 
is necessary to provide a framework for better understanding the critiques 
against these views raised by the proponents of issuant views.  
Although C.S. Lewis does not fulfill my criterion of contemporaneity, his 
extensive reflections on the nature of hell have been an undeniable 
inspiration to many of the scholars highlighted in this work, in particular to 
                                                
73 Avery Cardinal Dulles, “The Population of Hell” First Things 133 (2003): 36-41. 
74 Admittedly, most of Swinburne’s work on the doctrine of hell was done while he was 
still a communicant in the Church of England. In many ways, his belief in purgatory and his 
emphasis on the separation of the ungodly from God as expressed in poena damni are at odds 
with the teaching of Orthodox theologians like Kallistos Ware, John Romanides, Hierotheos 
Vlachos, Aristotle Papanikolaou and George Metallinos who claim that no one is ever 
separated from the love of God, but that God’s love can be perceived as extremely painful by 
the ungodly who resist God’s love and grace.  
Ware writes that “it is not possible for us to speak in any detail about the realities of the 
Age to come.” Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1986), 178. 
75 Gregory A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 
2001); Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan (NY: Vintage Books, 1996); T.J. Wray and Gregory 
Mobley, The Birth of Satan (NY: Palgrace Macmillan, 2005).  
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proponents of issuant views. As such, I would be remiss in not including 
chapter three, in which I present his thought by way of background to the 
contemporary discussions of the duration, quality, purpose and finality of 
hell.  
Later issuantists generally do not place Lewis’ reflections on hell in a 
historical context showing how his ideas were influenced by or developed 
within a political, religious, cultural or socioeconomic context. Rather, to the 
extent that they interact directly with Lewis at all, they employ a systematic 
methodology to glean Lewis’ ideas from a wide range of texts that encompass 
both fictional and non-fictional works. With this starting point, they are then 
able to analyze and critique Lewis’ contributions to our understanding of the 
duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell as they relate to an answer to 
the problem of hell. This shall also be my methodology in this chapter.  
In chapter four I shall give a detailed presentation of basic issuantism, a 
view that seeks to answer the problem of hell by explaining how a possibly 
everlasting hell can be defined in terms of the harmonization for God’s 
motives for both heaven and hell in the love of God, a libertarian definition of 
human freedom, and a rejection of the Retribution Thesis. In this chapter I 
shall also contend that basic issuantism by itself does not succeed in solving 
the problem of hell.  
This should not, however, be construed as a gratuitous swipe at a straw 
man. Fully cognizant that no issuantist scholar believes only in basic 
issuantism, I shall show in chapter five how issuantist scholars strengthen 
basic issuantism with any number of supplements whose purpose is to 
provide a better solution to the problem of hell. 
In chapter six, I shall give several examples of non-issuantist scholars who 
supplement ECT and conditionalism with the same types of supplements as 
are used by issuantists to strengthen basic issuantism. I shall show that with 
the addition of these supplements, traditionalists and conditionalists can 
provide solutions to the problem of hell that are just as reasonable as those 
provided by supplemented issuantism.   
I shall conclude this work in chapter seven with some final reflections on 
the relative merits of issuantism and supplemented non-issuant theories of 
hell at presenting reasonable answers to the problem of hell.  
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NON-ISSUANT VIEWS OF HELL 
It is conceivable that the doctrine of hell is a mythologized 
projection of the worst side of human beings, of human beings in 
their most vindictive and intolerant depths. Telling us nothing 
about a supernatural Being, the doctrine of hell perhaps reveals the 
most imperfect side of the human species.1 
[T]he feelings that make people want conditionalism to be true 
seem to me to reflect, not superior sensitivity, but secular 
sentimentalism … – J.I. Packer2  
[P]eople hold to this teaching about hell for pragmatic and not 
biblical reasons – hell is the ultimate big stick to threaten people 
with. – Clark Pinnock3 
Conditional immortality is wishful thinking by those who want to 
escape the problem of hell by maintaining it is a doctrine not taught 
in the Bible.  – John F. Walvoord4 
Even though emotions sometimes run high in the debate over the duration, 
quality, purpose and finality of hell, it is important to bear in mind that 
theologians do not formulate their conceptions of the afterlife based on 
emotion. In spite of occasional accusations to the contrary, traditionalists do 
not develop their interpretation of hell as eternal conscious torment because 
of feelings of vindictiveness. Conditionalists do not arrive at their conclusions 
based on a sentimental desire to mitigate the harshness of unending 
punishment. Nor do universalists found their hope of the final reconciliation 
of all creation with God on some naive optimism. These careful scholars 
                                                
1 J.E. Barnhart, Religion and the Challenge of Philosophy (Totowa NJ: Littlefield, 
Adams, 1975), 126-127. 
2 J.I. Packer, “Evangelicals and the Way of Salvation: New Challenges to the Gospel – 
Universalism and Justification by Faith” in Kenneth S. Kantzer and Carl F. H. Henry (eds), 
Evangelical Affirmations (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990), 126. 
3 Clark Pinnock, “Response to John F. Walvoord” in Crockett 1992, 39. 
4 John F. Walvoord, “Response to Clark H. Pinnock” in Crockett 1992, 170. 
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arrive at their varying conclusions because of what they perceive to be the 
best understanding of the biblical material along with sound theological 
reasoning. Nonetheless, these theologians believe that one’s emotions can 
play a minor role in providing existential confirmation to conclusions that 
are drawn from careful exegesis and theological reflection.   
In this chapter I shall examine the most common non-issuant views of 
hell. I define non-issuant views of hell as any view of hell that rejects at least 
one of the three main trademarks of basic issuantism. Although the term 
issuantist refers specifically to the question of divine motivations for heaven 
and hell, in this work I use the term in a broader sense to designate any non-
universalist view of hell that is characterized by what I believe to be the three 
sine qua non trademarks of issuantism: the conviction that both heaven and 
hell must issue from the love of God, a libertarian definition of human 
freedom and a rejection of the Retribution Thesis. A non-issuant view of hell 
is thus not limited to a rejection of the idea that hell is an expression of the 
love of God. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter four, the love of God as divine 
motivation for hell is a necessary but not adequate characteristic of 
issuantism, while its rejection is adequate but not necessary for non-issuant 
views of hell.  
The non-issuant views of hell under consideration in this chapter include 
ECT, conditionalism and universalism. I shall not present a structured critique 
of any of these positions at this point, as issuant views of hell were largely 
developed as an alternative to what issuantists perceive to be the inherent 
problems of non-issuant views.  
Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) 
The key element of ECT is the idea that the ungodly dead will suffer an 
unending, conscious punishment in hell. Kvanvig lists four theses that define 
what he calls the strong view of hell.5  
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: some persons are consigned to 
hell; 
(H2) The Existence Thesis: hell is a place where people exist, if they 
are consigned there; 
                                                
5 Kvanvig 1993, 19. Kvanvig himself does not ascribe to ECT. Rather, he begins with ECT 
as a starting point because of its dominant position in Western Christian theology. Kvanvig’s 
terms for ECT include “the strong view” in Kvanvig 1993 and the “punishment model” in 
Kvanvig 2008, 413-427. 
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(H3) The No Escape Thesis: there is no possibility of leaving hell, 
and nothing one can do, change, or become in order to get out of 
hell, once one is consigned there; and 
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for and purpose of 
hell is retributive in nature, hell being constituted so as to mete out 
punishment to those whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. 
Apologists for ECT or traditionalists may have different views concerning 
certain details, such as whether the fire is real or metaphorical, whether there 
is active torment or whether the punishment is primarily a deprivation of 
good things like the presence of God. Proponents may also have differing 
views on whether hell entails physical suffering (poena sensus) in addition to 
mental anguish (poena damni) and whether all people in hell receive the same 
punishment or not.  
Exegetical Considerations for ECT 
One major consideration for traditionalists is exegesis of the biblical material. 
Traditionalists hold that theological reasoning divorced from the clear 
teaching of Scripture is of little value.  
John F. Walvoord comments:  
[T]he nature of hell, its eternity, and its punishments can only be 
determined by what the Bible teaches. … If the Bible is verbally 
inspired and accurate, and if it is the only revelation we have 
concerning life after death, we have no alternative to what it reveals 
– and that is to acknowledge that eternal punishment for the 
wicked will last forever. No one really knows enough about the 
future to deny what the Bible teaches.6 
In a similar vein, Crockett writes: 
Opinions on the nature of final judgment will always be with us, 
and it would be presumptuous to say that I know precisely what 
hell is going to be like. I do not, of course, and no one else does 
either. When it comes to the afterlife, only the dead know for sure. 
Yet we do have revelation from the Lord of the living and the dead, 
and that revelation – the Scriptures – must be our guide. If it is not, 
we will find ourselves at sea, driven largely by the winds of the 
moment.7 
Without exception, contemporary advocates of ECT accept a grammatical-
historical hermeneutic where the interpretation of biblical texts is guided by 
                                                
6 Walvoord 1992b, 170. 
7 William V. Crockett, “The Metaphorical View” in Crockett 1992, 45. 
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the presumed intention of the author and the understanding of the original 
recipients of the texts within their historical context. 
Some of the verses that traditionalists highlight include: 
Isaiah 66:22-24 – “For as the new heavens and the new earth that I 
make shall remain before me, says the Lord, so shall your offspring 
and your name remain. From new moon to new moon, and from 
Sabbath to Sabbath, all flesh shall come to worship before me, 
declares the Lord. And they shall go out and look on the dead 
bodies of the men who have rebelled against me. For their worm 
shall not die, their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be an 
abhorrence to all flesh.” 
Daniel 12:1-2 – “At that time shall arise Michael, the great prince 
who has charge of your people. And there shall be a time of trouble, 
such as never has been since there was a nation till that time. But at 
that time your people shall be delivered, everyone whose name shall 
be found written in the book. And many of those who sleep in the 
dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to 
shame and everlasting contempt.”  
Matthew 18:6-9 – “It is better for you to enter life crippled or lame 
than with two hands or two feet to be thrown into the eternal fire. 
… It is better for you to enter life with one eye than with two eyes to 
be thrown into the hell of fire.” Robert A. Peterson comments on 
this passage that even though the text does not specifically say what 
will happen to the damned in hell, in combination with other New 
Testament texts, the message is clear. “The New Testament need 
not specify every time it uses the imagery of fire in connection with 
hell. It specifies many times and uses shorthand in others.”8  
Matthew 25:31-46 – In the pericope of the sheep and goats 
judgment, there is a clear symmetry between the fate of the blessed 
and the fate of the damned. “Depart from me, you cursed, into the 
eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. … And these will 
go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal 
life.” 
Mark 9:42-48 – This text is a parallel to Matthew 18 with the 
addition of the quote from Isaiah 66. “It is better for you to enter 
the kingdom of God with one eye than with two eyes to be thrown 
into hell, ‘where their worm does not die and the fire is not 
quenched.’” 
2 Thessalonians 1:5-10 – “This is evidence of the righteous 
judgment of God … God considers it just to repay with affliction 
those who afflict you … when the Lord Jesus is revealed from 
                                                
8 Fudge and Peterson 2000, 140. 
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heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, inflicting vengeance 
on those who do not know God and on those who do not obey the 
gospel of our Lord Jesus. They will suffer the punishment of eternal 
destruction, away from the presence of the Lord and from the glory 
of his might….”  
Jude 7 – Sodom and Gomorrah “serve as an example by undergoing 
a punishment of eternal fire.”  
Jude 13 – “the gloom of utter darkness has been reserved forever” 
for the ungodly. 
Revelation 14:9-11 – “If anyone worships the beast and its image 
and receives a mark on his forehead or on his hand, he also will 
drink the wine of God's wrath, poured full strength into the cup of 
his anger, and he will be tormented with fire and sulfur in the 
presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb. And 
the smoke of their torment goes up forever and ever….” 
Revelation 20:14-15 – “Then Death and Hades were thrown into 
the lake of fire. This is the second death, the lake of fire. And if 
anyone's name was not found written in the book of life, he was 
thrown into the lake of fire.”  
Although ECT-scholars may have differing opinions regarding the extent to 
which a grammatical-historical hermeneutic demands a literal interpretation 
of the fire and the worm,9 the consensus among traditionalists is that a plain 
reading of these and other biblical texts leads to the conclusion that hell is an 
unending punishment in a conscious state of mind.10  
The Traditionalist Interpretation of !"#$%&' and its Derivatives 
Closely related to questions of hermeneutics is the interpretation of key terms 
in relevant verses. One such term is αἰώνιος and its related term αἰών. 
                                                
9 See for instance the difference between John F. Walvoord and William V. Crockett’s 
positions in Crockett 1992. 
10 It should be noted here that traditionalists, conditionalists and universalists can all 
point to Bible verses that would appear to give prima facie support to their view of hell. Each of 
these non-issuant views of hell is also challenged by other Bible passages that at first glance 
seem to call that interpretation of hell into question. Regardless of one’s perspective on hell, 
one must give interpretive precedence to one set of verses and interpret the rest in light of 
those whose meaning one takes to be most clear. Whether one’s foundational beliefs about the 
nature of God, hell and humanity guides the choice of which set of verses receives interpretive 
precedence, or whether one’s perceptions of the plain meaning of the biblical material forms 
one’s beliefs about the nature of God, hell and humanity is a bit like asking whether the 
chicken or the egg comes first.  
As the purpose of this present work is neither to defend nor critique any non-issuant 
view of hell, I shall simply present an overview of the verses commonly heralded as support for 
each non-issuant view without delving into a detailed exegesis or critique, a task which would 
take me too far afield from my stated purpose. 
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Traditionalists maintain that the natural understanding of these terms is 
quantitative. Eternal, forever, everlasting, for ever and ever and other 
translations of these terms evoke a sense of unending or infinite time.  
Traditionalists sometimes point to Augustine’s understanding of the 
importance of the symmetry in verses like Matthew 25:46 for our 
understanding of the meaning of αἰώνιος.11 
Then what a fond fancy is it to suppose that eternal punishment 
means long continued punishment, while eternal life means life 
without end … If both destinies are “eternal,” then we must either 
understand both as long-continued but at last terminating, or both 
as endless. For they are correlative, – on the one hand, punishment 
eternal, on the other hand, life eternal. And to say in one and the 
same sense, life eternal shall be endless, punishment eternal shall 
come to an end, is the height of absurdity. Wherefore, as the eternal 
life of the saints shall be endless, so too the eternal punishment of 
those who are doomed to it shall have no end.12 
Even if one concedes that αἰώνιος may have a qualitative as well as a 
quantitative element (as conditionalists maintain), Carson insists that 
“αἰώνιος more commonly has temporal or eternal overtones, rather than 
qualitative force. Even when it has the latter, the temporal sense is rarely 
forfeited.”13 
The Traditionalist Interpretation of ()*++,-% and its Derivatives 
Another important group of words is ἀpiόλλυμι and its derivatives. Since 
conditionalists emphasize the promise of destruction as part of the fate of the 
ungodly, traditionalists find it imperative to show that ἀpiόλλυμι and its 
derivatives do not entail the cessation of existence. The word group is also 
used in the sense of “waste” or “useless.” In Luke 15:8, the word is used of the 
“lost” coin. In Matthew 9:17 it describes the “ruined” wineskin.  Likewise, the 
disciples thought that ointment used to anoint Jesus was said to be “wasted” 
in Matthew 26:8. In none of these cases is cessation of existence presupposed.  
Carson concludes that the use of ἀpiόλλυμι and its derivatives does not 
necessarily prove ECT, but it does disarm one argument for conditionalism. 
None of this response so far demonstrates that the words in the 
New Testament for destruction, found in the context of perdition, 
necessarily refer to something eternally ongoing. The only point so 
                                                
11 Robert A. Peterson in Fudge and Peterson 2000, 120. 
12 Augustine, City of God, Marcus Dods, trans. in Philip Schaff (ed.), The Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II. (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Company, 1887), XXI:23. 
13 Carson 1996, 523. 
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far is that they do not militate against such a view, and therefore the 
issue itself must be decided on other grounds.14  
Historical Precedents of ECT 
Although there have been advocates of conditionalism and universalism 
throughout church history, ECT has clearly been the most common 
perspective. Although he does not apply a historical methodology, Peterson 
presents eleven key figures from the history of theology who believed in ECT: 
Tertullian, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, 
Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, Francis Pieper, Louis Berkhof, Lewis Sperry 
Chafer and Millard Erickson.15 
As Peterson writes in his defense of ECT,   
I don’t believe in eternal punishment merely because these eleven 
figures do. Rather, I believe in it because I am convinced that 
Scripture teaches it. Nevertheless, it is to our advantage to consider 
the witness of church history; we can learn from devout and wise 
persons who have preceded us.16 
It is significant, then, that in spite of their great diversity in place, 
time and tradition, these theologians agree on the subject of hell’s 
duration. Their writings constitute the majority report of the 
church historic.17 
While it is clear that ECT has historically been the dominant position among 
Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians, appeals to church history are 
ultimately unconvincing. Traditionalist Walvoord writes,  
It is possible to provide almost endless quotations from the early 
Fathers up to modern theologians who believe in eternal 
punishment and who do not. Though a study of these opinions is 
informative, it really proves nothing except that there has been a 
diversity of opinion from the beginning.18  
Desert and Justice 
According to the problem of hell, the four theses that constitute ECT form an 
inconsistent set given certain plausible assumptions about the nature of God 
                                                
14 Carson 1996, 522. 
15 My purpose in the present work is not to critique ECT, conditionalism or 
universalism except as these non-issuant views are critiqued by issuantists. No issuantist 
questions that ECT has been a dominant understanding of hell in the history of the Western 
church. As such, Peterson’s list is uncontested by issuantists.  
16 Fudge and Peterson 2000, 118. 
17 Fudge and Peterson 2000, 127. 
18 Walvoord 1992a, 14. 
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and what type of actions are open to such a God. An omnipotent God could 
create a world in which all moral agents freely choose life with God, an 
omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the foreknowledge that 
some (perhaps a significant proportion) of the creatures would end up in hell. 
If some people are ultimately consigned to hell, then God must be somehow 
limited in power, limited in goodness, or both. Some solutions to the problem 
of hell entail a modification to our understanding of God. Others propose a 
modification to our understanding of hell.  
Not willing to amend either their conception of God or their 
understanding of hell as ECT, traditionalists must try to reconcile God’s 
goodness, justice, omnipotence and omniscience with the divine decision to 
consign some people to an endless hell. According to ECT, all people deserve 
hell, and some people will ultimately be consigned there because God’s justice 
demands it. The two related questions for the traditionalist are thus desert 
and justice. 
People are morally responsible for their actions. To deny their 
responsibility is to take away part of their dignity as a person – it is to treat 
the person as morally or mentally inferior. To take away people’s 
responsibility for their actions is to treat them as puppets or animals – 
something less than human. They can’t control themselves because they are 
simply following their impulses or because of other factors outside their 
control.  
Carson points out how issues of desert and justice are integrally connected 
to other key components of Christian theology. “But such an attitude 
overlooks how central retributive punishment is in the Bible. At stake is the 
issue of justice. If we do not get this matter straight, it will radically affect how 
we view the cross, and thus the gospel.”19 
Traditionalists maintain that if people are not held morally responsible for 
their actions, there would be no need for Christ’s substitutionary death on the 
cross since just law is a prerequisite of mercy. To abolish justice and 
substitute it with mercy is to force a kindness upon people at their great 
expense (the expense of their human dignity). 
Of course this raises questions about the sense of proportion. How could 
the finite sins that one may commit during a fleeting human lifetime of at 
most 100 years warrant unending conscious torment in hell? Traditionalists 
present four major defenses of the proportionality of finite sins and 
everlasting punishment: the argument from duration, the Continuing Sin 
                                                
19 Carson 1996, 533. 
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Defense, the argument from the proportionality of heaven, and the status 
principle.  
An Argument from Duration 
First, some traditionalists point to Augustine, who answered this objection by 
drawing a parallel with the judicial system.20 Laws do not regulate the 
duration of the punishment based on the duration of the crime committed.  
Nor is there any one who would suppose that the pains of 
punishment should occupy as short a time as the offense; or that 
murder, adultery, sacrilege, or any other crime, should be 
measured, not by the enormity of the injury or wickedness, but by 
the length of time spent in its perpetration.21 
Augustine goes on to justify the proportionality of everlasting punishment to 
temporal sin by focusing not on the particular sins committed by individuals, 
but on the complicity of all humanity in the sin of Adam.22  
Justice does not demand that the duration of a punishment not exceed the 
duration of the crime. It does however demand that the punishment be 
proportionate to the crime committed.23 As such, Augustine’s parallel with 
the judicial system fails to save ECT from the charges of injustice based on the 
disproportionality between finite sins and infinite punishment. 
The Continuing Sin Defense 
A second, perhaps more compelling, attempt at reconciling an unending 
punishment in hell with temporally limited sins is the Continuing Sin 
Defense, the idea that the ungodly deserve infinite punishment in hell 
because they continue to commit an infinite number of sins even while they 
are in hell.24 
Carson quotes Revelation 22:10-11 – “Let the evildoer still do evil, and the 
filthy still be filthy, and the righteous still do right, and the holy still be holy.” 
                                                
20 Oliver Crisp, “Divine Retribution: a defense” Sophia 42/2 (2003): 35-52. 
21 Augustine, City of God, XXI:11.  
22 Augustine, City of God, XXI:12. 
23 Seymour 1998, 71. 
24 The Continuing Sin Defense was probably first developed by Thomas Aquinas. John 
Lamont, “The Justice and Goodness of Hell” Faith and Philosophy 28/2 (2011): 155. It was also 
promoted by Leibnitz, who wrote: “Since the damned remained wicked they could not be 
withdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not, in order to justify the continuation of 
their sufferings, assume that sin has become of infinite weight through the infinite nature of 
the object offended, who is God.” G.W. Leibnitz, Theodicy: Essay on the Goodness of God, the 
Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. E.M. Huggard, trans. (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1952), 290. 
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He reasons that ECT is justified not by any sins people commit during their 
lifetime here on earth, but because they never stop sinning.  
What seems hard to prove, but seems to me probable, is that one 
reason why the conscious punishment of hell is ongoing is because 
sin is ongoing. … If the holy and those who do right continue to be 
holy and to do right, in anticipation of the perfect holiness and 
rightness to be lived and practiced throughout all eternity, should we 
not also conclude that the vile continue their vileness in 
anticipation of the vileness they will live and practice throughout all 
eternity?25  
Philosopher William Lane Craig concurs: 
We could agree that every individual sin that a person commits 
deserves only a finite punishment. But it doesn't follow from this 
that all of a person’s sins taken together as a whole deserve only a 
finite punishment. If a person commits an infinite number of sins, 
then the sum total of all such sins deserves infinite punishment. 
Now, of course, nobody commits an infinite number of sins in the 
earthly life. But what about in the afterlife? Insofar as the 
inhabitants of hell continue to hate God and reject Him, they 
continue to sin and so accrue to themselves more guilt and more 
punishment. In a real sense, then, hell is self-perpetuating. In such a 
case, every sin has a finite punishment, but because sinning goes on 
forever, so does the punishment.26 
Taken by itself, Carson and Craig’s suggestion that unending punishment is 
warranted for unending rebellion against God fails to rescue ECT from the 
charge of injustice. For this type of finite but ending punishment to be just, 
the person in hell would have to be free to repent, cease rebelling against God 
and be released from hell. It is on these grounds that Kenneth Einar Himma 
rejects the Continuing Sin Defense of scholars like Carson and Craig. “If it is 
either logically or metaphysically impossible to escape hell, then it can’t be a 
person’s contingent behaviour that accounts for her not leaving hell.”27  
The possibility of postmortem repentance and release from hell is not one 
that Carson admits, even though both Carson and Craig could claim that the 
person in hell is still morally responsible despite internal and external factors 
that limit which choices are practically open for him. Carson and Craig could 
claim that the fixed character of the ungodly in hell would make it at least 
                                                
25 Carson 1996, 533. 
26 William Lane Craig, On Guard (Colorado Springs: David C. Cook, 2010), 273.  
27 Kenneth Einar Himma, “Eternally incorrigible: the continuing-sin response to the 
proportionality of hell” Religious Studies 39/1 (2003), 63. 
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practically impossible for them to repent. An appeal to the Fixed Character 
Thesis28 still fails to explain why a person in hell could not repent. A fixed 
character does not mean that people are unable to act in ways that run 
contrary to their character. A virtuous person may sometimes act in a mean 
or selfish manner. Likewise, an evil person may sometimes be moved to acts 
of kindness. However, in the absence of God’s common grace in hell, it is 
difficult to see what would motivate a hell-hardened sinner to want to repent.  
An Argument from the Disproportionality of Heavenly Reward 
As a third response to the problem of proportionality between finite sins and 
everlasting punishment, some traditionalists point to Thomas Aquinas, who 
argued that since the reward of heaven is out of proportion to the finite 
goodness of a virtuous life, the question of proportions should not be a 
problem for the doctrine of hell. If it is acceptable to reward finite goodness 
with infinite heaven, then it cannot be morally objectionable to punish finite 
evil with infinite hell.  
As reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now, according to 
Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: Every one 
who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath life everlasting. 
Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is 
due to temporal guilt.29 
Seymour rejects this line of reasoning on the grounds of justice. When it 
comes to reward, justice does not prohibit giving a reward that is 
disproportionate with the act being rewarded. One may give a greater reward 
than is merited. With punishment, however, justice allows that the 
punishment must be according to what was deserved or less, not more.30 Both 
the generous reward for a good deed and a mitigated punishment for evil are 
expressions of a mercy that is compatible with justice.  
The Status Principle  
A fourth defense for the disproportionality between finite sin and infinite 
punishment comes from Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. By sinning “one 
offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite 
in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must 
                                                
28 See chapter five below. 
29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supplement Q 99, article 1. 
30 Seymour 2000, 45-47. 
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needs be infinite at least in duration.”31 This idea, known as the status 
principle, has found wide reception among traditionalists.32   
Anselm’s version of the status principle states that the severity of the 
punishment is determined not only by the offense committed, but also 
(primarily) by the status of the offended person.33 Since God as the being a 
greater than whom cannot be conceived is worthy of infinite honor, all sin 
against God is of infinite severity and deserves infinite retribution. 
Thomas Aquinas reiterated this idea. 
The magnitude of the punishment matches the magnitude of the 
sin … Now that a sin against God is infinite; the higher the person 
against whom the sin is committed, the graver the sin – it is more 
criminal to strike a head of state than a private citizen – and God is 
of infinite greatness. Therefore an infinite punishment is deserved 
for a sin committed against him.34 
Although the status principle seems to go against the moral sensitivities of 
people living in egalitarian democracies, Kvanvig presents an analogy that 
makes the status principle more accessible to modern Westerners. 
A facile dismissal of this defense would attempt to tie the 
plausibility of such an appeal to status to the moral experience 
within nonegalitarian societies. The claim would be that such an 
appeal could only be plausible to those involved in such societies, 
where, e.g., the moral experience of killing a prince would be quite 
different from that of killing a serf. I think, however, that this 
dismissal is too quick. For the concept of status need not be 
interpreted in such a sociological fashion. Consider, for example, 
the appeal to status central to humanism. Even in an age 
emphasizing the moral dimension of the rights of animals, it is too 
facile to dismiss the humanistic elements of our moral experience as 
entirely unfounded. Even if it is prima facie wrong to kill any 
animal, it is implausible to think that the forced choice between the 
death of a human and the death of, say, a lizard is an unresolvable 
moral dilemma. Furthermore, notice that the moral choice here is 
difficult to explain in terms only of harm caused or harm intended, 
unless one builds into the idea of harm caused the idea that human 
                                                
31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supplement Q 99, article 1.  
32 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. III (New York: Scribner’s, 1873; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1940), 870-880; John Piper, Let the Nations be Glad! (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1993), 127; Carson 1996, 534. 
33 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, Book 1, Ch. XXI. Sidney Norton Deane, trans. (Chicago: 
Open Court Publishing Co., 1926). 
34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q 87, Article 4, Ia2ae.27. 
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life has an intrinsic value beyond that of a lizard.  Such a viewpoint, 
I suggest, is nothing more than a recognition of the intuitive 
plausibility of some type of status principle.35 
That is to say that the status of the type of being against whom one may sin is 
more important than the status of the individual being. Thus, taking the life 
of a vegetable would be judged by a different moral standard than the taking 
the life of an animal, which in turn would be judged differently than taking a 
human life.36 Sins against God are deemed the most serious of all. 
Just as the status principle explains how temporal sins can deserve 
everlasting punishment, it also explains how the collective sins of humanity 
could be atoned by the temporary sufferings of Jesus Christ. Robert A. 
Peterson writes: 
Instead, he suffered the equivalent of eternal punishment; his 
temporal anguish was equal to the eternal condemnation due sinful 
human beings. … In other words, because of the infinite dignity of 
Christ’s person, his sufferings, though finite in duration, were of 
infinite weight on the scales of divine justice. ... As God incarnate, 
Jesus was capable of suffering in six hours on the cross what we can 
suffer only over an infinite period of time.37   
The status principle is not without its problems. First, the status of the 
offended party is not the only factor that is taken into consideration when 
determining culpability. A person’s intention, negligence, knowledge and the 
degree of damage done are also determining factors. For instance, a mother 
who accidentally poisons and kills her family by serving them mushrooms 
she innocently picked in the forest is not deemed as morally reprehensible as 
the mycologist who intentionally poisons his wife with a toxic mushroom.  
Second, the status principle goes against our normal moral intuitions or 
assumptions that some sins are more egregious than others. We believe for 
instance that murder is worse than gluttony. There cannot be degrees of sin if 
all sins deserve the same infinite punishment since they are all sins against the 
same infinite God. Our moral intuitions tell us it is unjust to execute 
                                                
35 Jonathan Kvanvig, “Jonathan Edwards on Hell” in Paul Helm and Oliver Crisp (eds), 
Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 2-3. 
36 Even within these categories there may be a breadth of opinion. Many people would 
place the killing of a mosquito or rat in a different category than the killing of a beloved family 
pet. Historically some people have justified treating certain classes of people (Jews, women, 
slaves, homosexuals) differently than the white male majority. Even in our times philosophers 
like Peter Singer have justified the unequal treatment of “normal” human beings vis-à-vis non-
self-conscious humans such as the unborn, newborn or those in a persistent vegetative state.  
37 Fudge and Peterson 2000, 175. 
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shoplifters or to sentence speeders to a lifetime in prison. Yet this is exactly 
what the status principle proposes: that even “little white lies” make a person 
deserving of endless suffering in hell. In De Conceptu Virginali Anselm 
recognizes this truth even though it apparently contradicts the status 
principle he sets forth in Cur Deus Homo. “Although no one thinks that equal 
punishment follows unequal sins, … not all individuals deserve to be 
tormented in hell in equal degree.”38   
The Immortality of the Human Soul 
Traditionalists accept the immortality of the human soul, although this is a 
tenet that traditionalists tend to presuppose unless specifically challenged by 
conditionalists. That is, defenses of ECT rarely include a defense of human 
immortality. Once the human soul comes into existence, it will continue to 
exist sempiternally: experiencing after death either the blessings of eternal life 
with God, or the torment of unending punishment in hell from which there is 
no possibility of release or escape.  
Peterson presents a number of biblical passages in support of human 
immortality: Luke 16:19-31; Luke 23:44-46; 2 Corinthians 5:8; Philippians 
1:23; Hebrews 12:23; and Revelation 6:9.39 However, with the exception of 
Luke 16 (Lazarus and the rich man), each of the passages describes the 
continued existence of the souls of the godly.  
Peterson points out the irony of conditionalist accusations that the 
inherent immortality of the human soul is a Platonic concept that was foreign 
to the worldviews of second temple Judaism and early Christianity.   
This is significant in light of Tertullian’s suspicion of philosophy 
epitomized in his oft-quoted saying “What does Jerusalem have to 
do with Athens?” It would be unwise for annihilationists to claim 
that Tertullian believes in eternal punishment under the influence 
of Greek philosophy.40 
Against the charge that the everlasting existence of the souls of the ungodly is 
incompatible with God’s ultimate victory over evil, traditionalists state that if 
it is legitimate for God to allow evil now, then it is not problematic for God to 
allow evil to continue to exist in eternity. If the existence of evil is compatible 
with divine love and justice now, then it will continue to be so.  
                                                
38 Anselm, De Conceptu Virginali, chapter XXIII, in Jasper Hopkins and Herbert 
Richardson, trans., The Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of 
Canterbury (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000), 457. 
39 Fudge and Peterson 2000, 174. 
40 Robert A. Peterson in Fudge and Peterson 2000, 119. 
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As benevolence in God seems in the beginning to have permitted 
moral evil, not because sin was desirable in itself, but only because 
it was incident to a system which provided for the highest possible 
freedom and holiness in the creature; so benevolence in God may to 
the end permit the existence of sin and continue to punish the 
sinner, undesirable as these things are in themselves, because they 
are incidents of a system which provides for the highest possible 
freedom and holiness in the creature through eternity.41 
These are the most important considerations for ECT. In light of divine 
justice, human desert and exegesis of the biblical material, traditionalists 
conclude that the ungodly will face unending punishment in a conscious state 
of mind, forever separated from God in hell. 
Conditionalism 
Conditionalism is the name for a variety of ideas that have in common the 
notion that the human soul only has conditional immortality. That is, the 
human soul has a beginning and will have an end unless it receives eternal life 
through the gift of faith in God. The ungodly who have not received the gift 
of eternal life will eventually cease to exist, generally after a period of 
conscious suffering commensurate with the severity of the sins committed in 
one’s lifetime.   
In this section, I shall outline the main reasons given by conditionalists for 
conditionalist eventual extinctionism.  
Exegetical Considerations for Conditionalism 
Conditionalists share the traditionalists’ concern for faithfulness to the 
biblical texts. In general, conditionalists also accept a grammatical-historical 
hermeneutic. Conditionalist Edward William Fudge quotes J. Julius Scott 
approvingly: 
To avoid mishandling Scripture, “the interpreter must deal 
thoroughly and honestly with the text. He must faithfully follow the 
principles for grammatical-historical exegesis in order to carefully 
and painstakingly ascertain the meaning of the passage in it original 
setting.”42 
Indeed, conditionalist scholars such as Fudge, John Wenham, John Stott, 
Clark Pinnock, and Philip Hughes are known for their high view of the Bible 
                                                
41 Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Philadelphia: Judson, 1907 reprinted 
1958), 1053. 
42 J. Julius Scott, “Some Problems in Hermeneutics for Contemporary Evangelicals” 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 22/1 (1979): 74-75. 
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as Scripture and for their application of a grammatical-historical 
hermeneutic. 
Scriptural support for conditionalism generally falls into two categories: 
biblical passages that seem to support the conditional immortality of the 
human soul and passages that speak of the ultimate destruction of the 
ungodly. 
Some of the verses that conditionalist authors often highlight in support of 
the conditional immortality of the human soul include: 
1 Timothy 6:16 – “… the King of kings and Lord of lords, who 
alone has immortality….” The point here is that only God is 
inherently immortal. 
Romans 2:7 – “to those who by patience in well-doing seek for 
glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life.” In this 
verse, immortality is not a given, but something that is sought 
through faith and perseverance. 
2 Timothy 1:10 – “… our Savior Christ Jesus, who abolished death 
and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel....” The 
gospel of Jesus Christ is the key to attaining immortality / eternal 
life. 
1 Corinthians 15:54 – “When the perishable puts on the 
imperishable, and the mortal puts on immortality, then shall come 
to pass the saying that is written: ‘Death is swallowed up in 
victory.’” Humanity’s default position is mortality; immortality is 
given to (at least) some through Christ’s ultimate victory over 
death.  
Conditionalists also devote much attention to a large number of biblical texts 
that speak of the final destruction of the ungodly: 
Matthew 10:28 – “And do not fear those who kill the body but 
cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and 
body in hell.” Conditionalists maintain that this verse shows very 
clearly that hell is a place where both body and soul are destroyed. 
Romans 9:22 – “What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to 
make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of 
wrath prepared for destruction….” The ungodly who are under the 
wrath of God are destined for destruction. 
2 Thessalonians 1:8-9 – “… inflicting vengeance on those who do 
not know God and on those who do not obey the gospel of our 
Lord Jesus. They will suffer the punishment of eternal destruction, 
away from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his 
might.…”  
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2 Peter 3:7, 9, 16 – “But by the same word the heavens and earth 
that now exist are stored up for fire, being kept until the day of 
judgment and destruction of the ungodly. … The Lord is not slow 
to fulfill his promise vas some count slowness, but is patient toward 
you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach 
repentance. … which the ignorant and unstable twist to their own 
destruction….”  
These, along with a number of Old Testament texts that speak of the final 
destruction of the ungodly,43 are given in support of the idea that the ungodly 
will eventually cease to exist.  
Furthermore, conditionalists emphasize the destructive nature of fire as a 
biblical metaphor for the fate of the ungodly. Fudge writes, “When the 
unquenchable fire finally destroys the lost, they will be gone forever.”44 
Likewise, Wenham writes that conditionalists “claim that the unquenchable 
fire and undying worm mean only fire which is unquenchable and worms 
which are undying until their work of destruction is complete.”45 
The Conditionalist Interpretation of !"#$%&' and its Derivatives 
Closely related to the biblical texts presented in support of conditionalism is 
the question of how one should interpret αἰώνιος. Whereas traditionalist 
readings of the relevant biblical passages tend to assume only the quantitative 
dimension – a person’s consignment to hell will last indefinitely – 
conditionalists maintain that αἰώνιος has both a quantitative and a qualitative 
dimension. Bible translations where αἰώνιος is rendered “everlasting”46 only 
do justice to the word’s quantitative dimension. Qualitatively, αἰώνιος is 
understood in terms of finality or being eternal in its effects. Wenham writes,  
Christ’s reference to ‘eternal life’ and ‘eternal punishment’ is not 
primarily concerned with the everlastingness of the two destinies, 
but with the finality of what happens when the advent of the New 
                                                
43 Fudge recognizes the difficulties in drawing conclusions about the fate of the 
ungodly from the Old Testament use of sheol, but remains convinced that a sufficient number 
of positive statements are made in the Old Testament to conclude that the ungodly will 
ultimately cease to exist. Fudge 1982, 2001, 85. The verses he highlights include Psalm 1:6, 
Psalm 37:1-40, and Psalm 68:2. 
44 Fudge and Peterson 2000), 44. 
45 Wenham 1974, 36. 
46 NIV: John 6:47; 2 Thessalonians 1:9. KJV/NKJV: Matthew 18:8; 19:29; 25:41; 
Hebrews 13:20; passim. Fudge comments on the KJV translation of Matthew 25:46 (“And these 
shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal.”): “The King 
James translators betrayed theological bias and not linguistic expertise with their ‘everlasting’ 
punishment but ‘eternal’ life, a ‘purely wanton and arbitrary variation.’” Fudge 1982, 2001, 195.  
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Age is consummated. These two views are not mutually exclusive 
and both could be held together.47 
Fudge admits that the word’s etymology supports a prima facie quantitative 
understanding.  
We should probably conclude that both “eternal” and aiōnios have 
roots signifying time in both English (and its Latin ancestor) and in 
Greek. But some are ready then to remind us that in biblical 
interpretation the important thing is not secular etymology so 
much as sacred usage.48  
Fudge then goes on to summarize Pétavel’s conclusions that αἰώνιος and its 
Hebrew equivalent are sometimes used for things that come to an end, such 
as the sprinkling of blood at Passover (Exodus 12:24), the Aaronic priesthood 
(Exodus 29:9), Solomon’s temple (1 Kings 8:12f) and Gehazi’s leprosy (2 
Kings 5:27).   
Based on second temple Jewish conceptions of the two ages: the Present 
Age and the Age to Come (Matthew 12:32; Luke 20:34f), Fudge maintains 
that αἰώνιος can be correctly used to describe the quality of pertaining to the 
Age to Come. 
The Age to Come is of another order which may be called ‘eternal’ 
(aiōnios). … That the Age to Come is eternal in quality is seen in 
the fact that the life of the Age to Come (eternal life) is possible 
even in the Present Age through faith in Jesus.49 
When αἰώνιος is used to qualify acts or processes, Fudge claims that the 
emphasis lies on the results or finality of the action. Regarding Hebrews 6:2, 
he writes: 
There will be an act or process of judging, and then it will be over. 
But the judging results in a judgment – and that will never end. The 
action itself is one thing; its outcome, its issue, its result, is 
something else. “Eternal” here speaks of the result of the action, not 
the action itself. Once the judging is over, the judgment will remain 
– the eternal, everlasting issue of the once-for-all process of 
judgment.50 
The qualitative nature of αἰώνιος is illustrated clearly in Jude 7, where Sodom 
and Gomorrah were said to be destroyed by “eternal fire.” In this verse, the 
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49 Fudge 1982, 2001, 41. 
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primary meaning must be qualitative rather than quantitative since the fires 
that destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah are not still burning.    
The Conditionalist Interpretation of ()*++,-% and its Derivatives 
Another key Greek term for conditionalists is the word ἀpiόλλυμι and its 
derivatives. Fudge is careful to defend the “normal” understanding of such 
words. 
There is no reason, therefore, not to take Paul’s primary words in 
their most ordinary and common senses. He says the wicked will 
“perish,” “die,” be “corrupted” or be “destroyed.” Those terms have 
very definite connotations to the most simple person. We need not 
suddenly become technical physicists worrying about material 
“annihilation.”51 
Acknowledging the use of ἀpiόλλυμι in the sense of “waste” or “uselessness”, 
Fudge comments that an emphasis on these exceptions can lead to 
misunderstanding. One must focus on how the word is generally used in the 
New Testament.  
In fact, it appears 92 times in the New Testament, 13 times in Paul’s 
letter. Most often it refers to actual death [Matt. 2:13; 8:25; 12:14; 
16:25; 21:41; 22:7; 26:52; 27:20; John 10:10; 11:50; Acts 5:37; 1 Cor. 
10:9, 10; Jude 5, 11]. Sometimes it is contrasted with enduring, 
eternal life [John 6:27; 10:28; 12:25; Heb. 1:11; 1 Pet. 1:7]. It is the 
regular term for the “lost” or for those who are “perishing.” [Matt. 
10:6; 15:24; 18:11; 1 Cor. 1:18, 19; 2 Cor. 2:15; 4:3; 2 Thess. 2:10 
etc.]. Several times it describes the final state of the wicked in the 
Age to Come [Matt. 5:29, 30; 10:28; John 3:16; 17:12; 2 Pet. 3:9].52  
John Stott also comments on the finality of destruction. “It would seem 
strange … if people who are said to suffer destruction are in fact not 
destroyed; and … it is difficult to imagine a perpetually inconclusive process 
of perishing.”53 
That ἀpiόλλυμι must entail a total cessation of existence is further 
illustrated in the doctrine of divine conservation. Fudge summarizes: 
[I]f man depends wholly on God for his existence day by day, and if 
the wicked are banished absolutely from God’s presence and are 
deprived of any divine blessing, the question must arise how they 
can continue to exist for any period of time. But there is more. Not 
                                                
51 Fudge 1982, 2001, 257. 
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only does Scripture say throughout that life in any dimension is a 
gift of God; it is also a matter of record that “immortality” and 
“incorruption” are promised as exclusively to the righteous as are 
“glory” and “honor” (Rom. 2:7, 10; 1 Cor. 15:42-44, 50, 54).54  
Thus a person’s rejection of God’s offer of eternal life is also a rejection of all 
the blessings that God bestows on creation, including love, pleasure, beauty, 
friendship and even existence itself. 
Historical Precedents of Conditionalism 
Conditionalists claim that the consensus of the early church was that the 
human soul is mortal. When later church fathers tried to “wed” Plato’s ideas 
of the immortality of the soul with the teaching of the Bible, two “bastard 
offspring” were born: universalism (à la Clement of Alexandria and Origen) 
and unending conscious torment (Augustine and Tertullian).55  
Once Augustine’s perspective became the canon for correct doctrine in the 
Western church, ECT became the dominant position. Conditionalist 
perspectives were still to be found throughout church history, but those who 
held them were commonly marginalized or anathematized, often for other 
reasons.56  
Fudge acknowledges that ECT has held a place of primacy in Western 
theology, but rejects the idea that theology is to be formulated based on 
church tradition. If this were so, he pontificates, then “Protestants ought all to 
line up and apologize to the pope of Rome.”57 
Ultimately, appeals to the history of theology are inconclusive. The 
correctness or incorrectness of an idea must be decided on other grounds.  
The Nature of God and the Status Principle According to 
Conditionalism  
If one accepts a classic understanding of God as perfectly good, holy, 
powerful and just, then one immediately encounters problems with the idea 
of unending conscious torment of the ungodly in hell. How can such endless 
punishment be fair? Is it reasonable to believe that a loving God would 
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torture some humans for millions of years for the sins committed during a 
lifetime of at most 100 years?  
Traditionalists since the days of Anselm have sought to defend God’s 
justice by means of the status principle – the punishment due to sin is based 
not on anything inherent in the sin, but on God’s elevated status as the being 
a greater than which cannot be conceived. Thus, even actions that would be 
considered minor infractions against a human deserve an infinite 
punishment when directed towards the infinite God.  
If this were the case, then the punishment for all sins should be the same, 
since all sin is ultimately against the same God. Yet the Bible seems to 
indicate that there are various degrees of both virtue and reward and of sin 
and punishment.     
Matthew 5:19 – “Therefore whoever relaxes one of the least 
of these commandments and teaches others to do the same 
will be called least in the kingdom of heaven …” 
Matthew 22:36 – “‘Teacher, which is the great 
commandment in the Law?’ And he said to him, ‘You shall 
love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your 
soul and with all your mind.’”  
Matthew 23:23 – “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, 
hypocrites! For you tithe mint and dill and cumin, and have 
neglected the weightier matters of the law: justice and mercy 
and faithfulness.” 
John 15:13 – “Greater love has no one than this, that 
someone lay down his life for his friends.” 
John 19:11 – Jesus speaks to Pontius Pilate: “Therefore he 
who delivered me over to you has the greater sin.” 
1 Corinthians 13:13 – “So now faith, hope, and love abide, 
these three; but the greatest of these is love.” 
In Death and Eternal Life, John Hick states that “the very notion of a 
greater condemnation suggests a range of punishments and not a 
simple dichotomy between infinite penalty and infinite reward.”58 
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Fudge also maintains that the status principle is problematic in that 
there is an implicit presumption of inherent immortality.59        
The Mortality of the Human Soul 
As noted earlier, conditionalists maintain that the human soul is mortal, and 
that unless one receives immortality through faith in God, one’s soul will 
eventually cease to exist. Conditionalists also aver that the immortality of the 
human soul is a concept that has crept into Christian theology from Greek 
philosophy.  
Jewish people of the second temple period had no unified concept of the 
afterlife. Some groups like the Sadducees refused to speculate on the afterlife 
on the grounds that the Pentateuch gives very few clues about an eventual life 
after death and because one’s duty as a believer was to worship Yahweh alone 
and not to give veneration to departed ancestors. Other Jewish schools had 
developed a this-world apocalyptic hope for the nation of Israel after coming 
into contact with Zoroastrianism during the Babylonian captivity.60 
Hellenized members of the Jewish community were the first to develop 
concepts of individual immortality. “Wherever diaspora Jews met Greek 
intellectuals, the idea of an immortal soul surfaced.”61 While the Book of 
Wisdom (first century BCE) took immortality for granted, Philo of Alexandria 
did much to develop and explain the Greek idea.   
By creating a unique synthesis of Platonic philosophy and biblical 
tradition, Philo paved the way for later Christian thinkers. For him, 
death restores the soul to its original, pre-birth state. Since the soul 
belongs to the spiritual world, life in the body becomes nothing but 
a brief, often unfortunate, episode. While many human souls lose 
their way in the labyrinth of the material world, the true 
philosopher’s soul survives bodily death and assumes “a higher 
existence immortal and incorporeal.”62 
The main difference between the Platonic concept of the soul and later 
Christian adaptations was that Plato believed the soul to be inherently 
immortal. The view later espoused by Augustine and the mainstream of the 
Western church was that the soul had a beginning, but that once it came into 
existence, it would have no end.   
                                                
59 Fudge 1982, 2001, 426. 
60 Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, Heaven: A History (New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press, 1988), 11-14. 
61 McDannell and Lang 1988, 15. 
62 McDannell and Lang 1988, 17. 
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Both Plato and Paul use the terms “death” (thanatos), “destruction” 
(apōleia), “corruption” (phthora), “perish” (olethros) and “die” 
(apothnēskō) – but with this difference: Plato says none of these 
things will ever befall the soul, for it possesses immortality; Paul 
says these are the very words which best tell the destiny of those 
who resist God and refuse to believe in Jesus.63  
Other Christian thinkers like Justin Martyr and Tatian actively opposed the 
Platonic doctrine of immortality on the grounds that it was incongruent with 
other key doctrines.64 
Conditionalists would do well, however, not to commit a genetic fallacy in 
automatically rejecting the idea of the inherent immortality of the soul 
because of its putative Greek origins.  
Clark Pinnock summarizes the effects the presumption of immortality has 
had on the Christian understanding of hell. 
People mixed up their belief in divine judgment after death (which 
is scriptural) with their belief in the immortality of the soul (which 
is unscriptural) and concluded (incorrectly) that the nature of hell 
must be everlasting conscious torment. The logic would be 
impeccable if only the second premise were not false.65 
Philip E. Hughes concludes that a Scriptural view of human nature is one in 
which body and soul are part of an integrated whole, not one in which an 
eternal soul is held captive in a physical body. That humans are corporeal-
spiritual entities is a necessary prerequisite for a proper understanding of 
christology: the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus.66 
                                                
63 Fudge 1982, 2001, 268. 
64 “For those things which exist after God, or shall at any time exist, these have the 
nature of decay, and are such as may be blotted out and cease to exist; for God alone is 
unbegotten and incorruptible, and therefore He is God, but all other things after Him are 
created and corruptible. For this reason souls both die and are punished…” Justin Martyr, 
Dialogue with Trypho, 5 in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds), The Ante-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. I. (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Publishing Company, 1885), 197. 
Although Tatian rejected the immortality of the human ψυχή, one must not conclude 
that he was a conditionalist. Individual humans shared in the immortal piνευμα of God. “The 
soul is not in itself immortal, O Greeks, but mortal. Yet it is possible for it not to die. If, indeed, 
it knows not the truth, it dies, and is dissolved with the body, but rises again at last at the end of 
the world with the body, receiving death by punishment in immortality. But, again, if it 
acquires the knowledge of God, it dies not, although for a time it be dissolved.” Tatian, Oration 
to the Greeks, 13. J.E. Ryland, trans. in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds), The 
Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Publishing Company, 1885), 70.  
65 Pinnock 1992a, 148f. 
66 Hughes 1989, 400. 
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God’s Final Victory over Evil  
A further theological reason for the conditionalist understanding of hell is 
related to God’s final victory over evil. The unending existence of people who 
continue to rebel against God forever in hell is interpreted by conditionalists 
as a black spot where the lordship of Christ is not complete.  
Pinnock writes:  
In what is supposed to be the victory of Christ, evil and rebellion 
continue in hell under conditions of burning and torturing. In what 
is supposed to be resolution, heaven and hell go on existing 
alongside each other forever in everlasting cosmological dualism.67  
Pinnock maintains that this cosmological dualism is inconsistent with verses 
like 1 Corinthians 15:28 and Revelation 21:5 that speak of a future state in 
which God will be “all in all” and in which God is “making all things new.” 
The eternal existence of evil is inconsistent with the eternal goodness of God. 
The presence of evil in the current world is not as problematic as its 
existence in the world to come. God allows evil now for the sake of grace – 
that people will take the opportunity to repent. God’s current allowance of 
evil is also weighed up by the promise that God will provide a final victory 
over evil and a final justice.   
Henri Blocher reflects on this difficulty:  
Would it be normal for God to allow for sin to go on for ever since 
he allows it now? That logic appears to bypass entirely the Biblical 
theme of divine patience. Is not the point that God tolerates at 
present what he will no longer when his patience comes to an end!68   
It is the conviction of conditionalists that God’s ultimate victory over evil 
must mean the final destruction of all who persist in their rebellion against 
God. 
Based on these theological concerns and the biblical texts that speak of the 
final destruction of the ungodly and of the conditional immortality of the 
human soul, conditionalists conclude that only a view of hell where the 
ungodly ultimately cease to exist is theologically viable and faithful to 
Scripture. 
Universalism 
Universalism is the view that all of humanity will eventually be restored and 
will finally enjoy eternal life with God. Universalists sometimes claim that 
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church fathers like Clement of Alexandria69 and his disciple Origen promoted 
the concept of apokatastasis or ultimate reconciliation of all creation with its 
creator. In spite of being anathematized both by the emperor Justinian in 543 
and ten years later at the fifth ecumenical council,70 universalism and 
apokatastasis have been recurring themes throughout the history of Christian 
thought. 
There are a number of varieties of universalism based on varying contexts, 
hermeneutical approaches and presuppositions. In the current work, I shall 
limit my attention to the contributions of Christian universalists who hope 
for the ultimate reconciliation of all creation with God based on the 
redemptive work of Jesus Christ on the cross. Among these particularist and 
inclusivist Christian universalists, Thomas Talbott’s influential book The 
Inescapable Love of God has become a modern classic defense of universalism 
among conservative evangelicals.71  
                                                
69 It is not altogether clear that Clement believed in apokatastasis. Clement writes: “For 
all things are arranged with a view to the salvation of the universe by the Lord of the universe, 
both generally and particularly. … But necessary corrections, through the goodness of the great 
overseeing Judge, both by the attendant angels, and by various acts of anticipative judgment, 
and by the perfect judgment, compel egregious sinners to repent.” Clement of Alexandria, 
Stromata book 7, chapter 2 in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds), The Ante-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. II (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Publishing Company, 1885), 526. Daley 
notes, “Although he alludes in one place, at least, to ‘the punishment of eternal fire’ (Quis Dives 
33), Clement generally views punishment after death as a medicinal and therefore temporary 
measure.” Brian E. Daley, SJ, The Hope of the Early Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 46-47. Many Christian universalists have nonetheless claimed him as one of their 
own, including Hosea Ballou (1829), Thomas Whittemore (1830), John Wesley Hanson (1899) 
and George T. Knight (1911). See also MacDonald 2008, 173 and Bradley Jersak, Her Gates 
Will Never Be Shut: Hell, Hope and the New Jerusalem (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009), 121. 
70 “IX. If anyone says or thinks that the punishment of demons and of impious men is 
only temporary, and will one day have an end, and that a restoration (ἀpiοκατάστασις) will take 
place of demons and of impious men, let him be anathema.” The Anathematisms of the 
Emperor Justinian against Origen, (Labbe and Cossart, Concilia, Tom. v., col. 677) in Philip 
Schaff and Henry Wace (eds), A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the 
Christian Church, Second Series. Vol. XIV: The Seven Ecumenical Councils (NY: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1900), 320.  
“I. If anyone asserts the fabulous pre-existence of souls, and shall assert the monstrous 
restoration which follows from it: let him be anathema.” The Anathemas against Origen from 
the Fifth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople 553) in Schaff and Wace 1900, 318. 
71 As we shall see presently, Thomas Talbott clearly affirms the three trademarks of 
basic issuantism. I choose nonetheless to categorize his version of Christian universalism as a 
distinct category from issuantism for three reasons. First, Talbott has engaged for many years 
in an ongoing scholarly discussion with issuantists like Jerry Walls and Jonathan Kvanvig 
where both sides have recognized that there is a fundamental difference between Talbott’s 
perspective and that of Walls and Kvanvig. Second, issuantism has developed as an answer to 
the problem of hell – how belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God can be 
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Exegetical Considerations 
Talbott shares a grammatical-historical hermeneutic with the conditionalists, 
traditionalists and issuantists with whom he dialogues. As such, he devotes 
much space to biblical exegesis. He presents, among others, a number of 
verses from the New Testament that prima facie seem to support 
universalism. 
Romans 5:18 – “Therefore, as one trespass led to condemnation for 
all men, so one act of righteousness leads to justification and life for 
all men.” 
Romans 11:32 – “For God has consigned all to disobedience, that 
he may have mercy on all.” 
1 Corinthians 15:22 – “For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ 
shall all be made alive.” 
Some critics of universalism interpret these verses by showing that the word 
“all” is sometimes limited in scope, or by claiming that “all” refers to all 
classes of people rather than to all individuals.72 Talbott maintains however 
that there is no good reason either from the immediate context of these texts 
                                                                                                               
reconciled with the belief that some people will end up forever in an eternal hell. Rather than 
trying to reconcile these paradoxical beliefs as do issuantists, Talbott and other Christian 
universalists circumvent the problem of hell by rejecting the idea that anyone will end up 
forever in an eternal hell. Finally, Talbott’s affirmation of the three trademarks of basic 
issuantism are only tangential to his main argument for universalism, the idea that since a 
fully-informed, rational choice for an eternal hell is incoherent and thus logically impossible, a 
loving God would do anything possible to dispel the illusions and confused mental states that 
would lead a person ultimately to reject God. 
72 “I suggest that ‘all’ in Rom. 5 really has primarily in view ‘both Jews and Gentiles and 
not just Jews’: that is the point that Paul is concerned to make.” I.H. Marshall, “Does the New 
Testament Teach Universal Salvation” in J. Colwell (ed.), Called to One Hope: Perspectives on 
the Life to Come (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), 20.  
“[T]he universal terms in these texts … are all limited or generalized by their context in 
such a way that it is nowhere possible to maintain that every human being everywhere, past, 
present, and future, is being clearly, specifically, and inescapably spoken of as destined for 
salvation.” J.I. Packer, “Universalism: Will Everyone Ultimately Be Saved?” in Christopher W. 
Morgan and Robert A. Peterson (eds), Hell Under Fire (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 187. 
“Both the context and Paul’s theology as a whole make it clear that in saying ‘in Christ 
all will be made alive,’ he means ‘in Christ all who are in Christ will be made alive.’ The lack of 
such a qualifier in the sentence itself is the result of both the balanced style and the fact that he 
expected it to be read in the context of his argument with them, not as a piece of abstract 
theology.” Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (New International Commentary 
on the New Testament) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 749-750. 
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or from the wider context of Pauline thought to conclude “that Paul did not 
mean what his sentence, taken in isolation, appears to say.”73   
I have been unable to find a single example, drawn from Paul’s 
theological writings, in which Paul makes a universal statement and 
the scope of its reference is unduly fuzzy or less than clear. Paul’s 
writing may be cumbersome at times, but he was not nearly as 
sloppy a writer (or a thinker) as some of his commentators, in their 
zeal to interpret him for us, would make him out to be.74 
Talbott maintains that in each of the verses cited above, Paul provides a 
contrast between two universal statements, where the first statement provides 
the scope for the second.   
Talbott’s Interpretation of !"#$%&' and its Derivatives 
Talbott admits that while the quantitative definition of αἰώνιος is often 
assumed, “on no occasion of its use in the New Testament does ‘aiōnios’ refer 
to a temporal process of unending duration.”75  
I do not mean to imply that the New Testament writers took over 
the Platonic idea of an utterly timeless eternity, but I do mean to 
imply that their use of “αἰώνιος” was roughly Platonic in this sense: 
Whether God is eternal (that is, timeless, outside of time) in the 
Platonic sense or everlasting in the sense that he endures 
throughout all of the ages, nothing other than God is eternal in the 
primary sense. Other things – for example, the gifts, possessions, 
and actions of God – are eternal in the secondary sense that they 
have their causal source in the eternal God himself.76  
It is this “secondary sense” that makes Talbott unwilling to limit the scope of 
αἰώνιος to the quantitative dimension. “[T]his adjective need not carry any 
implication of unending duration.”77 As such, Talbott emphasizes the word’s 
qualitative dimension. He cites verses like Romans 16:25-26 and Jude 7 as 
examples of the limited temporal duration of αἰώνιος. Just as the eternal times 
of Romans 16 and the eternal fire of Jude 7 were limited in duration, the 
eternal punishment of which Jesus speaks in Matthew 25:46 is “eternal” even 
if limited in duration.  
                                                
73 Talbott 1999, 57. 
74 Talbott 1999, 59. 
75 Thomas Talbott, “Pauline Interpretation of Divine Judgement” chapter 3 in Parry 
and Partridge, 2003, 46. 
76 Talbott 1999, 87. 
77 Talbott 1999, 86. 
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Both the fire and the punishment are eternal in the sense that they 
have their causal source in the eternal God himself. For anything 
that the eternal God does is eternal is the sense that it is the eternal 
God who does it.78  
The qualitative definition of αἰώνιος can be applied to the eternal life of which 
Jesus also speaks in the same passage. “The emphasis is upon the special 
quality, not the duration, of a life in proper relationship with God.”79 
Jürgen Moltmann concurs with this qualitative definition of αἰώνιος.  
The Greek word aionios, like the Hebrew word olam, means  time 
without a fixed end, a long time, not eternal in the absolute, 
timeless sense of Greek metaphysics. The plural forms olamin and 
aiones cannot point to a timeless eternity as this can only be 
communicated in the singular. If damnation and the pains of hell 
are ‘eternal,’ then they are aeonic, long-lasting or finite. Only God 
himself is ‘eternal’ in an absolute sense and in a qualitative sense 
‘unending’. … The term aionios refers not to God’s absolute 
eternity, but to the necessity of choosing faith or lack of faith.80 
It is by means of a qualitative definition of αἰώνιος that Christian universalists 
like Talbott and Moltmann can harmonize biblical passages that speak of 
eternal punishment with his premise that the love of God will lead to the 
ultimate reconciliation of all creation with God.  
Talbott’s Interpretation of ()*++,-% and its Derivatives 
Talbott concedes that “Paul no doubt believed that God would eventually 
destroy the wicked.”81 But what exactly does that mean? Talbott denies that 
ἀpiόλλυμι means annihilation. On the basis of 1 Corinthians 5:5, he writes 
that destruction is an explicitly “redemptive concept.” 
It could not possibly imply the ultimate ruin of the individual 
whose flesh is destroyed. For that individual, it implies just the 
opposite: the gain of all that is worthwhile, utter blessedness, for 
Paul here presents ‘the destruction of the flesh’ and ‘the salvation of 
the spirit’ as two sides of the same coin.82  
                                                
78 Talbott 1999, 88. 
79 Talbott 1999, 88. 
80 Jürgen Moltmann, Das Kommen Gottes: Christliche Eschatologie (Gütersloh: Chr. 
Kaiser, 1995), 269. My translation. 
81 Talbott 1999, 94. 
82 Talbott 1999, 95. 
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The destruction of which Paul speaks is not the annihilation of the individual, 
but the destruction of the vessel of wrath for the redemptive purpose of 
showing mercy to the person who was captive in sin.  
Talbott highlights some of the same Bible passages as traditionalists, where 
ἀpiόλλυμι and its derivatives are used in relation to things that clearly do not 
cease to exist: Matthew 10:6; Luke 15:4, 24; and Luke 19:10.  
In none of these contexts does being lost or having perished imply 
the annihilation of an individual’s consciousness, nor does it imply 
that salvation is no longer possible; to the contrary, being lost or 
having perished is just what makes one eligible for being found and 
thus for being saved.83   
The wages of sin is death, but death or destruction is a necessary prerequisite 
for God’s gift of eternal life.  
Historical Precedents of Universalism 
Talbott maintains that one major cause of the moral atrocities for which the 
Christian church has historically been responsible was its rejection of 
apokatastasis in favor of the doctrine of endless torment.  
So if a sound doctrine, soundly interpreted, does not produce evil 
fruit in the lives of those who sincerely embrace it, then we are 
entitled, I believe, to regard acts of persecution within the Christian 
Church as a symptom of unsound doctrine or theological error.84 
Fear of eternal torment led to fear of heresy, which led to the persecution of 
putative heretics. “Had it not been for an obsessive fear of heresy, grounded 
in the traditional understanding of hell, most of the atrocities committed in 
the name of the Christian religion would never have occurred.”85   
Belief in apokatastasis was systematically maligned and anathematized. 
“Those who prevailed were those with the civil authorities on their side and 
the power of the sword at their right hand.”86 As such, Talbott is unconvinced 
that theological truth can be ascertained by examining the putative consensus 
of Christian orthodoxy. “But the more I read about the imperial church – the 
power plays, the petty jealousies, the various political intrigues – the less 
inclined I was to place any confidence at all in its pronouncements.”87 
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86 Talbott 1999, 17. 
87 Talbott 1999, 20. 
Issuant Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
50 
The Nature of God According to Talbott 
Talbott illustrates the inherent problem with ECT. There is a fundamental 
inconsistency in affirming the following three statements: 
1. It is God’s redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his 
will) to reconcile all sinners to himself; 
2. It is within God’s power to achieve his redemptive purpose for 
the world; 
3. Some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will 
therefore either consign them to a place of eternal punishment, 
from which there will be no hope of escape, or put them out of 
existence altogether.88  
All three propositions seem to have biblical support. Yet, if one denies the 
first proposition, as do the Augustinians, then one jeopardizes the love of 
God. God’s love must be severely limited or redefined. If one rejects the 
second proposition, as do the Arminians, then one has difficulty in affirming 
the sovereignty or omnipotence of God in fulfilling God’s redemptive 
purposes for humanity. It is only in rejecting the third proposition that one 
preserves a conception of God wherein God is all-loving, sovereign and 
omnipotent, and worthy of one’s worship and devotion.89 
Like the issuant-view scholars whom he engages in debate, Talbott sees a 
fundamental inconsistency in viewing eternal punishment as an expression of 
God’s justice while eternal life is an expression of God’s mercy. A scenario 
where God’s mercy towards people and God’s desire to forgive and protect 
them from punishment stands in conflict with God’s justice in meting out the 
punishment that sinners rightly deserve can easily lead to the conclusion that 
“Christ died not to effect a cure in us, but to put an end to a bad case of 
schizophrenia in the Father.”90     
But where is the biblical warrant, I would ask in return, for thinking 
that divine justice requires something that divine mercy does not, 
or that divine mercy permits something that divine justice does 
not? Where is the biblical warrant for thinking that mercy and 
justice are separate and distinct attributes of God?91 
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This inconsistency is not overcome by an appeal to the “incoherent” idea of 
divine simplicity whereby all of God’s character qualities are in essence one 
and the same. Yet an understanding of both mercy and justice as expressions 
of God’s essential quality of love provides the only logically consistent means 
of bridging the gap between mercy and justice while preserving the integrity 
of both attributes.  
Beginning with the statement “God is love” (1 John 4:8), Talbott maintains 
that if God is essentially loving, then it is impossible for God to act in an 
unloving way. This must be much more than a fortuitous coincidence. Nor 
can it mean that God chooses to be loving to an arbitrarily chosen group of 
people. Due to the nature of human relationships, it is impossible for me to 
experience the love of God knowing that God at the same time is acting in 
unloving ways towards the people whom I love.  
The idea that God loves some created person but not all, or that he 
divided the human race into the elect and the non-elect, is, I 
contend, necessarily false. … even if God could have chosen not to 
love us – he could not choose to love some of us without also 
choosing to love all of us. The reason, I have said, has to do with the 
inclusive nature of love, the way in which it binds people’s interests 
together. For any two people you choose, either they will 
themselves be united in a bond of love, each willing the good for the 
other, or they will not be so united. If they are so united, then God 
cannot will the good for one of them without willing the good for 
the other as well.92 
When God consigns some of the people I love to an unending retribution in 
hell, I suffer along with them and God is no longer acting in love towards me. 
Logical consistency demands that God loves all people equally.  
The love of God “no doubt does preclude positive hatred and does 
preclude a final rejection of the beloved, [but] it in no way precludes our 
experiencing that love as punishment, or as harsh judgment, or even as divine 
wrath.”93 This is because of the nature of judgment and punishment as 
restorative, not retributive.   
Judgment 
Two prominent themes of the New Testament are divine judgment and God’s 
ultimate victory over evil. Critics of universalism sometimes claim that 
Christian universalists overlook the biblical material that speaks of divine 
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wrath and judgment,94 but Talbott maintains that a proper understanding of 
the judgment motif is a necessary prerequisite for affirming the theme of 
God’s ultimate victory over evil.  
The main options for understanding the purpose of divine judgment and 
punishment are retribution, deterrence, protection of the innocent, and 
rehabilitation. Talbott doesn’t develop the themes of deterrence and the 
protection of the innocent, as they are not so common in the discussions of 
eternal punishment. Retribution, however, is a much more common theme 
and Talbott gives extensive consideration to it.  
One foundational idea for retribution is justice. Some compensating loss is 
exacted of the sinner or criminal. Loss of personal freedom (prison sentence), 
loss of pleasure (corporal punishment) or of wealth (fines) compensate for 
the loss which the sinner / criminal has caused his victims. The idea of justice 
also demands that no innocent person be punished for the crimes of another 
and that punishment not be too excessive for the crime. In order for the 
criterion of justice to be satisfied, some evaluation must be made of the 
degree of harm done or of the actual loss inflicted by the criminal. The key 
issue becomes one of proportion. Talbott asks, given the principle of equal 
retaliation (lex talionis), what kind of sin could merit everlasting torment.  
One possible solution to this difficult question is to posit the status 
principle, which Talbott rejects for several reasons. First, there are other 
factors that we take into consideration when determining one’s degree of 
guilt: premeditation, knowledge, the degree of harm inflicted, etc. Second, we 
judge some sins to be greater than others. We regard torture and murder as 
more serious than pick-pocketing. This is a necessary assumption for the 
justice of the theory of retribution. 
[I]f every sin is infinitely serious and thus deserves the same penalty 
as every other sin, namely everlasting torment, then once again the 
idea, so essential to the retributivist theory, that we can grade 
offenses collapses – as does the idea of an excessive punishment and 
that of fitting lesser punishment to lesser crimes.95 
Third, everlasting torment for any possible sin against God goes against our 
normal moral understanding that jaywalkers should not be executed, or that 
not even mass-murderers should be tortured indefinitely.  
Talbott rejects Anselm’s reasoning that endless suffering is necessary to 
make restitution for the sins against God that cannot be redeemed by 
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suffering of a limited duration. “The truth is that no suffering of any duration 
will satisfy the demands of justice fully, because justice requires something of 
a different nature altogether.”96 Real justice demands restitution, but since full 
restitution is impossible, the whole point of retributive justice is thwarted. For 
Talbott, “Perfect justice requires reconciliation and restoration.”97  
Freedom and Rationality 
Talbott accepts a libertarian incompatibilist definition of human freedom. 
Yet for a human choice to be counted as truly free, it must also be rational. 
An irrational choice is one that a person makes when there is no motive for 
making that choice and in spite of an exceedingly strong reason not to choose 
it.98  Irrational choices are incompatible with true freedom. “A necessary 
condition of free choice, in other words, is a minimal degree of rationality on 
the part of the one who acts freely.”99 The logical consequence of this, 
according to Talbott, is that no choice for hell can truly be free, since no 
choice for hell can be truly rational in the absence of a motive for making the 
choice and in spite of strong reasons for not doing so. Since the inchoate 
choice for hell is irrational and thus not free, a loving God is justified in 
orchestrating events such that the person realizes the irrationality of the 
choice for hell and freely and rationally accepts the gift of God’s love.  
As long as any ignorance, or deception, or bondage to desire 
remains, it is open to God to transform a sinner without interfering 
with human freedom; but once all ignorance and deception and 
bondage to desire is removed, so that a person is truly ‘free’ to 
choose, there can no longer be any motive for choosing eternal 
misery for oneself.100  
According to Talbott’s definitions, God does not violate a person’s freedom 
by removing all ignorance, deception and bondage to desire. However, an 
everlasting hell would be so egregious that God would be justified in 
overriding human freedom to prevent someone from ending up there.  
We still have every reason to believe that everlasting separation is 
the kind of evil that a loving God would prevent even if it meant 
interfering with human freedom in certain ways. … So, a loving 
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God … could never permit his loved ones to destroy the very 
possibility of future happiness in themselves. Just as loving parents 
are prepared to restrict the freedom of the children they love, so a 
loving God would be prepared to restrict the freedom of the 
children he loves.101 
Victory over Evil 
Through loving intervention to “cure” human irrationality and prevent them 
from making unfree choices, God ensures the final victory over evil. Talbott 
cites two passages that illustrate what he believes to be Paul’s understanding 
of Christ’s victory over evil.  
Philippians 2:10-11 – “… so that at the name of Jesus every knee 
should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every 
tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the 
Father.” 
Colossians 1:16-20 – “For by him all things were created, in heaven 
and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions 
or rulers or authorities – all things were created through him and 
for him. And he is before all things, and in him all things hold 
together. And he is the head of the body, the church. He is the 
beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in everything he might 
be preeminent.  For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to 
dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether 
on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross.” 
According to Talbott, Christ’s victory entails the willing submission of all 
creation to the lordship of Christ. This choice is made freely and rationally. 
God is always merciful, even though sinful creatures can sometimes perceive 
God’s mercy as severity, judgment, or punishment. God judges and 
disciplines a person for the purpose of helping a person recognize the 
irrationality of her ways, and producing a contrite heart that is able to receive 
God’s mercy.   
 
In this chapter we have taken a more detailed look at the main non-issuant 
views of hell: eternal conscious torment, conditionalism and universalism. 
These views provide a foil for advocates of various forms of issuant views that 
we will examine in the coming chapters.  
   
 
                                                
101 Talbott 1990a, 38. 
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“MY WILL BE DONE” –  
C.S. Lewis’ Issuant View of Hell 
In the long run the answer to all those who object to the doctrine of 
hell is itself a question: “What are you asking God to do?” To wipe 
out their past sins and, at all costs, to given them a fresh start, 
smoothing every difficulty and offering every miraculous help? But 
He has done so, on Calvary. To forgive them? They will not be 
forgiven. To leave them alone? Alas, I am afraid that is what He 
does.1  
Although C.S. Lewis cannot be considered a contemporary thinker, I am 
including an examination of his views on hell here since he was one of the 
earliest Christian thinkers to develop a full-fledged issuant view as a proposal 
for answering the problem of hell. Moreover, his ideas have served as a great 
inspiration to a number of subsequent issuantists such as N.T. Wright, 
Jonathan Kvanvig, Stephen T. Davis, Peter Kreeft, Bradley L. Sickler and Jerry 
Walls. Many of these scholars have sought to improve on some areas where 
Lewis’ ideas are deemed inadequate or inconsistent.  
C.S. Lewis shared the sentiments of many people today. “There is no 
doctrine which I would more willingly remove from Christianity than this, if 
it lay in my power. … If a game is played, it must be possible to lose it.”2 But 
since Jesus so clearly warned against hell, Lewis believed that one must take 
his words seriously. Yet how does one reconcile the possibility that some 
people may end up in hell with a classic Christian concept of a loving God? 
He writes, “I am not going to try to prove the doctrine tolerable. Let us make 
no mistake; it is not tolerable. But I think the doctrine can be shown to be 
moral by a critique of the objections made, or felt, against it.”3 
                                                
1 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (NY: Macmillan, 1962, 1974), 128.  
2 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 118.  
3 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 120. 
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To understand Lewis’ concept of hell, one must first look at his 
understanding of humanity and of God. Lewis believed that if one doesn’t like 
the idea of eternal reward and eternal punishment, it is often because one has 
a faulty concept of God. One cannot understand God’s greatness and 
character while at the same time trivializing both God’s greatness and the sin 
that makes it impossible for sinful humans to dwell in God’s presence.   
The Nature of God, the Nature of Humanity 
According to Lewis, divine sovereignty and human freedom belong together 
in an almost inexplicable way. He presupposed a compatibilist definition of 
human freedom whereby a sovereign God knows – and at least allows 
through some voluntary limitation of his powers – human choices for evil. In 
Perelandra, Ransom comes to the conclusion that “Predestination and 
freedom were apparently identical.”4 In another context, Lewis wrote, “Free 
will is the modus operandi of destiny.”5  It is necessary to affirm both ideas, 
even if they seem from a human, temporal perspective to be contradictory.  
For every attempt to see the shape of eternity except through the 
lens of Time destroys your knowledge of Freedom. Witness the 
doctrine of predestination which shows (truly enough) that eternal 
reality is not waiting for a future in which to be real; but at the price 
of removing Freedom which is the deeper truth of the two.6 
He illustrates the relation between predestination and human freedom with 
our understanding of the nature of light. Sometimes light appears to 
observers as particles, while at other times it manifests itself as a wave. It is 
likewise easier for humans to see God’s sovereignty at some points while 
human freedom comes more into focus at others.   
… but till (if ever) we can see the consistency it is better to hold two 
inconsistent views than to ignore one side of the evidence. The real 
inter-relations between God’s omnipotence and Man’s freedom is 
something we can’t find out. … It is plain from Scripture that, in 
whatever sense the Pauline doctrine [of election] is true, it is not 
true in any sense which excludes its (apparent) opposite.7  
                                                
4 C.S. Lewis, Perelandra (NY: Macmillan, 1944, 1965), 149. 
5 C.S. Lewis, “On Stories” in Walter Hooper (ed.), Of Other Worlds: Essays and Stories 
(NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1966), 15. 
6 C.S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (NY: Macmillan. 1946), 141. 
7 From a letter dated August 3, 1952 in C.S. Lewis, W.H. Lewis (ed.), The Letters of C.S. 
Lewis (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966), 252. 
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From God’s atemporal perspective, there is no contradiction. “For the Enemy 
[God] does not foresee the humans making their free contributions in a 
future, but sees them doing so in His unbounded Now. And obviously to 
watch a man doing something is not to make him do it.”8 For God then, there 
is no such thing as foreknowledge or predestination.    
Yet without true human freedom, people cannot be held morally 
accountable for their actions. “[S]ince the two conceptions, in the long run, 
mean the same thing – to think of this bad man’s perdition not as a sentence 
imposed on him but as the mere fact of being what he is.”9 Likewise, without 
human freedom, there can be no justice in judgment.     
The Nature of God According to C.S. Lewis  
Lewis believed that both divine justice and divine mercy demand the idea of 
hell. Without a hell one would have just cause to question God’s justice. If 
God knows all the evil that people cause yet ignores it, God is no longer just, 
but an enabler. It is unfair both to the guilty and to the innocent to turn a 
blind eye to human evil.  
God’s standards for right and wrong are not arbitrary – they are grounded 
in God’s nature. That’s why evil people will not be permitted to continue in 
their sin forever and believe mistakenly that they’ve “won.” God’s justice 
demands that people come to the realization that evil is evil and that 
goodness and morality have their source in the nature of God.  
Hell is also an expression of divine mercy and grace. Hell was created as a 
“… tourniquet on the wound through which the lost soul else would bleed to 
a death she never reached.”10 
The pain that the sinner experiences in hell, whether physical or 
psychological is also an expression of God’s mercy in that it prevents human 
evil from harming even more people.   
Human Nature According to C.S. Lewis 
When God created humankind, it was with the intention that human beings 
would live in a relationship with God. To illustrate this, let’s call it humanity’s 
“factory settings.” People have unfortunately changed these factory settings 
through their sinful choices. Now the new default setting is that humanity is 
separated from God and headed for destruction. It is possible in the course of 
                                                
8 Letter 27 in C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (NY: Macmillan, 1961), 150. 
9 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 123.  
10 Book Ten: “The Regress,” chapter IV: “The Black Hole” in C.S. Lewis, The Pilgrim’s 
Regress  (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 180.  
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using a computer, that viruses can “infect” the operating systems, or that files 
related to various downloaded programs can conflict and cause problems for 
the computer’s operation. The best solution in such cases is to save one’s 
documents and restore all the factory settings. Likewise, when people 
recognize that the “settings” they’ve created in life no longer work, they can 
go back to the manufacturer’s settings. In theological terms this is called 
repentance and salvation.   
Lewis believed that for people to be held morally responsible for their 
actions, they must also be free. One can choose to promote the good of 
creation and general revelation, which is found in every person, or one can 
choose to follow the sinful tendencies that are also there as a result of original 
sin. The free moral choices one makes can lead to a lasting character – a 
virtuous life or a character that makes it impossible for a person to heed the 
voices that call one to a virtuous life. In The Magician’s Nephew, Aslan says of 
Uncle Andrew: “[he] has made himself unable to hear my voice. If I spoke to 
him, he would hear only growlings and roarings. Oh Adam’s sons, how 
cleverly you defend yourselves against all that might do you good!”11 When 
this happens, one can no longer distinguish between good and evil.   
Since we are created to live in a relationship with God, we are dependent 
upon God for our continued existence. When one becomes separated from 
God, or when God respects a people’s wishes to be left alone in hell, they will 
die both physically and spiritually.   
Lewis’ Understanding of Hell 
In this section, I would like to highlight Lewis’ answers to a number of 
common questions about hell: What does hell look like? How does one end up 
there? and What kind of fate can one expect there?  Lewis’ answers to these 
three questions will even cast some light on his thoughts regarding the 
duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell.   
What Does Hell Look Like? 
Lewis’ theology shows clear signs of influence from Augustine, who in turn 
was strongly influenced by both Plato12 and Plotinus. Plotinus believed that 
                                                
11 Chapter 14: “The Planting of the Tree” in C.S. Lewis, The Magician’s Nephew in C.S. 
Lewis, The Complete Chronicles of Narnia (NY: HarperCollins, 1998), 67. 
12 Andrew Walker, “Scripture, revelation and Platonism in C.S. Lewis” Scottish Journal 
of Theology 55/1 (2002): 19-35. “Lewis’ Platonism is unmistakable … Lewis found in Platonism 
a comprehensive way to reconcile reason’s dialectic with the reasons of the heart. To settle for 
anything less than such a reconciliation, he felt, would be to betray his experience of art, mind, 
and the everyday world.” “[M]any aspects of Lewis’ thought are Platonic to the core.” Corbin 
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God was pure Being, the greatest good. Everything else can be placed on a 
scale where the beings closest to God are also those who share divine 
character qualities like existence. The farther away from God one comes, the 
more one is lacking in these divine attributes.13  
One can see similar ideas in Lewis’ theology of hell. In The Great Divorce, 
heaven and celestial beings are portrayed as really real. The ungodly, who 
come to the outskirts of heaven on a day-trip from hell, are presented as 
shadows or ghosts. Their voluntary distance from God makes them both less 
corporeal and less real. On the outskirts of heaven, even the grass and the 
water are so hard that it hurts for the ghosts to come into contact with them.   
This illustrates an important aspect of Lewis’ theology of hell. There are no 
“people” in hell; only the remains of human beings. These remains are what is 
left over when all the good that is part of human nature gradually disappears 
through one’s persistent choices to live apart from God. When one rejects 
God, one also rejects all the good things that God wishes to give his created 
beings: joy, beauty, friendship, generosity, love, goodness, benevolence, 
maybe even existence itself. The only things that remain are one’s selfishness, 
bitterness, spite, revenge, and a total lack of grace and forgiveness. Lewis 
illustrates this idea in The Great Divorce where hell is presented as a gray, 
rapidly expanding city where people move farther and farther away from each 
other since they cannot tolerate the others’ presence.14  
In one of the conversations in The Great Divorce, a ghost tries to 
understand the true nature of things in hell. He receives an explanation from 
writer George MacDonald, who in this book is a spokesman for Lewis’ own 
ideas.15  
‘Then those people are right who say that Heaven and Hell are only 
states of mind?’ ‘Hush,’ said he sternly. ‘Do not blaspheme. Hell is a 
                                                                                                               
Scott Carnell, Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing in C.S. Lewis (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1974), 67, 71. It is also comic to note that according to The Great Divorce (chapter 
1), the chthonic bookshops in the gray city sell the works of Aristotle. Perhaps Plato’s books are 
available in celestial bookshops?  
13 This scale of existence is nicely illustrated by Lewis’ application of the term 
Shadowlands to normal, earthly, human life. The name Shadowlands also betrays a striking 
connection to Plato’s cave allegory, where humans can only sense the shadows and simulacra 
of an unseen reality. Life on earth is characterized by a certain degree of goodness and 
existence – more than that which characterizes hell and its denizens, but less real than heaven 
and its inhabitants.  
14 Lewis, Great Divorce, chapter 2. 
15 There are certain similarities here between MacDonald and Virgil in Dante’s Inferno. 
Both act as insightful “guides” into unknown worlds beyond the grave.  
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state of mind – ye never said a truer word. And every state of mind, 
left to itself, every shutting up of the creature within the dungeon of 
its own mind – is, in the end, Hell. But Heaven is not a state of 
mind. Heaven is reality itself. All that is fully real is Heavenly. For 
all that can be shaken will be shaken and only the unshakable 
remains.’16 
Lewis draws a clear contrast between what humans were intended to be by 
the creator, and what they will become in hell as a consequence of their 
choices.   
To be a complete man means to have the passions obedient to the 
will and the will offered to God: to have been a man – to be an ex-
man or ‘damned ghost’ – would presumably mean to consist of a 
will utterly centered in its self and passions utterly controlled by the 
will.17   
Another image for hell comes from The Screwtape Letters, where hell is 
pictured as an all-encompassing bureaucracy. Lewis did not believe there is 
fire and brimstone in hell, nor in a devil who runs around tormenting people 
with a pitchfork. As a professor of literature, it was important for Lewis to 
emphasize that one must not “confuse the doctrine with the imagery by 
which it may be conveyed”18 when the Bible describes the fate of the godless 
in hell. 
How Does One End Up in Hell? 
Lewis’ answer to this question is closely related to his understanding of 
salvation. According to Lewis, people are saved only when they stop fighting 
against God and “surrender” to God’s will and plan for their lives. It is only 
then that they become truly human. A good illustration is the story of the 
dreadful boy Eustace in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader.19 Eustace’s 
consistently selfish actions led his body to be transformed into a dragon that 
matched his evil soul. Only when he surrendered completely to Aslan did he 
become fully human on both the inside and the outside. 
If we define salvation as surrender, then universalism presents a logical 
dilemma. God must either violate people’s free will and save them even 
                                                
16 Lewis, Great Divorce, 68-69.  
17 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 125-126.  
18 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 124.  
19 Chapter 6 in C.S. Lewis, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader in C.S. Lewis, The Complete 
Chronicles of Narnia (NY: HarperCollins, 1998).   
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though they don’t want to surrender, or else it must be possible for them to 
finally reject God.  
In the long run the answer to all those who object to the doctrine of 
hell is itself a question: ‘What are you asking God to do?’ To wipe 
out their past sins and, at all costs, to given them a fresh start, 
smoothing every difficulty and offering every miraculous help? But 
He has done so, on Calvary. To forgive them? They will not be 
forgiven. To leave them alone? Alas, I am afraid that is what He 
does.20 
God is a “gentleman” and will not force himself on anyone.  
The most important aspect of Lewis’ answer to this question is that he 
didn’t believe that God sends anyone to hell.  
It’s not a question of God ‘sending’ us to Hell. In each of us there is 
something growing up which will of itself be Hell unless it is nipped 
in the bud.21 
A man can’t be taken to hell, or sent to hell: you can only get there 
on your own steam.22 
The people who end up in hell do so as a natural consequence of their choices 
made in life. They choose to live their lives without God, and God in love and 
justice respects their moral maturity even when it entails self-destructive 
choices.   
There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to 
God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end, 
‘Thy will be done.’ All that are in Hell, choose it. Without that self-
choice there could be no Hell. No soul that seriously and constantly 
desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek find. To those who 
knock it is opened.’23  
Those who refuse to surrender to God continue in their rebellion against 
God. “I willingly believe that the damned are, in one sense, successful, rebels 
to the end; that the doors of hell are locked on the inside.”24 It is thus not God 
who locks them up in hell, but the rebels themselves who distance themselves 
from God until God finally removes all blessing from them. God had never 
                                                
20 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 128. 
21 C.S. Lewis, “The Trouble with X” in C.S. Lewis, Walter Hooper (ed.), God in the Dock 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 155.   
22 C.S. Lewis, The Dark Tower (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 49. 
23 Lewis, Great Divorce, 72-73. 
24 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 127.  
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intended for any person to end up in hell. “The saved go to a place prepared 
for them, while the damned go to a place never made for men at all.”25 
What Kind of Fate Can One Expect in Hell? 
Many people have the idea that heaven will be boring. Sometimes we hear 
people say that they’d rather go to hell where they can play poker and drink 
beer with their buddies. At least there, they’ll have some fun. Lewis claimed it 
was the exact opposite. God created people as sensuous beings with the 
capacity to enjoy friendship, sex, good food and drink. It is only in fellowship 
with God in heaven that the natural human capacity to experience pleasure 
will continue. Hell will be boring: friendship, beauty and all the good things 
one enjoys in life will be blatantly absent. The only thing left will be the 
unbridled human vices that make a person unbearable.  
Lewis was aware of the common objection to the doctrine of hell that the 
proportions between sin and everlasting punishment are unreasonable. He 
speculates freely at this point and presents several possible solutions. First, he 
calls into question the temporality of hell. That is, he wondered whether hell 
really entails an endless expanse of time. “That the lost soul is eternally fixed 
in its diabolical attitude we cannot doubt: but whether this eternal fixity 
implies endless duration – or duration at all – we cannot say.”26 Likewise, 
“Our Lord … usually emphasises the idea, not of duration but of finality.”27 
Second, Lewis speculated on the nature of time. In the alternate worlds of 
The Chronicles of Narnia and in his space trilogy, time often flows differently 
than it does in our world. He writes in The Problem of Pain that it is possible 
that time also has breadth in addition to length, and that time should be 
viewed as a plane and not as a line. An omniscient God would also know 
whether granting a person more time would make it easier for him to repent. 
If more opportunities (even more chances after death) would make a 
difference, God would give them.  
One could illustrate this with a hardened criminal who upon release from 
prison would perhaps like to stay out of prison, but who lacks the will to 
make the necessary changes in lifestyle.28 In the same way, there is at least a 
theoretical possibility for someone in hell to repent and be saved, and thus be 
released from his suffering, but considering the total absence of divine 
                                                
25 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 124-125.  
26 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 127.  
27 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 126-127.  
28 This point is insightfully raised by Jonathan Kvanvig in Kvanvig 1993, 120. 
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goodness and grace in hell, the chances that anyone in point of fact does that 
are negligible.  
Discussions of one’s fate in hell naturally raise the question of how the 
godly could enjoy being in heaven with the knowledge that some of their 
loved ones are suffering in hell.  
Lewis answers this question with yet another question: “Are we more 
merciful than God?”29 We cannot allow our subjective feelings to determine 
how we are to interpret the goodness of God. In The Great Divorce, Lewis tells 
the story of Sarah and Frank Smith.  Sarah is in heaven. Her husband Frank 
comes on an excursion from hell to the outskirts of heaven where he meets 
Sarah. Just as he always did in life, Frank tries to manipulate Sarah into 
feeling sorry for him in hell, but to no avail. Sarah finally goes her way filled 
with joy and a song in her heart.  
What some people say on earth is that the final loss of one soul 
gives the lie to all the joy of those who are saved. … That sounds 
very merciful: but see what lurks behind it. … The demand of the 
loveless and the self-imprisoned that they should be allowed to 
blackmail the universe: that till they consent to be happy (on their 
own terms) no one else shall taste joy: that theirs should be the final 
power; that Hell should be able to veto Heaven.30 
According to Lewis, hell can never blackmail heaven. The damned will never 
be able to take the final joy of the saved as hostage.   
Evaluation of Lewis’ View of Hell 
It would appear that Lewis is somewhat inconsistent in his thoughts on hell. 
Some aspects of his theory seem to fit more naturally with annihilationism or 
conditionalism. If one’s situation in hell means that one is separated from all 
blessings (the capacity to experience pleasure, joy, friendship, beauty) as 
Lewis maintains, it would be consistent to claim that one is also separated 
from the capacity for existence. According to Lewis, people become 
something less than fully human as a result of sin. It is only through 
surrender to God and salvation that they can be restored to full humanity. In 
hell, the corruption continues, which makes people not only less and less 
human, but less and less real.31 Lewis writes that “a damned soul is nearly 
                                                
29 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 126. 
30 Lewis, Great Divorce, 120. 
31 Lewis never placed much emphasis on the ontological argument for God’s existence, 
but he shared its presupposition that being is better than non-being.  
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nothing.”32 Among other things, he describes hell as “… ‘the darkness 
outside,’ the outer rim where being fades away into nonentity.”33 Yet several 
pages earlier, he explains why he does not believe in ultimate annihilation. 
There he gives the analogy of a log on a fire. It ceases to be a log, but does not 
cease to exist. It continues to exist in new forms: ashes, gases, heat, light, etc. 
Lewis argues that total annihilation is not a possibility due to certain physical 
laws.  
There are several problems here. First, it could be argued that Lewis’ ideas 
are at odds with the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.  If God can create 
something from nothing, then it is not too difficult to believe that God can 
cause something that exists to cease existing.  
Of course this applies to the material universe. A human person has both 
physical and spiritual dimensions. The laws of nature that govern the material 
world do not necessarily apply to the immaterial world. Lewis clearly rejects 
the physicalism and naturalism of his day, which insisted that the material 
universe is all that exists.34 Lewis holds to a mind-body dualism wherein 
human beings have both physical and spiritual dimensions. In spite of this, it 
seems that Lewis commits something of a category error here when he 
assumes that the immaterial dimension is also governed by the laws of nature. 
The laws of nature that govern the material world do not necessarily apply to 
other dimensions beyond the physical. In other words, that which is 
physically impossible due to certain laws of nature may nonetheless be 
logically and metaphysically possible. It is not physically possible for a person 
to lift a fully-grown horse into the air. Yet there is nothing illogical with the 
idea that a person with extraordinary strength like Pippi Longstocking or 
Superman could do it. Matter and energy cannot be destroyed; they take on 
new forms. This does not mean that the immaterial human soul could not be 
annihilated or otherwise cease to exist. Based on his understanding of both 
God and human nature, I maintain that Lewis would be more logically 
consistent if he had concluded that God will respect a person’s will to live life 
without God even when that choice leads to a final cessation of existence.  
A second problem for Lewis relates to the nature of human freedom. He 
seems inconsistent when he presupposes a compatibilist definition of human 
                                                
32 Lewis, Great Divorce, 139. 
33 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 127. 
34 See in particular chapters 3 and 4 in Miracles. Here he states explicitly that “rational 
thought is not part of the system of Nature” and that in “relation to Nature, rational thought 
goes on ‘of its own accord’ or exists ‘on its own.’” C.S. Lewis, Miracles (NY: Touchstone / 
Simon & Schuster, 1996), 39. 
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freedom (“Predestination and freedom were apparently identical”) on one 
hand while at the same time claiming that God’s omnipotence is voluntarily 
limited for the sake of deferring to human free choices35 – something that 
presupposes libertarian incompatibilism.  
This apparent inconsistency is perhaps nowhere more clear than in Lewis’ 
account of own salvation in Surprised by Joy. He writes that he had a free 
choice “in a sense”, but that it was not necessarily a libertarian free choice.  
I say, “I chose,” yet it did not really seem possible to do the 
opposite. … You could argue that I was not a free agent, but I am 
more inclined to think that this came nearer to being a perfectly 
free act than most that I have ever done. Necessity may not be the 
opposite of freedom.36  
In addition, Lewis describes himself as “the most reluctant convert in all 
England” and God as one who loves the prodigals whom he brings in 
“kicking, struggling, resentful, and darting his eyes in every direction for a 
chance of escape.”37 Hardly a description of libertarian free choice. Lewis 
seems thus to advocate a form of compatibilism when it comes to salvation 
yet libertarian incompatibilism when it comes to damnation.  
In the name of consistency, Lewis has two options. He could presuppose 
libertarian human freedom for both salvation and damnation or he could 
recognize that people are not free in a libertarian sense. Libertarian freedom 
preserves the goodness of God vis-à-vis people in hell. However, it takes its 
toll on God’s sovereignty. Is God really in control of the universe at all? 
Prayer would be limited to confession of sin and praising God for divine 
attributes. There would be no point in making any petition of God that 
involves human choices or actions. “Lord, please save my father” and “Lord, 
please help me get that job” become meaningless. Nor would thanking God 
for blessings that involve human choice be meaningful. “Lord, thank-you that 
this wonderful person and I choose to love each other and get married – 
because we know that you didn’t have anything to do with us becoming the 
wonderful people we are, or orchestrating the course of human events so that 
we would meet each other and fall in love.”   
                                                
35 “Finally, it is objected that the ultimate loss of a single soul means the defeat of 
omnipotence. And so it does.” Lewis, Problem of Pain, 129. Yet Lewis regarded this as a miracle 
in itself – that the Almighty would both freely limit himself and make adjustments for even 
self-destructive human choices. 
36 C.S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955), 224. 
37 Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 229. 
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A more realistic option given Lewis’ overall theology is to recognize that 
people are not free at all; they are slaves under sin. When one is saved by 
Christ one is still not free in a libertarian sense. There is an enemy of our 
souls who has a vested interest in leading people away from God and keeping 
them in sin. At the same time, there is also a good God who does everything 
possible to influence people to want to be saved.  
A presumption of compatibilism for both salvation and damnation would 
mean that God somehow “causes” some people to freely lock themselves into 
hell – in a similar manner to God’s way of compelling others to freely accept 
the gift of grace. In this case, the problem of God’s goodness would remain. 
That is, if God has even a little part in people ending up in hell, then God 
bears part of the blame, so to speak. This is the very problem Lewis tries to 
circumvent by positing that God does not send anyone to hell and that the 
gates of hell are locked from the inside.  
If God determines reality in even a small way, as one does in 
compatibilism, it becomes extremely difficult to explain why God could not 
prevent people from making self-destructive choices, or to cause people to 
“freely” choose to live in fellowship with God. Lewis writes that  
You may attribute miracles to Him, but not nonsense. This is no 
limit to His power. If you choose to say, ‘God can give a creature 
free will and at the same time withhold free will from it’, you have 
not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless 
combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply 
because we prefix to them the two other words ‘God can’. It 
remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic 
impossibilities are not things but nonentities. It is no more possible 
for God than for the weakest of His creatures to carry out both of 
two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because His power meets 
an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we 
talk it about God.38 
A third area of difficulty for Lewis relates to the classic Christian 
understanding of the resurrection of the body – the idea that both the godly 
and the ungodly will be raised from the dead to receive their eternal rewards 
and punishments (John 5:28-29). Lewis portrays the human “remains” in hell 
as incorporeal “damned ghosts.” Lewis does not deny the resurrection of the 
body, but he seems to do injustice to the idea – at least in relation to the 
ungodly. Based on his scale of existence, he claims that our present physical 
                                                
38 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 18. 
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bodies are only “half real and phantasmal”39 in comparison with the body the 
godly will receive in the resurrection of the dead, while the ungodly have a 
nearly incorporeal existence.   
Fourth, although Lewis rejects the idea that suffering in hell is a 
punishment or judgment, he commonly refers to the people in hell as “the 
damned.” Consider these passages already quoted in this chapter:   
To be a complete man means to have the passions obedient to the 
will and the will offered to God: to have been a man – to be an ex-
man or ‘damned ghost’ – would presumably mean to consist of a 
will utterly centered in its self and passions utterly controlled by the 
will.40   
I willingly believe that the damned are, in one sense, successful, 
rebels to the end; that the doors of hell are locked on the inside.41 
The saved go to a place prepared for them, while the damned go to 
a place never made for men at all.42 
Of course one could say that this is only a figure of speech, or that by their 
free choices, the ungodly damn themselves, but this still presumes some kind 
of judgment and punishment, not the purely natural consequences of one’s 
choices.  
A fifth problem for Lewis is also related to the substitution of the 
Retribution Thesis with the Self-Determination Thesis. Lewis is quite clear in 
his texts that deal specifically with the doctrine of hell that he rejects the 
Retribution Thesis in favor of the Self-Determination Thesis. Yet this seems 
to be at odds with his writings on a closely related topic. In 1953 Lewis 
published the article “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment” in the legal 
journal Res Judicatae.43 In this article he rejects what he calls the 
“humanitarian” theory of punishment, which would reform the penal system 
by treating criminals as sufferers from an illness. According to this 
humanitarian theory, the purpose of punishment should not be retributive, 
but either deterrence by example or remedial in the healing or treatment of 
the criminal. Lewis urges a “return to the traditional or Retributive theory not 
                                                
39 C.S. Lewis in a letter dated 19 August 1947 in Walter Hooper (ed.), The Letters of C.S. 
Lewis to Arthur Greeves (1914-1963) (New York: Collier/Macmillan, 1986), 511. 
40 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 125-126. My emphasis. 
41 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 127. My emphasis. 
42 Lewis, Problem of Pain, 124-125. My emphasis. 
43 C.S. Lewis, “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment” Res Judicatae 6 (1953): 224-
230. Reprinted in God in the Dock (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 287-294. 
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solely, not even primarily, in the interests of society, but in the interests of the 
criminal.”44 He believes that this view “carries on its front a semblance of 
mercy which is wholly false.”45 If one views deterrence as the primary purpose 
of the penal system, then it is not necessary that the one being punished is 
truly the one who committed the crime. If one rejects this idea as unjust, 
Lewis claims it is only because one has a residual concept of justice based on a 
retributive understanding of desert. Regarding the remedial view of 
punishment, Lewis writes, “To be ‘cured’ against one’s will and cured of states 
which we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level with those who 
have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classed 
with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals.”46 That is to say, the legal right 
to govern one’s own affairs and the moral responsibility for one’s actions are 
taken away. 
When it comes to crimes against the civil law, Lewis advocated a return to 
the concept of desert and retribution as the only view that respects the 
individual’s freedom and responsibility. Yet in the very similar case of crimes 
against God’s laws, Lewis removes the concept of desert and retribution in 
favor of self-determination. Could not Lewis’ critique of the humanitarian 
theory of punishment also be turned against his view of hell? He writes,  
But do not let us be deceived by a name. To be taken without 
consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty; to undergo 
all those assaults on my personality which modern psychotherapy 
knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern of 
‘normality’ hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never 
professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end until 
either my captors have succeeded or I grown wise enough to cheat 
them with apparent success – who cares whether this is called 
Punishment or not?47 
Lewis is unwilling to call consignment to hell a punishment, but isn’t this the 
very type of playing with words of which he accuses the humanitarian theory 
of punishment? One could easily say that taking a sinner from his home and 
friends, causing him to lose his liberty, to force him to undergo all the assaults 
on his personality that consignment in hell knows how to deliver; to be re-
made after some pattern of ‘normality’ hatched in a heavenly laboratory to 
                                                
44 Lewis, “Humanitarian”, 224; Lewis, God in the Dock, 287. 
45 Lewis, “Humanitarian”, 230; Lewis, God in the Dock, 293. 
46 Lewis, “Humanitarian”, 229; Lewis, God in the Dock, 292. 
47 Lewis, “Humanitarian”, 226; Lewis, God in the Dock, 290.  
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which he never professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end 
– who cares whether this is called Punishment or not? 
A final problem for Lewis is the difficulty of harmonizing his theory with 
the Bible.48 Lewis claims that hell is not an issue of judgment or punishment, 
but rather the natural consequences of a person’s free choices. The ungodly 
will certainly suffer in hell, but it is not because God judges them or consigns 
them to hell. It is difficult to integrate this idea with biblical passages that 
speak of hell as a punishment (Matthew 25:46; 2 Thessalonians 1:9), God’s 
wrath (John 3:36; Romans 9:22; Revelation 14:10 and 19:15), and that God 
casts the ungodly into a lake of fire (Revelation 20:15). Even if one interprets 
the lake of fire metaphorically, as Lewis does, taking God’s active roll in 
casting the ungodly into the lake of fire and reinterpreting it as a person’s free 
choice to lock himself into hell from the inside remains problematic.  Henri 
Blocher makes the keen observation that “the Biblical picture of the wrathful 
Lord and Judge of all hardly suggests a mere passive role. There is something 
suspicious in the zeal to exonerate God of responsibility in judgement – 
theodicy built on insignificance?”49 
In chapter two I outlined three criteria for issuant views of hell: the 
integration of heaven and hell as both issuing from the same divine 
motivation in dealing with humanity, the criterion of metaphysical libertarian 
human freedom, and the replacement of the Retribution Thesis with the Self-
Determination Thesis. Lewis is quite clear in regard to the Self-Determination 
Thesis; God does not send a person to hell. The gates of hell are closed from 
the inside. As we have seen in my analysis, Lewis is somewhat inconsistent 
when it comes to compatibilist or libertarian definitions of human freedom. 
Nor does Lewis specifically address the issue of love as God’s primary 
motivating attribute in allowing people to close themselves into hell, although 
the pastoral tone in the questions he asks seems to show a bit of what he 
believes to be God’s heart for creatures who have gone astray.  
In his reflections on the doctrine of hell, C.S. Lewis is – as always – a 
creative and innovative Christian thinker. Despite some internal difficulties, 
his ideas have both set the stage for later discussions on the duration, quality, 
purpose and finality of hell and inspired a number of younger issuantists 
who, standing on the shoulder of this giant, have attempted to refine issuant 
views of hell in ways that are more philosophically rigorous.   
                                                
48 Lewis does not claim explicitly to build his theology of hell on the Bible. As such, this 
point of critique does not reflect a weakness in the coherence of Lewis’ view. 
49 Blocher 1992, 300.  
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4 
BASIC ISSUANTISM 
Therefore, paradoxical though it may sound, the very possibility of 
people going to hell is created by God in order to enable human 
beings to gain the highest good. Without the possibility of hell there 
is no ultimate happiness. In this sense, both heaven (union with 
God) and hell (separation from God) flow essentially from God’s 
love for humanity.1   
Hell, especially after the resurrection, is a gracious gift, reflecting 
the love of God and His desire to join with Him as much as 
possible.2 
Just as many who were brought up to think of God as a bearded old 
gentleman sitting on a cloud decided that when they stopped 
believing in such a being they had therefore stopped believing in 
God, so many who were taught to think of hell as a literal 
underground location full of worms and fire, or for that matter as a 
kind of torture chamber at the center of God’s castle of heavenly 
delights, decided that when they stopped believing in that, so they 
stopped believing in hell. The first group decided that because they 
couldn’t believe in childish images of God, they must be atheists. 
The second decided that because they couldn’t believe in childish 
images of hell, they must be universalists.3 
At times Christ’s words, ‘Depart from Me,’ begin to sound less like 
a decree of banishment and more like an answer to the question, 
‘May I be excused?’4 
Problems with ECT have led a number of theologians to call into question one 
or more of its tenets. Conditionalists and annihilationalists reject the 
Existence Thesis in their claim that the ungodly do not exist (at least not 
                                                
1 Wilko van Holten, “Hell and the goodness of God” Religious Studies 35 (1999): 53. 
2 Michael Potts, “Aquinas, Hell, and the Resurrection of the Damned” Faith and 
Philosophy 15/3 (1998): 347. 
3 N.T. Wright, Surprised by Hope (NY: HarperOne, 2008), 175. 
4 Fudge 1982, 2001, 351. 
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forever) in hell. Universalists reject at a minimum the Anti-Universalism 
Thesis and possibly also the No Escape Thesis and the Retribution Thesis. If 
anyone is consigned to hell at all, it is only for the temporary purpose of 
rehabilitation.  
Issuant perspectives on hell have developed in response to what issuantists 
perceive to be shortcomings in the answers to the problem of hell historically 
provided by ECT, conditionalism and universalism. Kvanvig writes that both 
ECT and any simple rejection of any of the four premises that make up ECT 
are “inadequate.” He writes, 
[T]he strong view must be abandoned as an adequate account of 
the nature of hell. … The typical alternatives to the strong view, 
which I call “simple alternatives,” are developed by dropping 
commitment to one of (H1)-(H4). Each of the simple alternatives is 
at least as problematic as the strong view itself, and this fact shows 
that whether any account of hell can be a component of an 
adequate theology of the Christian religion is far from a settled 
issue.5 
The “simple alternatives” to which he refers are the abandonment of the 
Existence Thesis (in annihilationism and conditionalism), the abandonment 
of the No Escape Thesis (in what Kvanvig calls “second chance theories” or 
what I later identify as Extra Chance Theses), universalism, and the rejection 
of the Retribution Thesis.  
At first glance, this last “simple alternative” would seem somewhat 
paradoxical, since Kvanvig himself also rejects the Retribution Thesis. Indeed, 
its rejection is one element of the issuant view Kvanvig posits. At this point 
Kvanvig criticizes Swinburne’s rejection of the Retribution Thesis on the 
grounds that Swinburne’s “reasoning is incomplete” in not explaining how 
God’s final abandonment of the ungodly in hell could be justified on non-
retributive grounds.6  
In this chapter I shall now turn to a more detailed presentation of issuant 
views of hell, beginning with what I shall call basic issuantism. Basic 
issuantism is the view of hell where the end is not universal salvation and 
which is made up of what I believe to be the three sine qua non trademarks of 
issuantism that distinguish all forms of issuantism from non-issuant views of 
hell: the love of God as the motivation for both heaven and hell, metaphysical 
                                                
5 Kvanvig 1993, 63. 
6 Kvanvig 1993, 101. As we shall see, Kvanvig’s own solution to the problem of hell is 
found in a “composite view” comprised of basic issuantism supplemented with the Middle 
Knowledge Thesis and the possibility of ultimately passing out of existence.  
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libertarianism and the rejection of the Retribution Thesis. Each of these 
trademarks relates directly to one of the sobriquets used for this category of 
views of hell: issuantism, the choice model of hell and the natural 
consequence view of hell, respectively. Although the term issuantism has its 
origins in the first of these three trademarks, issuantism is not limited to or 
defined exclusively in terms of the love of God as divine motivation for both 
heaven and hell.   
My desire in this chapter is not to create a straw man whom I shall then 
destroy in one fell swoop. Rather, I intend to distill the essence of issuantism 
from a large number of books and articles written by scholars who in some 
way reject the conclusions of traditionalists, conditionalists and universalists 
regarding the duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell.7 In critiquing 
basic issuantism I bear in mind the fact that no issuantist to my knowledge 
believes only in the three trademarks of basic issuantism. The issuantist 
scholars highlighted in the present work all seek to strengthen basic 
issuantism with the addition of one or more supplements. I shall 
subsequently turn to these supplements in chapter five. 
The Love of God as Divine Motivation for Heaven and 
Hell 
On issuantism, hell is the potentially eternal fate of the ungodly that is 
distinguished from non-issuant views by three characeristics: the love of God 
as divine motivation both for heaven and hell, metaphysical libertarian 
human freedom and the rejection of the Retribution Thesis. In this section I 
shall examine the case made by issuantists for the first of the three trademarks 
of basic issuantism: that divine motivations for both heaven and hell must 
issue from the same divine character quality, viz., the love of God. 
Advocates of ECT and conditionalism generally maintain that heaven is an 
expression of (or “issues from”) God’s love and grace, while hell issues from a 
different divine character quality such as justice or holiness. Although the 
idea that hell could issue from the love of God is a fairly novel concept within 
Protestant theology, it is well established within the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition. Citing verses like Romans 8:35 and Psalm 139:7, Many Orthodox 
scholars echo the sentiments of earlier believers like St Isaac the Syrian that 
one can never escape from the love of God. Everyone will experience the 
same love of God in the postmortem state. For believers this will be a source 
                                                
7 It is for this reason (among others) that I do not classify the works of universalists 
who hold to the three trademarks of basic issuantism as issuantists.  
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of blessing and eternal bliss; nonbelievers who reject God’s love and grace will 
experience the love of God as a burning fire.8   
While it is not ordinarily a problem to explain some of God’s actions in 
terms of one character quality and other actions in terms of a very different 
attribute, issuantists maintain that this becomes problematic when we view 
heaven and hell as two mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives for 
postmortem human existence.  
Kvanvig proposes a way around this problem:  
When one thinks of Heaven and Hell in geographic terms, it is easy 
to see how to generate the desire for a third alternative to Heaven 
and Hell, since if these are but two postal addresses, the possibility 
of other postal addresses is easy to imagine. But when one’s 
conception of the afterlife is a relational matter with Heaven 
involving a beatific vision and enjoyment of the divine, Hell is 
properly understood as the contrast of such a relationship.9 
More specifically, Kvanvig suggests what one must do in order to defend the 
idea that heaven issues from the love of God while hell is an expression of a 
different divine attribute.  
Explaining some of God’s actions by appealing to one of his 
characteristics and different divine actions by appealing to other 
characteristics is not in itself a mistake. … my complaint is that it is 
not enough merely to cite different motives. We must also have 
some account of how the different motives are related to each 
other.10  
The contrast between heaven and hell is the contrast between such opposites 
as mercy and justice or grace and desert. Issuantists claim that if one 
understands hell as a punishment for sin, as in ECT and conditionalism, then 
the natural conclusion would be that the only alternative to hell – heaven – 
would be a reward for good service. However, this does not square easily with 
                                                
8 Isaac of Nineveh (Isaac the Syrian) insisted that a remedial hell issues from the love of 
God and will eventually result in apokatastasis, the ultimate reconciliation of all creation with 
God. See tracts 38-41 in Isaac’s The Second Part, Sebastian Brock, trans., Corpus Scriptorum 
Christianorum Orientalium, Vol. 555; Scriptores Syri, Vol. 225 (Louvain: In Aedibus Peeters, 
1995). See also Sergius Bulgakov, The Bride of the Lamb, Boris Jakim, trans. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 459; Aristotle Papanikolaou and Elizabeth H. Prodromou, eds, Thinking 
Through Faith: New Perspectives from Orthodox Christian Scholars (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 195; George Metallinos, “Paradise and Hell in the Orthodox 
Tradition” Orthodox Heritage 7/3-4 (2009): 211-223; Romanides 2004.  
9 Kvanvig 2011, 29. 
10 Kvanvig 1993, 109-110. 
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classic Christian faith, where one gains entrance to heaven through the grace 
of God.  
One objection against belief in the doctrine of hell relates directly to the 
question of whether hell is an expression of divine love or some other 
attribute. In what is now called McTaggart’s dilemma, John McTaggart 
reasons that if there is a hell, one would have no good reason for believing in 
it.11 According to McTaggart, the only two reasons for believing anything are 
empirical evidence or credible testimony. Since there is no empirical evidence 
that hell exists, our only knowledge of it comes as a putative revelation from 
God. Revelation tells us that a person’s condition in hell will be horrific. 
McTaggart claims that anyone who would send a person to such an 
everlasting hell would be very vile indeed. Since revelation tells us that God 
sends some people to hell, one must conclude that God is very vile. If God is 
vile, there is no reason why one should believe anything God says, including 
the claim that there is a hell.  
One possible way around McTaggart’s dilemma is by insisting on the 
loving nature of God and God’s loving purpose for humanity, even as they 
relate to the doctrine of hell. If there is a genuine threat to our well-being, and 
if God loves us, it would be loving for God to warn us. However, if God is the 
one responsible for the possibly harmful fate, one could question the 
goodness and/or love of God unless there were some good reason for the 
potentially harmful fate. For example, parents can put out rat poison and 
warn their children not to eat it because if they do, they could die. The 
parents are not evil unless they put out the rat poison with the specific 
purpose of harming their children. If they put out rat poison for a different 
purpose – to get rid of rats that could harm their children – then both putting 
out rat poison and warning their children of the dangers of eating rat poison 
are loving acts, not evil ones. According to the Bible, hell was not created for 
the purpose of harming or punishing humans, but primarily for punishing 
Satan and the demons that have rebelled against God and who would harm 
people, and secondly for protecting people from Satan’s harm. As such, the 
creation of hell is not an evil thing, but a loving thing.  
According to issuantism, failure to integrate the divine motives for heaven 
and hell in the love of God can easily lead to a fragmented view of God. God 
is viewed as gracious and loving to a person, calling her to repentance until 
the time of her death, but then immediately switches to become a God of 
wrath and retribution. Kvanvig writes: “it will not do to portray God as 
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fundamentally loving until we reach the point of discussing the nature of hell, 
and suddenly portray God as fundamentally a just God.”12 Rob Bell 
comments that the concept of God presented by ECT is not very appealing.  
God would have no choice but to punish them forever in conscious 
torment in hell. God would, in essence, become a fundamentally 
different being to them in that moment of death, a different being 
to them forever. A loving heavenly father who will go to 
extraordinary lengths to have a relationship with them would, in 
the blink of an eye, become a cruel, mean, vicious tormenter who 
would insure that they would have no escape from an endless future 
of agony.13 
Kvanvig maintains that it is not enough for non-issuantists merely to state 
that heaven and hell both issue from different divine character qualities. This 
approach “wreaks havoc on the integrity of God’s character.”14   
Trevor Hart concurs:  
The danger here lies in the suggestion that love and justice are 
somehow two separable quantities within the character of God, and 
that the dynamics of atonement consist in some sort of power 
struggle between two distinct sets of claims within God himself. 
The concomitant suggestion follows on that men and women may 
thus be placed either under the love of God, or else under his 
justice; that the claims of the one may apply to them or not, 
depending upon their faith or lack of it; that God may be a loving 
Father towards some, and an arbiter of naked justice towards 
others.15 
There are two possible approaches to solving this problem. A segregated 
approach must not only state that there are different motivations for the two 
possible destinies, but also seek to explain how these motivations are related 
to each other. In particular, it must explain why the divine attribute that 
generates hell must predominate when the attribute that finds expression in 
heaven cannot.  
                                                
12 Kvanvig 1997, 567. 
13 Rob Bell, Love Wins (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2011), 173-174. The theology of hell 
presented in Bell’s book clearly displays the three main characteristics of basic issuantism: the 
love of God as the divine motivation for both heaven and hell, libertarian free will and hell as a 
natural consequence of free human choices. With the further rejection of the No Escape 
Thesis, his conclusions tend more towards a hopeful universalism than most other issuantist 
scholars. See Ray Baker, “Hell’s Bells for Bell’s Hell” Theofilos 2 (2011b): 41-54. 
14 Kvanvig 1993, 136. 
15 Trevor Hart, “Universalism: Two Distinct Types” in Cameron 1992, 24. 
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[A]ny account of hell that involves such a shift and does not explain 
it is theoretically inadequate. Furthermore, the needed explanation 
cannot posit a change in the character of God, for example, from 
being an individual whose primary motive is love to one whose 
primary motive is justice. Such changes of character are possible for 
imperfect beings, but God’s character is not alterable in this way, 
according to traditional theism.16 
This is the challenge Kvanvig gives non-issuantists.  
Kvanvig’s own approach on the other hand is that of integration. That is, 
he seeks to explain how both heaven and hell issue from the same divine 
character quality. For Kvanvig, hell flows “from the same divine character 
from which heaven flows.”17 Kvanvig first attempts to show why God’s love 
must be the foundational attribute for both heaven and hell, and not some 
other attribute like God’s sovereignty. Making God’s sovereignty the absolute 
starting point risks justifying even horrendous evils as good just because God 
has willed them. It goes back to the classic question raised by Plato in 
Euthyphro: Is the good good because God wills it, or does God will the good 
because it is good? Supposing that the good is good because God wills it is 
metaethical voluntarism. The greatest weakness with this view, according to 
Kvanvig, is that it robs God’s moral judgment of any kind of meaningful 
content. If God is beyond morality, then nothing God does can be truly said 
to be evil, wrong or unjust. Moreover, nothing God does can correctly be 
deemed good, right or just. If anything can be good because God wills it, “it is 
true that God is good and perfectly so; the problem is that it is a trivial truth, 
no more informative about God’s character and behavior than is the 
statement that God is God.”18  
If God wills the good because it is good, then one can raise questions 
about God’s relationship to the good. Is God bound by moral norms in the 
same way as humans? God’s goodness presumably does not consist in 
following an external set of moral rules. But is God free not to follow these 
rules? If God is not able to sin, but does what is good of necessity, then how 
can God be praiseworthy for being good? Kvanvig’s conclusion is that God’s 
sovereignty provides an insufficient basis for justifying God’s actions.  
Nor can God’s justice be the dominant attribute since the Bible repeatedly 
reports instances where God postpones judgment on account of love. Justice 
as a dominant attribute does not explain why God would take the initiative to 
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do something to remedy humanity’s predicament. The integration of divine 
motivations for heaven and hell must be one that is faithful to the uniqueness 
of both alternatives. For Kvanvig and other issuantists, this divine motivation 
is the love of God. Other divine qualities such as sovereignty and justice fail 
to account for God’s great actions of creation and redemption.  
Eleonore Stump presents another integrated approach to the divine 
motivations for heaven and hell. She defines the love of God for a human 
person in thomistic terms as God doing whatever possible to ensure the most 
good for that person.19 This entails the actualization or fulfillment of the 
person’s nature. She writes: 
[F]or Aquinas, to love something is to treat it according to its 
nature. Thus God’s love for human persons consists essentially in 
treating them according to their nature; and so, given Aquinas’ 
account of human nature, God’s love for a person involves helping 
to maximize that person’s capacity for reason.20    
The height of human reason is the cultivation of a virtuous character, 
including a character that loves God. 
People who refuse or fail to cultivate a virtuous character develop a 
secondary, vicious nature. It would be inappropriate for God to allow a 
person with a vicious character into heaven. There would then be two options 
open for God. First, God could annihilate a person with a vicious character. 
Stump believes that this would be unloving of God. God could only destroy a 
being if there were some overriding good that could so be achieved. Given the 
thomistic identification of goodness with being, it is difficult to conceive how 
God’s love (ensuring the most good for a person) could be expressed by 
destroying the person’s being.  
Since the person’s vicious character makes it impossible for God to love in 
the sense of maximizing the person’s capacity for reason, God’s other option 
is to treat the person according to her second, vicious nature. The person 
with a vicious character is thus consigned to a hell that is more like a 
quarantine than a torture chamber. In Stump’s conception of hell, the 
ungodly are unable to harm themselves and others. “[B]y putting restraints 
on the evil they can do, he [God] can maximize their being by keeping them 
from additional decay. In this way, then, he shows love.”21 Thus hell is an 
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16/2 (1986): 192. 
20 Stump 1986, 192. 
21 Stump 1986, 197. 
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expression of God’s love for people who have chosen not to develop a 
virtuous character.  
Walls agrees with Stump in his emphasis that divine goodness must be 
closely related to God’s love. Otherwise, God’s goodness could easily become 
a cold, metaphysical abstraction, whereas the emphasis in the Bible and in the 
religious experience of believers is that God’s goodness finds its primary 
expression in God’s love for creation and in God’s desire to have a 
meaningful relationship with at least some human creatures. A loving God 
will do everything possible to call people into a relationship with Godself, 
including providing “optimal grace” after death for those who have lived their 
lives under circumstances where they have not been able to see God’s true 
loving character. “But if God does everything he can to save all persons, short 
of destroying anyone’s freedom, it may be that God can, consistent with 
perfect goodness, create some persons knowing they will never act in 
accordance with grace.”22 Once these criteria are fulfilled, God’s action in 
allowing people to make a definitive choice for hell can be a loving act. 
Peter Kreeft presents an issuant view of hell that is clearly inspired by C.S. 
Lewis. Regarding the integration of divine motivations, he writes: 
Some think that if there is a hell, justice has the last word, not love 
or mercy, which is one of love’s works. We naturally think of mercy 
as the relaxation and compromising of justice, and justice as prior. 
But in God, love is more primordial than justice. Justice is simply a 
form that love takes. The very act of creation is pure love, for no 
creature was even there to justly deserve anything, not even 
existence, before it was created. Scripture never says, “God is 
justice”, but it does say that “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8). Love is God’s 
essence; justice is one of its works, and mercy is another. Justice is 
the structure of love. Justice is like the skeleton; love is like the 
person. 
 Hell is due more to love than to justice. Love created free 
persons who could choose hell. Love continues to beat upon the 
damned like sunlight on an albino slug and constitutes their 
torture, as we have seen. The fires of hell are made of the love of 
God.23 
                                                
22 Walls 1992, 93. 
23 Peter J. Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics 
(Crowborough, E Sussex: Monarch, 1995), 292. Stanley J. Grenz presents a similar idea: 
“Because God is eternal, our experience of God’s love – whether as fellowship or as wrath – is 
also eternal. Just as the righteous enjoy unending community with God, so also those who set 
themselves in opposition to God’s love experience his holy love eternally. For them, however, 
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Like Kvanvig, Kreeft insists that only the love of God could provide a 
sufficient motivation for God’s acts of creation. 
Issuantist Stephen T. Davis reflects that one’s normal intuitions are to 
view love and wrath as opposites, an idea which he rejects. Love is an intrinsic 
quality in God and an essential part of God’s inter-Trinitarian relations. 
God’s wrath, on the other hand, is not intrinsic; it emerges only as a result of 
human sin. The same can be said of grace, which like wrath is a divine 
response to human sinfulness. Even though both wrath and grace emerge as 
secondary qualities in God, they are not opposites, since both exist for the 
same purpose – to lead sinners to repentance.24    
Sharon L. Baker25 argues for a form of issuantism where God’s purpose for 
hell is always restorative not retributive. She combines issuantism with a form 
of annihilationism. “The wrath of God, rather than anger, is love that burns 
away the sin, purifying the sinner so that true reconciliation and restoration 
can take place.”26 In Baker’s eschatology, God’s love both purifies those who 
make positive responses to God’s grace and consumes the ungodly. 
Buckareff and Plug defend an issuant version of hell that includes endless 
opportunities for the ungodly to repent and be released from hell. Regarding 
love as the divine motivation for hell, they reason: 
1. All of God’s actions are just and loving. 
2. If all of God’s actions are just and loving, then no action of 
God’s is motivated by an unjust or unloving pro-attitude. 
3. If no action of God’s is motivated by an unjust or unloving pro-
attitude, then God’s soteriological activity is motivated by His 
just and loving pro-attitudes.  
4. If God’s soteriological activity is motivated by His just and 
loving pro-attitudes, then God’s provision for separation from 
Him is motivated by God’s desire for the most just and loving 
state of affairs to be realized in the eschaton.27  
                                                                                                               
this experience is hell.” Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Nashville: 
Broadman & Holman, 1994), 836. 
24 Stephen T. Davis, “Hell, Wrath and the Grace of God” in Buenting 2010, 93-94. 
25 No known relation to the present author. 
26 Sharon L. Baker, Razing Hell (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 122.  
27 Andrei A. Buckareff and Allen Plug, “Escaping hell: divine motivation and the 
problem of hell” Religious Studies 41 (2005): 42-43.  
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The Wrath of God 
The issuantist contention that even hell must issue from the love of God 
raises some interesting questions about the wrath of God. What is one to 
make of verses like John 3:36,28 Romans 1:1829 or Revelation 14:9-11?30 In 
chapter one of the present work I described the methodology of some 
issuantists who use philosophical reflection more than exegesis in the 
development of their view of hell. As a result, some of these issuantists choose 
to ignore the question altogether.31  
Fortunately, not all issuantists turn a blind eye to the biblical language of 
God’s wrath towards the ungodly. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli give three 
options for understanding the images of wrath.   
‘The wrath of God’ is a scriptural expression. But (a) it is probably a 
metaphor, an anthropomorphic image, like ‘God’s strong right 
hand’ or God changing his mind. It is not literal. And (b) if it is not 
a metaphor but literal wrath (hate), it is a projection of our own 
hate onto God rather than a hate within God himself. And (c) if it is 
an objective fact in God rather than a subjective projection from us, 
then it refers to God’s holiness and justice, not a smoldering 
resentment; it is his wrath against sin, not against sinners.32 
Kreeft and Tacelli give the illustration of a child who wants to be angry and 
resentful towards his parents. As his mother takes him into her arms to 
reassure him of her unfailing love, the child becomes even more furious, 
                                                
28 “Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life; whoever does not obey the Son shall 
not see life, but the wrath of God remains on him.” 
29 “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and 
unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth.” 
30 “If anyone worships the beast and its image and receives a mark on his forehead or 
on his hand, he also will drink the wine of God's wrath, poured full strength into the cup of his 
anger, and he will be tormented with fire and sulfur in the presence of the holy angels and in 
the presence of the Lamb. And the smoke of their torment goes up forever and ever, and they 
have no rest, day or night, these worshipers of the beast and its image, and whoever receives 
the mark of its name.” 
31 No mention is made of the wrath of God in any of the works by Swinburne, Kvanvig 
or Stump listed in the bibliography. Walls gives the wrath of God only a passing mention in the 
context of the views of Origen and Clement of Alexandria on the purifying nature of purgatory 
(Walls 2012, 15) and in a description of the penal substitution view of the atonement (Walls 
2012, 158). In a brief discussion Walls uses “the fourth bowl of God’s wrath” (Revelation 16:9), 
to illustrate the point that punishment does not always achieve the desired end of a restored 
relationship (Walls 2004a, 211). In a similar vein, Buckareff and Plug only touch upon the 
wrath of God in the context of stating that God allows hell for the sake of restoring a 
relationship (Buckareff and Plug 2005, 44).  
32 Kreeft and Tacelli 1995, 289-290.  
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kicking and shouting and pounding his fists at her. They write, “Wrath is 
what love feels like to us when we hate it.”33 Kreeft and Tacelli do not exegete 
any specific scriptural passages, but lay out these alternatives as general 
observations or possibilities, seemingly landing on alternative (b) as the most 
probable interpretation.   
Issuantist Stephen Davis explains how biblical images of the wrath of God 
can be harmonized with the conviction that even hell must issue from the 
love of God. He begins by defining the wrath of God as “God’s opposition to, 
hatred of, and dissatisfaction with human disobedience.”34 Davis maintains 
that the wrath of God is not retributive in nature; its purpose is not to punish 
for punishment’s sake. Rather, the purpose of God’s wrath is to lead 
wrongdoers to repentance.  As a parallel to his statement “the grace of God is 
our only hope” Davis makes the surprising but “equally true” statement that 
“the wrath of God is our only hope.”35 By this he means that without the 
wrath of God, we would have no awareness that some acts are morally right 
or that others are morally wrong or that our morally wrong acts have 
ruptured our relationship with God.  
Davis does not see the wrath of God and the love of God as competing or 
contradictory concepts; both are aspects of God’s nature. While God’s love is 
an intrinsic characteristic of the triune God, wrath only manifests itself in 
God as a response to sin. Grace is related to wrath in that it too only arises as 
a response to sin. The purpose of God’s goodness is to lead wrongdoers to 
repentance (Romans 2:4). Thus, both grace and wrath have the same 
function. “[T]he divine wrath and the divine mercy are not opposed to each 
other after all.”36 Without wrath we would not understand mercy and would 
not be moved to take the necessary steps to have a restored relationship with 
God. 
Perhaps the scholar who does the most to interpret the wrath of God in 
non-retributive terms is Stephen Travis.37 Travis examines scores of biblical 
                                                
33 Peter J. Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Catholic Apologetics (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 2009), 352. 
34 Davis 2010, 92. 
35 Davis 2010, 92. 
36 Davis 2010, 94. 
37 Stephen H. Travis, Christ and the Judgement of God: The Limits of Divine Retribution 
in New Testament Thought (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008). Although Travis does not 
always state positively what he believes to be the nature or purpose of hell, he seems at least to 
distance himself from both belief in ECT and universalism. He most likely leans towards some 
form of conditionalism or annihilationism, based partly on this statement: “But the balance of 
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passages that prima facie would lend themselves to a retributive 
interpretation and shows how they can more properly be understood in terms 
of relationship.  Although his purpose is to show that retribution is not God’s 
main motivation in judgment,38 he is careful not to do violence to the texts by 
forcing implausible, non-retributive interpretations.  
The main thrust of Travis’ exegesis is that the basis for judgment in both 
the Old Testament and the New Testament is not a person’s or nation’s 
individual sins or good deeds. Instead, the basis is one’s covenantal 
relationship with God. Although individual acts gradually form a fixed 
character, one’s character is a sign of one’s place within the covenant or one’s 
choice to stand outside the covenant. Those who are in covenant with God 
can expect to enjoy the protection and blessings of that relationship while 
those who are not in such a relationship with God will experience the wrath 
of God. The wrath of God for Travis is tantamount to being abandoned by 
God. This includes the removal of God’s protection and God’s “face” or 
presence so that people will experience the natural consequences of their 
choice to stand outside the covenantal relationship with God.   
I will illustrate Travis’ interpretations by summarizing his exegesis of two 
representative passages: one from the gospels and one from Paul.   
The clear contrast in John 3:36 is between belief and obedience on the one 
hand and disbelief and disobedience on the other hand. Those who are in 
relationship with Christ through faith experience eternal life while those who 
demonstrate through their disobedience the fact that they are not in 
relationship with Christ will experience the wrath of God.39 
In Romans 1:18-32 the contrast is between God’s righteousness that is 
revealed in the gospel and God’s wrath that is revealed against 
                                                                                                               
evidence suggests that ‘the second death’ symbolizes the destiny of those who have refused to 
be in relationship with God as a state of non-being rather than a state of conscious torment.” 
(Travis 2008, 307). He is careful however to balance this by cautioning himself and his readers 
that “we are wise not to build on John’s visions a dogmatic case for any precise answer to the 
question, What is the fate of those who refuse the mercy of God?” (Travis 2008, 307). I include 
Travis in this section because his exegesis of biblical passages dealing with the wrath of God 
along non-retributive lines is fully in keeping with both the issuantists’ insistence on the love of 
God as the divine motivation for hell and their rejection of the Retribution Thesis. Even 
though he is not an issuantist, he does the exegetical work that most issuantists only hint at. 
38 Travis admits that some texts are best understood in retributive terms, especially in 
the Old Testament, but states that their infrequency is surprising given the prominence of 
concepts of retribution in the Greco-Roman world. He maintains however that the retributive 
texts from the Old Testament are generally reinterpreted by the New Testament authors in 
light of the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
39 Travis 2008, 266-267. 
Issuant Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
84 
unrighteousness. God’s wrath is revealed in God “giving them over” to their 
own devices. The natural consequence of their choice not to have a 
relationship with God is that God respects that wish and leaves them alone. 
“Wrath is thus equivalent to abandonment by God. It is the lost condition of 
humanity.”40 He relates that each kind of sin is met by its own appropriate 
judgment. The glory that was God’s due (v. 23) relates to the degrading 
actions of verse 24. For exchanging the truth about God for a lie (v. 25), they 
will exchange natural sexual relations for unnatural ones (v. 26). For not 
thinking it worthwhile (ούκ ἐδοκίμασαν) to know God (v. 28) they will 
experience a corresponding depraved (ἀδόκιμον) mind (v. 28). Travis 
encapsulates his findings, “This structured series goes to emphasize that 
wrath is not capricious. It is God’s personal and fitting response to human 
contempt of him and his will.”41  
As we have seen, Kvanvig challenges non-issuantists to provide a defense 
for the segregated approach of interpreting heaven as an expression of God’s 
love and hell as an expression of God’s justice, wrath or holiness. On the 
whole, non-issuantists do not need to take this challenge since a segregated 
approach to God’s motivations for heaven and hell is not a necessary 
component of any non-issuant view of hell.  
The non-issuantist need not take issue with the issuantists’ attempts to 
integrate both heaven and hell under the banner of God’s love. While belief 
that the love of God must be the divine motivation for hell is a necessary (but 
not adequate) part of issuantism, its rejection is an adequate (but not 
necessary) part of any non-issuant view of hell. Saying that hell is an 
expression of God’s love is admittedly somewhat counterintuitive,42 but 
nothing that directly contradicts the views of non-issuantists, since non-
issuantists also believe in the non-contradictory nature of God’s attributes. 
Both issuantists and non-issuantists can agree that describing God’s attributes 
is somewhat like trying to look at a house with a microscope – one can only 
see a tiny bit at any one time. Even while looking at a piece of kitchen tile, one 
                                                
40 Travis 2008, 61. 
41 Travis 2008, 61-62. 
42 This observation was made by Nietzsche in section 15 of the first essay in On the 
Genealogy of Morals, “Dante, as it seems to me, made a crass mistake when with awe-inspiring 
ingenuity he placed that inscription over the gate of his hell, ‘Me too made eternal love.’” 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, Horace B. Samuel, trans. (New York: Dover, 
2003), 28. Nietzsche was here paraphrasing Dante’s Inferno, canto III:4-6 and suggested that 
eternal hate would be a more appropriate source for the creation of the Christian doctrine of 
hell. Dante, however, does not see hell as issuing exclusively from the love of God, but also 
from God’s wisdom and justice.  
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knows the house is also made up of wood, plumbing, electrical wiring, 
windows, wallpaper, insulation and more. It’s just that one cannot see all 
these aspects of the house at the same time with the limited perspective of a 
microscope. Both issuantists and non-issuantists know that God is holy, just, 
loving, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, etc. – even though it is hard to see all 
these attributes simultaneously with the limited perspective of God’s actions 
in one specific set of circumstances. 
Metaphysical Libertarian Human Freedom 
A second trademark of basic issuantism is libertarian human freedom. In this 
section I shall examine the issue of compatibilist and libertarian definitions of 
human freedom as they relate to issuantism.   
The issue of determinism versus free will is of course a perennial topic of 
discussion in philosophy and theology. The question of whether determinism 
and human freedom are compatible has led to two major viewpoints: 
compatibilism and incompatibilism.  
Incompatibilism is the idea that human freedom is incompatible with 
determinism. Incompatibilism takes two forms: a hard determinism that 
rejects human freedom and a metaphysical libertarian human freedom that 
rejects all forms of causal determinism.  
A classic definition of metaphysical libertarianism that goes back to 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second century CE) is that one is free if, ceteris 
paribus, one at the time of action had the possibility of doing otherwise in a 
particular situation. Harry Frankfurt labeled this definition the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities (PAP).43 A deciding factor is the ceteris paribus 
condition. Libertarians interpret PAP as the ability to do otherwise in a given 
situation assuming that the laws of nature and the events of the past up to the 
moment of action were identical. For a compatibilist PAP means that one 
“could have done otherwise if one had so willed” or one “could have done 
otherwise if one had had sufficiently good reasons for so doing.” In such 
cases, all other things would not be equal at the time of action. 
It would then appear that compatibilists and libertarians have differing 
understandings of PAP. Libertarians assume that the laws of nature and 
history of the world up to the point of decision would be the same regardless 
of whether the person chooses action A or action B. Compatibilists, on the 
other hand, maintain that one could have chosen to act differently if one had 
                                                
43 Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of 
Philosophy 66/23 (1969): 829-39. 
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so desired, but deny, on the basis of the laws of nature and the previous 
history of the world, that a person would have different desires.  
A somewhat more nuanced definition would include the idea that one is 
free in a libertarian sense when all of one’s actions are causally 
undetermined.44 The way one understands “causally undetermined” may vary 
among libertarians. Some level of quantum indeterminacy in one’s brain may 
be sufficient for some libertarians to say that a person is free, whereas others 
require a higher degree of indeterminacy. Libertarians commonly hold that a 
person’s will and actions can be caused, but these causes can only be 
probabilistic, not deterministic. These causes may be either internal or 
external. Internal causes like dispositions or a fixed character are (at most) 
probabilistic; they may increase the likelihood of a certain choice, but do not 
determine it.  
Take for instance two cases. In the first, a child is raised by racist parents 
who are part of a white supremacist movement. From an early age the child is 
indoctrinated with the virtues and achievements of whites while ethnic 
minorities become scapegoats for all societal ills. Chances are great that the 
child will grow up to be a racist, even though there is a possibility that the 
child will not be a racist. Maybe a falling-out with the parents over an 
unrelated issue will cause the child to fall in love with a person of color to 
spite the racist parents. In a second scenario, the child is raised in a setting 
where a person’s race is simply not an issue. Yet somewhere along the way, 
the now young adult begins to explore white supremacist websites, books, 
chat rooms and more – to the point that the person becomes a convinced 
white supremacist. In this case the young person’s racism has primarily 
internal causes. In both scenarios, external and internal causes are 
contributing or probabilistic factors without being determining. 
Compatibilism 
A hard determinism that denies human freedom implies that external causes 
such as the decrees of God, fate or natural laws determine a person’s course of 
action. As a soft form of determinism, compatibilism states that there is at 
least an internal cause for everything. The presence of external causes may 
mean that an act is not free if the external cause leads one to act against one’s 
desires. Because of external causes such as the commands or threats of a 
superior officer, a soldier may find himself “forced against his will” to commit 
war crimes or other atrocities against civilians. According to compatibilism, 
                                                
44 Hall 2003, 24. 
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this soldier is not free since he is not able to act in accordance with his 
desires.  
Compatibilism allows for at least some form of determining cause that still 
allows a person to act in accordance with her desires. Some forms of inner 
causes (such as compulsion) impinge on freedom. The important thing is that 
people can act based on their values or desires. For instance, a person may 
wash her hands hundreds of times a day. If the hand-washing is due to 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and the person wishes to be free from this 
compulsion, then she is not free. If, however, she repeatedly washes her hands 
because she is a doctor making her rounds in the hospital ward (plus 
bathroom breaks, meal preparation, etc.), then she is acting according to her 
values and her actions are free.  
First and second-order desires and volitions 
In a now classic article in The Journal of Philosophy,45 Frankfurt makes a 
distinction between first and second-order desires and explains the difference 
between persons, animals and “wantons.”  
Both humans and animals have what Frankfurt calls first-order desires. 
These are the simple desires to do or not to pursue a certain course of action. 
The distinction between persons and animals is that persons also have 
second-order desires. Second-order desires are desires about first-order 
desires. They can take several forms: the desire not to have a first order desire 
(such as the desire to eat lots and lots of ice cream); a desire to have a first-
order desire that one does not have (the desire to exercise); and a desire for 
one first-order desire to win over another one – when a person wants a 
certain desire to be her will (that the desire to exercise would win out over the 
desire to eat too much dessert).  
A person has free will if she acts on the desire that she wants to win. A will 
is a desire that is effective in producing behavior. A person has freedom of the 
will if she has the will she wants.  
Frankfurt specifies further that a person who has this third type of second-
order desire (that a certain first-order desire be her will) also has a “second-
order volition.” It is the presence of second-order volitions that distinguishes 
a “person” from non-persons. Frankfurt calls these non-persons “wantons.” 
Wantons are beings who do not care about their will; they do not deliberate 
over which desires or set of desires they would prefer to translate into action. 
                                                
45 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” The Journal 
of Philosophy 68/1 (1971): 5-20. 
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Even though wantons do not have freedom of will, they may still be held 
morally responsible for their actions.   
In my view, however, the relation between moral responsibility and 
the freedom of the will has been very widely misunderstood. It is 
not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done 
only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally 
responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at 
all.46 
Although Frankfurt is a compatibilist, several authors have found his theory 
helpful in understanding issuant views of hell.47 Using Frankfurt’s 
terminology, one could say that a person in hell has a first-order desire to love 
self rather than God. She may also have a second-order desire that she love 
God more than she does. In addition, she may have a second-order volition in 
her wish that her first-order desire to love self were not her effective will. 
Thus, according to Frankfurt’s theory, the person in hell is not there freely 
since her first-order desire to love self does not align with her second-order 
volition. If she is not free, can she be morally responsible for her 
predicament? Frankfurt and some other compatibilists would answer in the 
affirmative.  
Frankfurt’s theory explains how a person’s choice to love self rather than 
God can be morally culpable despite the presence of external constraints. This 
is a controversial view and philosophical journals are replete with discussions 
of what are now called Frankfurt-style counterexamples. With these 
counterexamples Frankfurt and other compatibilists maintain that because of 
hypnosis, brainwashing or electrical or mechanical manipulation of the brain 
a person can be morally responsible even though she lacks the possibility of 
doing otherwise in a given situation.48  
                                                
46 Frankfurt 1971, 18. 
47 Barnard 2010, 65-75; Andrei A. Buckareff and Allen Plug, “Value, Finality and 
Frustration: Problems for Escapism?” in Buenting 2010, 77-90. 
48 To name just a few: David P. Hunt, “Frankfurt Counterexamples” Faith and 
Philosophy 13/3 (1996): 395-401; Joseph Keim Campbell, “A Compatibilist Theory of 
Alternative Possibilities” Philosophical Studies 88/3 (1997): 319-330; Michael S. McKenna, 
“Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt Counter-Examples?” Philosophical Studies 91/3 
(1998): 259-264; Linda Zagzebski, “Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternative 
Possibilities?” Noûs 34 (2000): 231-248; Daniel Speak, “The Impertinence of Frankfurt-style 
Argument” The Philosophical Quarterly 57/226 (2007): 76-95.  
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Libertarianism 
A simple definition of libertarianism can be expressed in PAP: a person is free 
if he or she had the possibility of doing otherwise. A more exact definition of 
PAP would include the ideas that the freedom to do otherwise must obtain at 
the time of action and under the same set of circumstances. Libertarians insist 
that all of our actions be causally undetermined. One’s choices must also be 
morally significant. That is, the choices must be between good and bad 
alternatives, not simply among a range of good choices.  
Libertarians point to the common human phenomenon of deliberating 
over different courses of action as evidence that a person must be free in this 
sense. Libertarian philosophers like Héctor-Neri Castañeda and Richard 
Taylor argue that one cannot rationally deliberate about whether to bring 
about some event that one thinks is determined to happen.49 For example, it 
would be meaningless to deliberate over whether one should allow the sun to 
rise tomorrow morning. According to libertarianism, if internal or external 
determining causes limit the range of choices available to a person, then it 
would be meaningless to look back on a past choice and wish one had done 
something else unless the choice were morally significant. Following 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, a libertarian may claim that the fact that we regret 
our actions shows that we were actually free to do otherwise. This conclusion 
is not necessary; a compatibilist like Tomis Kapitan could claim that it would 
suffice for a person to believe herself to be free to do otherwise.50 Thus a 
person who voted for presidential candidate M could in retrospect wish she 
had voted for a different candidate even though unbeknownst to her, the 
election was rigged so that it was not possible for M not to be elected. Kapitan 
calls this the presumption of contingency. Together with the efficacy 
condition (the belief that one has some ability to affect the course of events), 
the presumption of contingency shows how libertarians cannot use the fact of 
deliberation as support for libertarianism.  
Moral Responsibility 
Of perhaps greater interest to issuantists is the relationship between human 
freedom and moral responsibility. Although compatibilists argue for moral 
responsibility even in the midst of some degree of determinism, libertarians 
maintain that people can only be morally responsible if they are free in a 
                                                
49 Cited in Tomis Kapitan, “Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives” 
The Philosophical Quarterly 36/4 (1986): 231. 
50 Kapitan 1986, 233-237. 
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libertarian sense. The degree to which one is to be considered free and 
morally responsible in the presence of internal causes that in turn have 
external causes is a topic of discussion among libertarians. Swinburne, for 
example, acknowledges that acts may have external causes, but maintains that 
they are not sufficient causes; that is, they are not determining causes. 
Lindsey Hall explains the fine line the libertarian must walk between 
randomness and compatibilism. 
The libertarian then must provide an account of freedom with a 
very specific degree of causation. Too much, and the type of 
freedom will become compatibilist or even determinist and too 
little and the freedom will be no more than randomness of choice, 
unable to make that agent morally accountable.51  
Whereas libertarians do not allow for any form of cause that determines a 
person’s course of actions, compatibilists allow for the presence of internal 
causes like personal convictions, fear or sloth, even if these internal causes 
have developed as a result of external factors like culture or conditioning.  
Personal convictions or a fixed character may limit what choices are 
practically open for a person. Compatibilists say that the person is still free 
and responsible for his actions, while libertarians maintain that a person is 
still free and morally responsible if the internal and external causes only 
increase the probability of a certain action without determining it. If however 
some cause determines an action, the resultant absence of freedom also 
entails the absence of responsibility for the action. Let us look at an example 
to illustrate these points. 
Suppose that in a non-determined universe, a man is at home watching 
television and suddenly hears a woman outside crying for help. According to 
both libertarianism and compatibilism, he is free either to go out and help the 
woman or to continue watching TV. Let’s suppose he chooses to remain in 
front of the TV. The compatibilist would say he is free, since this is what he 
wants to do. The libertarian would also say he is free, since he could choose to 
go out and help the woman. Both the compatibilist and the libertarian would 
contend that the man is morally responsible for his decision. 
Yet unbeknownst to the man, his doors were nailed shut so that he 
couldn’t have left his home to help the woman if he had tried. In this case, 
both the libertarian and the compatibilist would say the man had freedom of 
will even if he did not have freedom of action, regardless of whether he knew 
the door was nailed shut. Libertarians would say the man is not responsible 
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for not helping the woman since he did not have freedom of action. 
Compatibilists would say that the person’s physical (in)ability to leave his 
home is irrelevant to how we judge the freedom or morality of his (in)action. 
He may not be free to leave his home, but he is free to desire to leave it. 
According to compatibilism, that makes all the difference.   
If not only external causes like a barred door, but even internal causes 
such as fear, indifference or belief in a deterministic universe are determining 
factors in the decision-making process, then the person does not enjoy 
libertarian freedom – given the present set of circumstances, it is not possible 
for him to act otherwise. Although the person may experience some level of 
personal regret, he recognizes at the same time that it was not a freely chosen 
course of action. 
Libertarianism and the Problem of Hell 
The problem of hell is a specific form of the problem of evil. One common 
means of providing a defense for God’s actions in allowing evil in the world is 
the Free Will Defense (FWD).52 The FWD is dependent upon a libertarian 
conception of human freedom. One could summarize the FWD that free will 
is a great good; so great, in fact, that it justifies the existence of the moral evil 
that free humans may cause. Since God desires to bring about a world in 
which the greater good of human freedom obtains, God cannot create a world 
in which human creatures are both free and in which there is no evil.  
The FWD could be strengthened by explaining why one should value 
freedom above the absence of moral evil. Intuitively we believe that we should 
take precautions to stop people from harming others. These precautions may 
include legislation, fines or imprisonment for those who break the 
injunctions of law, and even acts of civil courage whereby some people react 
to prevent situations where it appears that an innocent person may come to 
harm. Of course one must keep in mind that the FWD is presented as a 
defense and not a theodicy. This is a distinction made by Alvin Plantinga. 
“[T]he aim [of a FWD] is not to say what God’s reason [for permitting evil] is, 
but at most what God’s reason might possibly be.”53 The purpose of a defense 
is to provide a logically possible explanation for the state of affairs in the 
actual world, whereas greater demands are placed on a theodicy in justifying 
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God’s actions in creating the actual world. That is, the explanation must be 
not only logically possible, but true (or at least plausible).  
Issuantists claim that any theology of hell which presupposes anything 
other than a libertarian definition of human freedom fails simpliciter to 
answer the moral objections against hell raised by the problem of hell. If God 
can predestine or otherwise compel a person to salvation, then God would be 
morally culpable for not choosing or compelling all people to salvation.54 
Moreover, people who ultimately reject God cannot be held morally 
responsible for their choices if their condition were such that they were not 
free to choose otherwise.  
Walls points out the serious implications of compatibilism for the 
doctrine of hell. 
For if freedom and determination are compatible, and persons are 
free only in the sense that they do what God has made them willing 
to do, then God could save all persons with their freedom intact. 
Not only could God save all persons, but he could also eliminate 
evil and do it in such a way that all would obey his will ‘most freely.’ 
He could, but he will not.55  
Issuantists thus insist on a libertarian understanding of human freedom. 
Swinburne writes: “Free will is a good thing, and for God to override it for 
whatever cause is to all appearances a bad thing.”56 He does not believe that 
God may override people’s freedom, even for the sake of preventing them 
from being damned.57  
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Evaluation of libertarian freedom as it relates to issuantism 
Metaphysical libertarianism is not without its challenges. It is difficult to 
conceive why a rational person would choose to go to hell if PAP is true. In 
other words, is it an intelligible notion to believe that some people could 
freely choose to do evil or to damn themselves if they really knew what they 
were doing? Swinburne holds that significant freedom must include the 
freedom to act irrationally and damn oneself,58 while universalists like 
Thomas Talbott and Eric Reitan, on the other hand, claim that a decisive 
choice for evil is an unintelligible notion simply because it is irrational.59 
David Guevara argues that consigning a person to hell is unjust if that person 
has been fully rational in choosing not to believe in God, and insists that such 
a choice for hell can indeed be rational.60 
A second problem relates not directly to libertarianism as such, but to the 
use by some issuantists of Frankfurt’s model of first and second-order desires 
and volitions to explain how a person can end up in hell. The Frankfurt 
model seemingly works well with issuant views that combine basic issuantism 
with the Less-than-Human Thesis where the person in hell is a wanton.61 Yet 
it seems problematic for issuantists who in rejecting the Retribution Thesis 
see hell as the natural consequence of a person’s free choice to live without 
God. People are not morally responsible for actions in which they are not 
free. Nor do the people who end up in hell have to be wantons; they can have 
first- and second-order desires for evil and volitions that are in line with those 
evil desires. This is a logical possibility even if it is difficult to imagine a 
person who consciously chooses to do evil. It is more common that people 
believe their actions to be good or that their actions will lead to a better result 
than some other course of actions. 
A third critique of some extreme forms of libertarianism is that the 
absence of causes makes all choices random. Although he is a libertarian 
himself,62 Talbott writes:  
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If a person makes a choice, and nothing causes him to make that 
choice, his undetermined choice would be a mere chance 
occurrence or random event, and one could hardly be held 
responsible for a chance occurrence or a random event.63  
If the only criterion for free choice is the absence of determining causes, then 
a person could make significant moral choices by simply flipping a coin. 
Talbott points out that a satisfactory definition of libertarian freedom must 
include at least some conception of rationality. That is why we do not regard 
infants, the severely brain damaged, paranoid schizophrenics, or even dogs as 
free, morally responsible agents.64  
People have a tendency to try to see reasons for why things happen. When 
a loved one is killed in an accident, people want to know why. When a child 
comes down with cancer, the parents want to know why. As such, 
indeterminacy is existentially unsatisfactory. Therefore, the libertarian must 
make some sort of qualification as to what types of causes (such as 
probabilistic causes) can be admitted for a choice still to be considered free.  
It is not at all certain that Talbott’s charge of randomness is properly 
directed against the issuantists. Among the issuantists highlighted in this 
work, none makes the claim that freedom demands that no external causes be 
allowed, only that these external causes can only be probabilistic and not 
determining. The presence of probabilistic causes provides enough of a basis 
for decisions not to be made randomly.  
Hall comments that once issuantists qualify what types of causes are 
compatible with freedom, this qualified libertarianism starts to look more like 
compatibilism.  
Swinburne concedes that human freedom is not perfect and that 
actions do have causes, but the point is that they are not sufficient 
causes. The libertarian then must provide an account of freedom 
with a very specific degree of causation. Too much, and the type of 
freedom will become compatibilist or even determinist and too 
little and the freedom will be no more than randomness of choice, 
unable to make that agent morally accountable.65 
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Issuantists need therefore to be more precise in distinguishing between 
determining causes and probabilistic causes. What would constitute a 
determining cause for a libertarian? If there are only probabilistic causes, are 
there any circumstances in which a person is not truly free?  
In a fourth critique against libertarianism as it relates to issuantism, one 
could say that the libertarian interpretation of PAP is not sufficient for 
determining moral responsibility. Compatibilist philosopher Daniel Dennett 
writes: “I will argue that whatever ‘could have done otherwise’ actually means, 
it is not what we are interested in when we care about whether some act was 
freely and responsibly performed.”66 The main consideration is not whether a 
person could have done otherwise, but rather whether the action itself is 
morally right or wrong and whether the person is morally responsible for her 
actions.  
Dennett goes on to give the example of Martin Luther at the Diet of 
Worms.67 When Luther stated, “Here I stand; I can do no other”, he was 
saying that the constraints of his conscience and convictions made it 
practically impossible for him to recant. Luther was not trying to avoid 
prosecution by an appeal to some lack of freedom that would entail absence 
of moral responsibility. Nor did the ecclesial court free him from 
responsibility because he was unable to do otherwise. Dennett claims that the 
(in)ability to have done otherwise is a red herring in any discussion of 
freedom and responsibility. Likewise, the Nürnberg trials at the end of World 
War II did not absolve Nazi concentration camp guards of their guilt on the 
grounds that they were not free not to follow the orders they’d received from 
their superiors. 
In this section I have shown that issuantists maintain that only a 
libertarian definition of human freedom preserves an agent’s moral 
responsibility for her actions. I shall return to the question of libertarianism 
as it relates to issuantism in chapter five where I shall examine the 
implications of the development of a fixed character for issuantism.  
Rejection of the Retribution Thesis 
Thus far we have examined two criteria for issuant views of hell: the love of 
God as the integration of divine motives for heaven and hell and 
metaphysical libertarianism. As noted previously, the term issuantism relates 
directly to the integration of divine motives for heaven and hell; both 
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destinies must “issue” from the same divine character quality, viz., God’s love. 
Libertarian human freedom relates directly to an alternative designation for 
issuantism, “the choice model of hell.” A third important characteristic of 
issuantism relates to the designation “the natural consequence model of hell” 
– the rejection of the Retribution Thesis.  
In this section, I shall first examine the concept of desert. Next I shall 
present the chief objections raised by issuantists against the Retribution 
Thesis. Finally, I shall detail and evaluate the most common explanations 
proposed by issuantists as to the purpose of hell.  
Desert 
In the penal system, possible justifications for punishment can be divided 
into two main categories: retributive and utilitarian. George Sher claims that 
utility and desert face in opposite temporal directions.  
Because an action’s utility is determined by the future benefits it 
will bring, while what a person deserves ordinarily depends on his 
past or present actions or characteristics, it is not obvious that a 
consistent utilitarian can allow for desert.68  
Because of their forward-looking nature, utilitarian accounts tend to 
emphasize the incentive effects of reward and punishment.  
Retributive justice is founded upon notions of desert. Certain agents or 
subjects are said to deserve some positive or negative object on the basis of 
some action or condition related to the agent and/or the object. The basis for 
desert can be an act, an omission or a character quality. Some formulations of 
desert also include a source who in some way bears the responsibility for 
providing the subject or agent his due object, as in the following example: 
Because of her bravery in saving children from a burning school building, Miss 
Yoder deserves praise from the community. Unless one presupposes the 
existence of God or some other provider of cosmic justice, it is not necessary 
to include a source in the formula, especially if there is no apparent 
connection between the source and the benefit or harm done by the action, as 
in the statement: Marcus has had so much bad luck; he deserves some good 
luck for a change. In this case, who (if not God) should be the supposed 
source or provider of the good luck Marcus deserves? 
In other examples, it would appear that a violinist deserves praise for her 
stunning performance because she has practiced diligently for many years, 
but that the winner of a lottery does not deserve praise since his purchase of a 
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winning lottery ticket was a matter of pure chance. While philosophers like 
John Rawls and James Rachels claim that desert presupposes responsibility on 
the part of the agent for the basis of the object, they also reject the idea of true 
desert on the grounds that not even the violinist deserves praise since the 
basis for her achievements lies partly outside her personal responsibility: a 
natural-born talent, early conditioning by parents, etc.69 Rawls writes: 
It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments 
that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native 
endowments, any more than one deserves one’s initial starting 
place in society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior 
character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his 
abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large 
part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he 
can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to 
these cases.70  
Moreover, criminals do not deserve retributive punishment since they do not 
bear responsibility for the combination of nature and nurture that has led to 
their criminal character and actions. There may, however, be certain 
legitimate expectations on the part of both the criminal and society: 
rehabilitation of the criminal, restitution, restoration, deterrence and/or 
incapacitation for the purpose of protecting innocent members of society.  
This issue of desert relates closely to questions of determining causes for a 
person’s actions and to the role of religious luck in character formation. 
Causes that have their origin in religious luck would seem to allow for moral 
responsibility if they are only probabilistic or if one accepts some form of 
compatibilism. Without moral responsibility there can be no grounds for 
saying that a person deserves reward or punishment. 
The injustice of retribution 
Issuantists, who reject compatibilism in favor of a metaphysical libertarian 
definition of human freedom, also reject retribution as a divine motivation 
for hell for a number of reasons.  
Beyond the aforementioned reasons for a general rejection of desert, 
issuantists reject the Retribution Thesis first because the rejection of positive 
notions of desert is consistent with other parts of Christian theology.  
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On the surface of things, it would seem that if one thinks of hell as a place 
of punishment, it would be reasonable to conclude that heaven is a place of 
reward if one also believes that heaven and hell represent two mutually 
exclusive, exhaustive alternatives for postmortem human existence. That is, if 
the ungodly deserve eternal punishment, then the godly must deserve eternal 
life. Yet classic Christian theology denies that eternal life is a reward for 
faithful service. Rather, it is the free and gracious gift of a loving God, 
unmerited by anything one has done. If heaven is not a reward for doing 
good, how could hell be a punishment for doing evil?  
For instance, I once found 500 Swedish crowns (at that time roughly €50) 
on the platform of a subway station in Stockholm. Although I did not have 
any desert-claims on the money, my family and I benefited from a nice meal 
(including dessert!) in a restaurant as a consequence. In what way does this 
relate to eternal salvation? One cannot say that anyone deserves salvation as a 
reward for good behavior. Consider the following statements: 
MT1 Mother Teresa deserves to go to heaven because of her loving 
service to the poor. 
MT2 Mother Teresa deserves to go to heaven because of her great 
faith in God. 
MT3 Mother Teresa deserves to go to heaven because of Christ’s 
atoning death on her behalf.     
Although statement MT1 may resonate with popular sentiments, it does not 
easily harmonize with classic Christian theology that one does not merit 
salvation by good works. Statements MT 2 and MT 3 may prima facie seem to 
fit in better with Christian theology, even though the notion of desert may 
still seem alien to discussions of God’s grace. It is precisely because grace is 
undeserved that it is grace.  
If one rejects positive notions of desert as reward, it makes sense to reject 
ideas of desert as punishment. Consider these statements:  
1. Emma deserves to go to hell because of her persistent rejection 
of God’s grace.  
2. Alex deserves to go to hell because of his failure to place his faith 
in God.  
Although issuantists allow for some form of existence in hell, they reject the 
idea that it is something one deserves. It may, however, be a legitimately 
expected consequence based on Emma’s free choice to reject God’s grace or 
Alex’s failure to place his faith in God.  
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Sharon Baker presents a second reason for rejecting the Retribution 
Thesis. She claims that the Retribution Thesis renders forgiveness 
unnecessary. “Retributive justice does not require forgiveness, and if 
forgiveness later occurs, it is meaningless because the offense has already been 
set right through the retributive measures.”71 In contrast to this idea, Baker 
maintains that God’s unilateral decision to forgive means that punishing 
sinners becomes unnecessary. The fires of hell serve a purifying and 
restorative purpose.  
A third reason for rejecting the Retribution Thesis relates to justice and 
proportionality. Here one can legitimately ask whether two wrongs can make 
a right. If it’s wrong for Emma and Alex to live in rebellion against God or fail 
to submit themselves to God in worship and service, then it must also be 
wrong of God to punish them eternally with no prospect of rehabilitation or 
restoration. After arguing that justice demands nonviolence, Baker asks, “If 
justice is not present in violence, how then can we conceive of a God who 
executes justice through violence, especially the eternal violence of hell as we 
have traditionally thought it?”72 In a non-theological context, George Sher 
asks: “How can one impermissible act annul or cancel the normal 
impermissibility of another?”73 
Issuantists claim that according to a retributivist understanding of hell, the 
ungodly could never be punished sufficiently. In the legal system, 
punishment must be condign for the crime that has been committed. Once 
the demands of justice have been fulfilled, it is expected that the criminal be 
released from prison regardless of whether he has mended his ways. Without 
an appeal either to the status principle or to the Continuing Sin Defense 
advanced by Carson and Craig that unending punishment in hell is 
warranted by unending sin against God, the retributivist can never say that 
the demands of justice have been satisfied. The criterion of commensuration 
cannot be fulfilled according to the ECT theory of hell where even after 
millions of years in hell, the sinful lifestyle of the ungodly still warrants an 
infinite number of additional years of incarceration. Buckareff and Plug 
conclude that a retributivist view of hell from which there is no possibility of 
escape is inconsistent with the loving nature of God.  
If retributivism is right and some people are consigned to hell 
forever, then those who are consigned to hell forever are so 
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consigned because of the heinous nature of the sins that they have 
committed. Since hell would be retributive, the denizens of hell 
would be eligible to leave and enter heaven only when their 
punishment was exhausted. Those who are consigned to remain in 
hell for eternity, however, would never exhaust their punishment, 
and so could never enter heaven and be in communion with God. 
But, if the above arguments are sound, then this state of affairs 
would be one that God would not will since it would be 
inconsistent with His motivational states – in particular His desire 
for all persons to be reconciled with Him. So if retributivism is true, 
and some of those in hell remain there forever, then there must be 
some reason why they remain in hell, otherwise God’s policy would 
seem inconsistent – specifically, God would desire reconciliation, 
but after serving their time, some or all remain in hell.74 
James Cain rejects the idea that hell must necessarily involve some form of 
divine injustice. “Suffering the loss of heaven – even if this is an infinite loss – 
also does not seem to involve an injustice if what one has lost is not 
something one has a right to in the first place.”75 That is to say that since 
heaven is not based on desert, it is not unfair of God not to grant heaven to 
some people regardless of whether they’ve been good or not. 
It seems that the concept of desert would demand that every person be 
consigned to hell, since “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” 
(Romans 3:23). That God gives the opportunity of salvation to at least some 
human creatures is grace. God is not obligated to create a “fair” world in 
which every person receives the same opportunity to be saved. To think thus 
is to presuppose some concept of desert whereby people deserve salvation or 
at least the chance to receive salvation.  
One might compare this to the TV show Undercover Boss. In this series, 
the CEO of a major corporation “incarnates” as an entry-level employee in his 
or her corporation. While learning new job skills, the undercover boss meets 
some employees who strive for excellence, take pride in their work and have 
creative ideas for improving the company’s efficiency and products. At the 
same time the boss also meets slackers who do as little work as possible, who 
take extended breaks for coffee, lunch and cigarettes, and who through their 
negative attitudes poison the work environment. After a period of observing 
the company’s operations from the ground level, the boss reveals his or her 
true identity to the employees. The good employees are rewarded with 
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promotions, pay raises and other benefits. The slackers on the other hand are 
given a chance to mend their ways during a period of “grace” – or in the 
worst cases find themselves unemployed. The CEO is under no obligation to 
give anyone these perks or benefits. Nor can one say that she is unloving or 
unfair to the many employees she never encountered during her undercover 
incarnation. When an employee is hired, an agreement is reached as to job 
description, expectations, pay and benefits. If the company fails to abide by 
this agreement, it becomes a case for the labor union or some other outside 
arbiter. The company may however reward its employees with bonuses and 
benefits beyond the stipulated agreement. Likewise, the company may treat a 
bad or unproductive employee less harshly than warranted.  
Like the undercover boss, God’s choice of whether to extend mercy or 
grace is largely determined by relationship. Stephen H. Travis writes,  
[H]eaven and hell are best spoken of not as reward and punishment 
for the kind of life we have lived, but as the logical outcome of our 
relationship to God in this life. Heaven is not a reward for being a 
Christian any more than marriage is a reward for being engaged. 
And hell, we may say, is not a punishment for turning one’s back 
on Christ and choosing the road that leads to destruction. It is 
where the road leads.76  
Kvanvig concurs. For him,  
the demands of [God’s] justice never arise apart from 
considerations of his love for the created order, and hence no 
account of hell that appeals only to God’s justice in explaining hell 
can offer a fully comprehensive solution to the problem of hell.77 
In rejecting the idea of retribution, the issuantist must also reject the 
concomitant idea of desert. 
The Purpose of Hell 
Issuantists agree in their rejection of the Retribution Thesis, but vary in their 
understanding of the purpose of hell. Apart from retribution, an idea that 
issuantists reject, the most common interpretations of the purpose of hell are 
related to various utilitarian theories of punishment such as restitution or 
reparation, deterrence or prevention, incapacitation or quarantine, 
rehabilitation and restoration.  
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In this section I shall present the most commonly advanced theories as to 
the purpose of hell. Even though issuantists are unanimous in their rejection 
of retribution as the purpose for hell, I shall begin with a brief consideration 
of retribution both for the sake of completeness and in order to provide a 
clear contrast to the non-retributive ideas presented by issuantists.  
Retribution 
The ECT view of hell outlined in chapter two above includes the Retribution 
Thesis: “The justification for and purpose of hell is retributive in nature, hell 
being constituted so as to mete out punishment to those whose earthly lives 
and behavior warrant it.”78 Retribution is also generally seen as the purpose of 
hell according to conditionalists.79 Retribution involves the imposition by an 
authority of some hardship on a wrongdoer, such as a deprivation or special 
burden.80 Retribution may entail a deprivation of freedom, privacy or goods 
to which a person otherwise has a right, or the imposition of special burdens 
in the form of fines, jail sentences or community service.  
Retributivists point to Bible texts like 2 Thessalonians 1:6-8 as support for 
their view.  “[S]ince indeed God considers it just to repay with affliction those 
who afflict you … inflicting vengeance on those who do not know God and 
on those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus.” Traditionalist J.P. 
Moreland writes, “Justice demands retribution … It would be unjust to allow 
evil to go unpunished and to reward evil with good, even if the good was not 
sought in a genuine, informed way.”81 
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Likewise, the “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” texts or lex talionis of 
Exodus 21:24 and Leviticus 24:20 have often been touted as a foundation for 
justice. The purpose of the law may well have been the establishment of 
proportionality – that one could not execute a person for knocking out a 
tooth. The lex talionis sets limits to the severity of allowable punishment as a 
means of upholding a foundational notion of justice.     
Theologians from the Anabaptist tradition frequently reject the lex 
talionis, quoting the words of Jesus from Matthew 5:38-39 – “You have heard 
that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, 
Do not resist the one who is evil. But if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, 
turn to him the other also.”  
John Howard Yoder points out that Jesus set aside the lex talionis and that 
even in its original Old Testament context, the law was not applied to tit-for-
tat retribution in the case of murder.82 
Sharon Baker concludes that “[i]n the teaching of Jesus, we are exhorted, 
through forgiveness, to break the cycle of retribution, an eye for an eye, of 
getting even.”83 
Baker states that the attribution of retributive motives to God in Old 
Testament times has its origin in an illegitimate borrowing of retributive 
ideas from surrounding cultures. She goes on to argue that Jesus corrects 
these misunderstandings on a number of occasions, perhaps most tellingly in 
his glaring omission when reading the text of Isaiah 61:1-2 at the synagogue 
of Nazareth in Luke 4:16-21. There Jesus reads: “The Spirit of the Lord is 
upon me, because he has anointed me to proclaim good news to the poor. He 
has sent me to proclaim liberty to the captives and recovering of sight to the 
blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the year of the 
Lord's favor.” At that point Jesus closes the book and sits down, omitting the 
words “… and the day of vengeance of our God.” Baker concludes that “Jesus 
reinterprets the message of the Old Testament. Through Jesus, God will bring 
not a sword but salvation, not revenge but redemption, not the violence of 
force but the compassion of forgiveness.”84 
Marilyn McCord Adams argues that retribution as expressed in lex talionis 
fails to provide a just basis for ECT on the grounds that justice would not 
allow people to be treated worse than they actually deserve and that no one 
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deserves everlasting torment in hell. “According to the ‘eye for an eye’ 
principle, God would have the right to visit total and everlasting unhappiness 
on a sinner, if and only if that sinner had done the same to God.”85 One could, 
however, argue that God punishes the ungodly on behalf of the people who 
have been victims of a person’s offenses. In this scenario, God is not getting 
revenge for God’s own unhappiness, but for the unhappiness the ungodly 
have caused others. Adams insists that lex talionis fails even by this standard 
to provide a just basis for endless suffering in hell since no person can have 
caused an eternal amount of suffering in the span of one lifetime. Even if one 
could quantify the suffering caused by the archetype of evil Hitler by 
multiplying the number of his victims by the duration of their suffering, one 
would still end up with a finite number. Even at that, Adams maintains that 
causing Hitler to suffer for millions of years would be out of proportion to the 
suffering he caused his victims.  
She illustrates this with the example of Jones who knocks out one of 
Smith’s teeth.86 According to lex talionis, Jones should also have a tooth 
knocked out in retaliation. Suppose however that Jones was particularly 
bellicose and knocked out one tooth from each of 32 victims. For each of the 
victims to retaliate by knocking out one of Jones’ teeth would be to place 
Jones at a greater disadvantage than the disadvantage he caused in knocking 
out one tooth from each of his 32 victims. The disadvantage of having no 
teeth is out of proportion to the disadvantage caused by Jones whereby his 
victims each lost one tooth.  
As we have seen, one objection raised against retributive theories of hell is 
that unending, conscious punishment in an eternal hell is out of proportion 
to any evils a person may commit in this lifetime. Retributivists, however, 
could respond that even the concept of proportionality presupposes 
retribution. If one believes it to be morally wrong to execute shoplifters or to 
torture speeders, it is only because we have a more foundational sense of 
desert, that the nature of acts like shoplifting and speeding does not warrant 
execution or torture.  
We will now turn to various utilitarian theories of punishment that have 
the potential of providing a purpose for hell that entails benefits both to 
wrongdoers and their victims, a consideration that is very important to many 
issuantists. 
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Restitution / Reparation 
The emphasis of restitution as a theory of punishment lies not on paying 
one’s debt to society, but on paying one’s debt to the victim. Victims of crime 
often end up with great financial loss due to loss of wages, legal fees, and even 
the necessity of paying for the criminal’s upkeep in prison. Where is the 
justice in that?  
Instead of viewing sin as a simple transgression of rules, proponents of 
restitution as the purpose for hell see the ungodly as gaining an unfair 
advantage over those who strive to live a godly life. The unfair advantage 
comes in many forms, including perceptions of freedom from ethical 
demands such as the duty to worship God, or from other demands that may 
have their basis in religious faith, such as altruism or marital faithfulness. 
Those who obey these and other rules abjure the advantages they otherwise 
could have gained. The ungodly thus benefit twice from their wrongdoing: 
once from the self-restraint of others and once from their own lack of self-
restraint. The ungodly have the advantage of freedom from the moral 
restraint that characterizes the godly. The fair balance is restored when the 
protection that the godly enjoy is removed from the ungodly. This is in one 
sense a natural consequence. When protection is removed, the unfair 
advantage is removed.  
The purpose for hell as restitution would be to remove the unfair 
advantage that the ungodly have usurped while restoring the balance of 
benefits and burdens that are common to all morally responsible people.  
Hell as restitution does not have to involve pain and suffering and thus 
avoids the criticism that retributive theories of hell entail unending, divinely 
sanctioned, senseless cruelty.  
Universalist Thomas Talbott leaves room in his theology for a temporary 
hell that combines several utilitarian models: restitution, rehabilitation and 
restoration.87 Talbott rejects the Retribution Thesis on the grounds that 
justice demands restitution rather than suffering.  
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If no suffering of finite duration will satisfy the demands of justice, 
perhaps suffering of infinite duration will do the trick. But the truth 
is that no suffering of any duration will satisfy the demands of 
justice fully, because justice requires something of a different nature 
altogether.88  
The idea here is that real justice demands restitution, not retributive 
punishment for punishment’s sake. Since full restitution is impossible from a 
human perspective, the whole point of retributive justice is thwarted.  
What sort of thing would satisfy justice to the full in the event that 
one should do something morally wrong? … If one could somehow 
make amends for the wrong action, that is, undo any harm done, 
repair any damage, in a way that would make up for, or cancel out, 
the bad consequences of the action (in one’s own life as well as in 
the life of others), one would then satisfy justice to the full.89 
Talbott maintains that it is impossible to achieve this type of restitutive justice 
from a human perspective.  
In human society, of course, we cannot always achieve perfect 
justice; some may wonder whether even God has the power to 
achieve it. And when we cannot achieve perfect justice in a given 
case, such as cold-blooded murder, we then settle for the best 
possible alternative: a means of removing the murderer’s unfair 
advantage. But whether we execute murderers, condemn them to a 
life sentence without possibility of parole, or punish them in some 
other way, our punishment does not in any way undo the harm 
they have done either to themselves or to others and does not, 
therefore, satisfy all the demands of justice.90 
In human terms, one can never fully establish justice and must settle for a 
second-best kind of justice, including forms of retribution. God, however, 
does not face such limitations.  
Accordingly, not even the best of the humanly devised systems of 
justice can be anything more than a distorted reflection of divine 
justice – limited, perhaps, to preventing wrongdoers from achieving 
an unfair advantage through their misdeeds and to regulating our 
human desire to strike back. … If we accept the Christian view, 
according to which sin is anything that separates us from God and 
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from each other, then the answer to our question is clear: Perfect 
justice requires reconciliation and restoration.91  
Justice demands restitution, but since restitution is impossible from a human 
perspective, we can leave it to God to achieve a higher form of justice in the 
form of reconciliation and restoration. Through the pains of a temporary hell, 
the illusions of ungodly are stripped away and they come to understand 
clearly the harm their sin has done to themselves, to others and to God. The 
repentance they express in response to God’s forgiveness is a concrete 
expression of their desire to make restitution to God and others. 
According to the restitution theory of punishment, prisons would serve a 
different purpose than they would under a retributive understanding of 
punishment. Restitution would mean the establishment of structures for 
criminals to give restitution to their victims with financial restitution as a 
basic first step. However, it may be argued that restitution cannot provide a 
complete and sufficient basis for justice. In cases of assault or murder there 
can be no restitution and fines for such crimes are arbitrary. Can one place a 
price tag on a human life or on the loss of peace of mind after an assault?  
Critics may claim that even in cases of theft, the restitution of stolen 
money is not sufficient since the victim’s loss is not exclusively financial and 
because restitution has no value in deterring either the criminal or others 
from (re)committing this crime.  
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine what a theory of hell as restitution 
would look like in practice for several reasons. First, the involuntary 
redistribution of benefits and burdens would seem like a prima facie violation 
of a person’s freedom in the libertarian sense, thus contradicting another key 
component of basic issuantism.  
A second problem comes in knowing what standard to apply in measuring 
the amount of unfair advantage the ungodly gain by their wrongdoing. If the 
benefits of wrongdoing are measured in terms of likelihood, then lying would 
have to be “punished” more severely than murder since people are less likely 
to murder than to seek the unfair advantage they believe they will gain by 
lying.   
Third, while one can understand the idea that hell removes the unfair 
advantage the ungodly have over the godly and restores a sense of balance, it 
does nothing to address the sins that the ungodly commit against God. 
Although God may be grieved by a person’s sin, there is little chance for 
                                                
91 Talbott 1999, 160. 
Issuant Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
108 
restitution of God’s emotional loss unless one combines restitution with some 
other theory of hell, such as restoration or rehabilitation. 
Deterrence / Prevention 
A theory of punishment popularized by utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham was 
that fewer people would commit crimes if they could see that the negative 
experience of harsh punishment would outweigh any putative pleasure the 
criminal may gain from his wrongdoing. Deterrence takes two possible forms: 
specific deterrence or prevention in which the wrongdoer is prevented from 
further wrongdoing and general deterrence in which the punishment of a 
wrongdoer serves as a warning example so that other people are deterred 
from the same wrong behavior. In many cases the mere threat of punishment 
may suffice to deter a would-be wrongdoer if the wrongdoer believes the 
threat. 
In the Bible deterrence is presented as one possible motivation for 
punishment in early Hebrew society alongside restitution and retribution. In 
the context of perjurers, the Israelites were instructed to punish the perjurer 
with the punishment his false testimony would have led to for the accused.  
[T]hen you shall do to him as he had meant to do to his brother. So 
you shall purge the evil from your midst. And the rest shall hear 
and fear, and shall never again commit any such evil among you. 
Your eye shall not pity. It shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.92 
In the case where an Israelite tries to persuade others to follow false gods, the 
punishment should be harsh so that “all Israel shall hear and fear and never 
again do any such wickedness as this among you.”93 
Swinburne rejects both the Retribution Thesis and the idea that hell could 
lead to reform or rehabilitation of the ungodly. Instead, he prefers to 
emphasize poena damni as the nature of hell more than any specific purpose 
of hell, he believes that hell nonetheless may have a certain value in deterring 
sin. “[P]oena damni will not serve any purposes of prevention or reform, but 
if it is known to or suspected by others that that may be the fate of those who 
sin continually, it can certainly deter those others.”94 He does, however, admit 
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that a condign punishment probably does not provide sufficient gravitas to 
deter would-be wrongdoers.95  
There are several problems with deterrence as the purpose for hell. In the 
first place, deterrence doesn’t work as a model without some concomitant 
idea of retribution. Without presupposing notions of desert, it would be 
justified for God to send an innocent person (who was presumed guilty) to 
hell.  
Sofia Jeppsson further explains this problem of founding punishment on a 
utilitarian theory of deterrence.  
The motivation for putting up walls and bars between A and B was 
to protect B from violence, but this could in theory be done by 
imprisoning B just as well as A. The reason that it is A and not B 
who ought to be imprisoned is not that it would be inconvenient to 
lock up all potential victims instead of the criminals, or have bad 
consequences from doing so, but simply that it was A and not B 
who did wrong, so it is A who deserves it.96 
It is thus only with the presupposition of desert that justice can be 
maintained.  
The punishment of a putatively guilty person for the purpose of 
deterrence leads to a second problem. Since no one truly knows who ends up 
in hell, the people who perhaps most need to be deterred from their sin are 
not likely to believe they are headed to hell. Buckareff and Plug write: 
Nor can the suffering be for deterrence purposes. If hell has a 
deterrent effect, that effect is due to the threat of hell. It is not due 
to the actual suffering of those in hell since we, prior to being 
consigned to hell, cannot observe the suffering. So any deterrence is 
due to the threat alone. If the threat alone is a sufficient deterrent, 
then the actual suffering of those in hell is unnecessary to satisfy 
any deterrent purpose.97 
As such, the actual sufferings of hell are unnecessary and the threat of hell is 
ineffective in deterring people from sin.  
A third problem is raised by the question of proportionality. According to 
the deterrence theory, if there were no punishment for crime, a great number 
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of people would commit petty theft such as shoplifting. Since most people 
have a greater natural resistance to taking another person’s life, fewer people 
would be tempted to do it in the absence of punishment. If deterrence were 
the only criterion for punishment, it would make sense to have a harsher 
punishment for the petty crimes that people are more likely to commit than 
for more serious crimes, which fewer people are likely to commit. As a 
utilitarian theory, deterrence has no means of insuring that less serious, but 
more common crimes not be punished harsher than more serious but less 
common crimes. The only justification for matching the severity of a 
punishment to the crime is a notion of proportionality that presupposes 
concepts like desert and retribution – that certain actions are inherently 
worse than others and thus deserving of a harsher punishment. 
Incapacitation / Quarantine 
Hell can also be seen as a form of quarantine or exile for the purpose of 
incapacitation of the wrongdoer or protection of the innocent. Quarantine or 
incapacitation may be seen as a form of prevention where the purpose is not 
primarily that the ungodly would learn the consequences of their action or 
mend their ways, but that they would be unable to continue in their 
wrongdoing. Those who are in hell are deprived of the goodness that comes 
from relationship with God and with other people in community. Issuantist 
Eleonore Stump states that consignment in hell has the purpose of preventing 
the ungodly from contaminating the heavenly community while God at the 
same time demonstrates divine love by allowing the good that is entailed in 
the existence of even the ungodly to continue. She ties this idea to a rejection 
of the No Escape Thesis, but maintains that it is only a contingent fact that no 
one ever escapes from hell.98  
Stump’s quarantine conception of hell builds on Aquinas’ definition of 
love as willing good to a person. When God loves a person, God wills that 
person good. This means God does whatever is within God’s power to ensure 
the most good for the person. For Aquinas, this good is the promotion of 
human rationality, which is closely related to morality. To actualize 
rationality is to aim at promoting moral actions and emotions in accord with 
reason, and virtuous states of character – thus fulfilling the final cause of 
humanity. For both Aquinas and Stump, existence is good, but this goodness 
can be outweighed by evil actions so that a person turns out on the whole to 
be evil.  
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For Stump, in order for hell to issue from God’s love for humanity, it is 
necessary that it be the best way open to God to aim at an increase of being. 
Since some people do not want to fulfill their God-given final cause in 
developing a moral character and becoming more fully rational creatures, it 
becomes necessary for God to do something with them so that they do not 
hinder the overall good which is going on in the redemption and growth of 
others. The logical choices are annihilation or some form of existence 
separate from God. Although allowing the ungodly to cease to exist might 
seem like a greater good than their unending suffering in hell, Stump does 
not believe that annihilation can be a greater good since annihilation 
necessarily entails non-existence and goodness is inextricably tied to 
existence. “In the absence of such an overriding good, however, the 
annihilation of the damned is not morally justified and thus not an option for 
a good God.”99 God consigns the damned to a place where the goodness of 
being is not lost, but where the corruption of their character does not risk 
endangering the progress being made by other beings.  
Kvanvig sees several problems with Stump’s approach. First, the 
quarantine model is no guarantee that the damned will not continue to 
destroy or corrupt whatever goodness may still be found in the other beings 
in quarantine. The second problem relates to the Existence Thesis. “If being is 
the fundamental value, justifying annihilation is difficult. However, if 
freedom is of fundamental value annihilation seems to be easier to justify.”100 
Freedom is clearly important, since it is the main explanation why God does 
not redeem everyone. Moreover, freedom cannot be of secondary importance 
to being since God should otherwise sacrifice the freedom of a person who 
has rejected God for the sake of maximizing his being. According to Kvanvig, 
Stump’s quarantine model has no means of explaining why seclusion in hell is 
morally superior to forced residence in heaven when the logical end of 
seclusion in hell is loss of freedom. 
C.P. Ragland develops a similar line of thought. If, as Stump maintains, 
God overrides the freedom of the ungodly for the greater good of existence, 
in spite of the fact that the ungodly may prefer annihilation to the everlasting 
suffering of hell, then why could God not override the freedom of the 
ungodly for the sake of saving them against their will? Surely the blessing of a 
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forced heaven must weigh greater than a forced consignment in an 
everlasting hell.101 
Rehabilitation 
A further utilitarian theory of punishment is that of rehabilitation. The 
rehabilitation theory of punishment is not satisfied with a change of actions 
or the prevention of certain negative actions. One of the underlying 
assumptions of this theory is that no healthy person in a sound state of mind 
would commit a heinous crime. As George Sher sees it, “… any society that 
wishes to forego punishment, but also wishes to control behavior, will be 
pressed to regard undesirable acts as forms of pathology.”102 That is, since it is 
a sign of illness, wrongdoing doesn’t warrant retribution. Attempts to alter 
the wrongdoer’s behavior become forms of therapy.  
As a theory of hell, rehabilitation is often a concomitant to either 
universalism or escapism as a supplement to basic issuantism. Many 
evangelical universalists make a place in their system for a temporary hell in 
which the ungodly see the error of their ways and are rehabilitated.103 Once 
the sinner has been rehabilitated, she is released from hell to enjoy the 
benefits of eternal life. 
Rehabilitation seems to face at least one of the weaknesses also seen in 
other utilitarian theories of punishment, viz., the lack of proportionality.  
As therapy, they need be neither predictable nor proportional to 
what the “patient” has done. … Instead, the mere potential for 
“pathological” behavior is sufficient to justify such attempts. … 
Carried to its natural conclusion, the “logic of therapy” ends by 
degrading us to the status of animals or things.104  
It appears that rehabilitation can not only lead to arbitrary and gross 
injustice, but that it also places enormous and arbitrary power to decide a 
person’s fate in the hands of those who set a course of treatment and decide 
when the criminal has been rehabilitated. In this case, a shoplifter and a mass-
murderer are both sentenced to an open-ended course of therapy and 
rehabilitation. Suppose the mass-murderer responds well to therapy and is 
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fully rehabilitated after a few weeks, while the shoplifter refuses to admit her 
guilt, is recalcitrant and remains in therapy for the rest of her life. On the 
rehabilitation theory, all sentences should be indeterminate. Since the relative 
severity of the crime is no longer a consideration (because it presupposes 
desert and retribution), all courses of treatment should continue until such 
time as the criminal is deemed to have been successfully rehabilitated by 
whatever arbitrary board or judge.  
More specific to our purposes, it would appear that viewing rehabilitation 
as the purpose of hell may present difficulties in explaining what happens to 
those who refuse to mend their ways, who remain permanently in hell. This 
seems to be most problematic for evangelical universalists, who would have to 
provide other reasons for their belief that no one ever refuses indefinitely to 
be rehabilitated and released from treatment in hell. Viewing the purpose of 
hell as rehabilitative does not have to present an inherent problem for 
issuantists who believe that a person may experience an unending hell as the 
natural consequence of one’s choices in life. 
Restoration 
According to restorative theories of justice, crime and wrongdoing are viewed 
as offenses against an individual or community, rather than against the state. 
The goal of justice is the healing of broken relationships and reconciliation of 
the wrongdoer with the offended. Among other means, this may take the 
form of personal meetings where wrongdoers learn of the great suffering their 
actions have caused the victims and their communities.  
One well-known example of an attempt to apply restorative justice on a 
large scale was South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 
1990s. During these hearings, survivors of egregious crimes committed 
primarily against black South Africans during the apartheid regime testified 
before those who had committed atrocities against them, telling their stories 
of personal suffering, loss and terror. Full amnesty was granted to some 
wrongdoers who confessed their guilt and met several other criteria. The 
goals were the reintegration of offenders into the community by encouraging 
them to take personal responsibility for their wrongdoing and the 
establishment of harmony across racial divides.  
Sharon Baker defines restorative justice as “A theory of justice that focuses 
on repairing a harm or offense so that the relationship between victim and 
offender can be restored.”105 One of her objections against retributive justice 
is that it removes the need for forgiveness. Even if forgiveness is subsequently 
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given, it is meaningless when the penalty has already been paid through 
retributive measures.106  
Focusing on the needs of the offenders, she points to God’s desire in the 
Bible to forgive and restore sinners to a renewed relationship with God. “[I]n 
Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses 
against them...”107  
Baker explains that divine justice does not mean that wrongdoers get off 
scot-free, but rather that God’s love “means coming face-to-face with the 
shameful depravity of personal sin by coming face-to-face with the one who 
has the right and the power to punish but who instead loves and forgives.”108 
Love and forgiveness result in repentance and redemption. Repentance is a 
fruit of, not a prerequisite for, restorative justice.  
In judgment, the sinner is confronted with the merciful, forgiving God 
whom she has wronged. The unfiltered exposure to God’s love serves as a 
catalyst for the sinner to recognize her guilt and repent. “[T]his is a chain 
reaction in which love forgives, forgiveness reconciles, and reconciliation 
restores – all characteristics of divine justice, God’s reconciling justice.”109 
As we have seen, one of the weaknesses of restitution as the purpose of hell 
is the impossibility of making restitution to an offended God. Baker’s 
restorative model seeks to overcome this problem through the extension of 
forgiveness and mercy to the wrongdoer. It would seem that Baker also 
succeeds in avoiding one of the problems facing other utilitarian theories of 
punishment, i.e., that they presuppose notions of desert and retribution. On 
Baker’s theory of restorative justice, one need not presuppose that sinners 
deserve mercy or forgiveness. They are gracious gifts given by a loving God. 
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As previously noted, Talbott rejects the Retribution Thesis in favor of a 
combination of utilitarian purposes, including restitution, rehabilitation and 
restoration. Recognizing the shortcomings of restitution as a theory of justice 
he suggests that one may settle for a second-best purpose, prevention.  
If we cannot achieve perfect justice, if we must settle for partial 
justice as a kind of second best, then we should at least prevent the 
wrongdoer, in so far as it lies within our power to do so, from 
achieving an unfair advantage over others.110  
However, the best means of preserving the dignity and humanity of the 
wrongdoer is through a restorative meeting between the sinner and God.  
Do we not want him to reclaim enough of his humanity to admit 
that he was wrong and to appreciate why he was wrong? Do we not 
want his illusions stripped away, so he can stand naked before his 
Creator? Only when the light finally breaks into his darkened 
understanding, only when the divine forgiveness begins its work of 
transformation, will he begin to appreciate the meaning of his 
punishment and the true nature of his evil deeds; and then, of 
course, he will already be on the road to redemption.111 
It is Talbott’s firm belief that no fully informed, rational person would 
continue perpetually in his rebellion against the love of God. Because of love, 
God does everything possible (including a personal confrontation after death) 
to show the sinner the error of his ways with the purpose of giving him full 
insight into the irrationality and destructiveness of his wrongdoing. When he 
realizes how his choices have harmed himself, others, and God he will repent 
and be restored to fellowship with God.  
The Nature of Hell 
While some issuantists like Stump and Baker clearly define the purpose of 
hell as quarantine or restoration, many others avoid the specific question of 
the purpose of hell and focus instead on the nature of hell.  
Theologians have traditionally defined the sufferings of hell in terms of 
both physical and spiritual anguish. Poena sensus is physical suffering and 
poena damni is the pain of loss experienced by the eternal separation of the 
ungodly from the presence of God. Poena damni or the natural loss of the 
good is perhaps the most common conceptualization of the nature of hell 
among issuantists today. 
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Swinburne maintains that hell does not consist of eternal physical 
punishment (poena sensus). Indeed, he is not certain that there is any 
suffering in hell. If there is suffering, it is a result of being separated from God 
(poena damni).  
But for God to subject them to literally endless physical pain (poena 
sensus in medieval terminology) does seem to me to be 
incompatible with the goodness of God. It seems to have the 
character of a barbarous vengeance; whatever the evil, a finite 
number of years of evildoing does not deserve an infinite number of 
years of physical pain as punishment. The all-important 
punishment is to be deprived of eternal happiness…112 
For Swinburne, the poena damni is on the one hand a more severe fate than 
poena sensus, yet at the same time possibly the best allocation of fate for those 
who have chosen it.113 “For the totally corrupt there must be the poena damni 
(i.e. damnation), the penalty of the loss of the vision of God, a penalty of far 
greater importance than any poena sensus…”114  
Michael Levine critiques Swinburne’s ranking of poena sensus and poena 
damni.  
If Swinburne sees the deprivation of the happiness of heaven as the 
‘all-important punishment’, then in claiming that God opts for 
distributing that punishment rather than the milder one of endless 
physical pain he sees God as choosing the more important and 
significant punishment. But given that Swinburne sees the less 
important punishment (i.e., endless physical pain) as incompatible 
with the goodness of God; is there not a presumption in favour of 
the view that the harsher, more significant punishment is also 
incompatible with the goodness of God?115  
According to Swinburne, poena sensus is incompatible with God’s goodness 
in that God would not punish a person with endless physical torment. Yet he 
believes that poena damni is a more significant punishment than poena 
sensus. How can poena damni be compatible with the goodness of God if it is 
worse than poena sensus and poena sensus is incompatible with God’s 
goodness? It would seem that one possible way around this conundrum is to 
propose the Not-so-Nasty Thesis. Swinburne seems to believe that poena 
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damni may not be all that bad if the totally corrupt have no desire for the 
good. The incorrigibly bad “have lost any desire for the good; and so for them 
the poena damni will be in no way a bad thing.”116 Even with the addition of 
the Not-so-Nasty Thesis, it is not completely clear how the Not-so-Nasty 
Thesis succeeds in rescuing Swinburne from the apparent contradiction of 
claiming that poena damni is worse than poena sensus and that poena sensus 
is incompatible with the goodness of God.  
Although Swinburne sometimes uses the language of punishment and 
judgment, he ultimately rejects the Retribution Thesis in favor of a view of 
hell as the natural consequences of one’s choices. “The poena damni is a loss 
of good, not an inflicted evil; and it is not so much a punishment inflicted 
from without as an inevitable consequence of a man allowing himself to lose 
his moral awareness.”117 Swinburne sees consignment to hell as the natural 
result of a fixed character that has been formed by a person’s choices in life.  
A fixed character limits the range of choices a person can freely choose. 
One may act in such a consistent manner over such an extended period of 
time that one’s natural desires for the good are extinguished. When this 
happens, the person’s freedom and chances of rehabilitation are also 
eliminated.   
Swinburne reasons that while one’s initial consignment to hell may be 
retributive in nature, one’s continued existence in hell is best explained by 
having lost one’s soul. The eternal duration of one’s residence in hell is not 
because one has done something to deserve it, but rather because it is 
impossible for one to achieve the moral character required for escape or 
release from hell. Kvanvig sees this as a weakness: at some point God 
abandons a person who persists in choosing evil, yet according to Kvanvig, 
Swinburne fails to provide an adequate explanation of why the issue of 
residence in hell is eternally fixed. That is, Swinburne has an insufficient basis 
for the finality of hell. Given the grounds of Swinburne’s rejection of the 
Retribution Thesis, there is no reason why he should keep the No Escape 
Thesis, which he does not reject. Similarly, he fails to provide reasons for the 
moral acceptability of God abandoning these people in hell.118 
According to Kvanvig, there are two possible approaches to understanding 
the privations one experiences in hell. First, it is possible to conceive of hell in 
terms of exile. Those who are in hell are deprived of the goodness that comes 
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with relationship with God and with other people in community. On the 
other hand, the privations of poena damni experienced by the ungodly in hell 
may extend even to the good of existence itself. This could be called an 
annihilation doctrine of hell. The main issue here is whether freedom or 
existence is the more important value.  
Kvanvig uses the analogies of capital punishment and suicide. In general, 
our penal system prioritizes existence more than freedom. Yet in some cases, 
suicide may be an expression of the preeminence of freedom over existence. 
Just as suicide may be justifiable in certain cases, the choice of annihilation 
may be justified in certain cases where one’s opposition to God is so great 
that anything (even nonexistence itself) is preferable to the presence of God. 
For God to override a person’s suicidal wishes (whether spiritual or physical) 
would be to declare the person morally incapable of handling one’s own 
affairs. If God were to override a person’s freedom to preserve her existence 
in an endless hell, then there is no good reason why God should not override 
a person’s freedom to give her an eternally blessed existence. “No matter how 
important existence is, intervention is sometimes too paternalistic to be 
justified, and hence the importance of freedom wins out over the importance 
of existence.”119 In such a case, the annihilation model would be preferable to 
the exile model. 
When issuantists like Kvanvig, Swinburne and others120 explain the nature 
of hell as the loss of some good a person otherwise would have enjoyed in 
heaven, they still fail to explain the purpose of hell. Why would God eternally 
remove common grace, the imago dei, or even existence itself from people as 
a “natural consequence” of their temporal rejection of God? That is, why 
should we believe that God will eternally remove people in hell from all 
experience of the goods of which God is author (love, friendship, beauty, joy, 
pleasure, existence)? If such a state entails immeasurable suffering for the 
ungodly, then why would it not be preferable for God to remove a person’s 
freedom as one of the good gifts of which God is the giver? If not for the sake 
of retribution, then there’s no clear reason why any of these goods would be 
absent, nor why they would be absent forever.  
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Summary and Evaluation of Basic Issuantism 
In this chapter I have presented what I believe to be the three sine qua non 
trademarks of basic issuantism: the love of God as the divine motivation for 
both heaven and hell, a libertarian definition of human free will, and the 
rejection of the Retribution Thesis.  
In regard to the first trademark, the integration of divine motives in the 
love of God, I have shown that issuantists contend that there is a fundamental 
inconsistency to most retributive perspectives on hell whereby God is 
portrayed as loving towards those who are being saved and wroth against 
those whom he condemns to hell.  
Issuantists maintain that both heaven and hell must issue from the love of 
God since love is a more foundational character quality than justice or wrath. 
Love is an intrinsic quality in God, while wrath only expresses itself as a 
response to sin. Moreover, issuantists hold that God’s love is the only 
attribute that provides a satisfactory foundation for God’s great works in 
creation and redemption; only love can be the basis for grace and mercy.  
Regarding the second trademark, metaphysical libertarianism, I have 
shown that issuantists believe that only a libertarian definition of human 
freedom is capable of preserving the concept of human moral responsibility. 
Issuantists contend that any form of determinism, including the soft 
determinism of compatibilism, eliminates moral responsibility. If a person’s 
actions can be at least partially determined by outside causes while claims of 
freedom and moral responsibility are asserted, then God would be morally 
culpable for not creating the world such that all people would freely choose 
salvation while at the same time being determined to do so.     
Regarding basic issuantism’s third trademark, I have shown that while not 
all issuantists state explicitly what they believe to be the purpose of hell, they 
uniformly reject the Retribution Thesis. Many issuantists emphasize the 
nature of hell more than its purpose and describe hell in terms of the 
privations of the goods with which God blesses those who are in a right 
relationship with God.  
With each of these points I have presented some possible objections to the 
positions held by issuantists. In most cases I have also shown that at least 
some forms of issuantism provide plausible answers to these objections. The 
problem comes in looking at basic issuantism’s overall potential for 
answering the problem of hell.  
Stephen Kershnar likens the doctrine of hell to a school principal who 
rules that any students caught fighting would be forcibly sodomized by the 
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school janitor. In setting up such a disproportionate system of punishment, 
the principal is responsible for the fighters’ suffering even if they place 
themselves in a position where they will be punished.121 
Kershnar’s example is clearly directed against retributive theories of hell. 
Yet if one rejects the Retribution Thesis, as in basic issuantism, then one 
views hell as some form of natural consequence of a person’s choice. In 
Kershnar’s example, there is no natural connection between the act of 
fighting and the punishment of being sodomized. According to issuantism 
there is nonetheless a natural connection between a person’s choice to live life 
without God and the natural consequences of those choices, being eternally 
separated from God and all the goods with which God wishes to bless people. 
Even so, God would still seem morally culpable for establishing a system 
whereby some people will suffer eternally, even if people can only blame 
themselves for ending up in that situation. 
A second point of critique against basic issuantism comes from Jonathan 
Kvanvig who is an issuantist himself. Kvanvig holds that basic issuantism has 
a problem in providing finality to a person’s choices. If human free choice is 
the deciding factor for determining one’s postmortem destiny, then what is 
there to say that one cannot freely change one’s mind? According to basic 
issuantism, it must be possible not only for a person in hell to repent and be 
released but for a person in heaven to apostatize and be cast out of heaven.  
According to Kvanvig, basic issuantism cannot guarantee universal 
salvation because of its inability to account for finality.   
[T]hough the ideal is for an individual to cooperate freely with God 
in the process of redemption, the nature of choice is such that no 
guarantee of success is possible. As such, for finality to be achieved, 
God must at some point end the uncertainty either by damning 
some forever or choosing to redeem a person against their will if 
need be.122  
Finality can only be achieved by God’s decision to damn some people or the 
forced salvation of others. 
A third idea to consider in evaluating basic issuantism is that of gratitude. 
Christians are to follow biblical examples in expressing gratitude to God for 
their salvation and for growth in grace in their lives.123 As the gift of God, 
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salvation is not something for which a believer can take personal credit.124 
This is in clear contrast to Eastern notions of karma where, if there is any 
spiritual growth or progress, one has only oneself to thank. Correspondingly, 
if I am a total spiritual loser and end up being reborn as a grasshopper, then I 
have no one to blame but myself.125  
When it comes to the doctrine of hell, critics are eager to blame God if 
someone ends up in hell. According to the problem of hell, if anyone suffers 
in hell, then God must somehow be at least partially impotent, ignorant or 
immoral. With the issuantist rejection of the Retribution Thesis and 
insistence on the Self-Determination Thesis, the blame for people ending up 
in hell is placed squarely back on the heads of the ungodly themselves. God 
gets the credit for a person’s salvation, but not the blame for her damnation. 
This would seemingly lead to the same type of asymmetry that issuantists 
reject in insisting that both heaven and hell must issue from the love of God. 
If humans cannot take credit for their salvation, how can they be blamed for 
their damnation? If the ungodly bear the sole responsibility for their infernal 
fate, then why aren’t the godly responsible for their eternal life?  
One option is to say that God is ultimately responsible for both the 
salvation of some and the damnation of others, an option found in Calvinism. 
Another option is to say that God is not responsible for either salvation or 
damnation. This option not only flies in the face of the Christian belief that 
salvation is a gift of God that one receives through faith, it also makes God 
largely redundant. It is on this basis that Moltmann calls issuant views 
“atheistic”. 
The logic of hell seems to me not merely inhumane but also 
extremely atheistic: here the human being in his freedom of choice 
is his own lord and god. His own will is his heaven – or his hell. 
God is merely the accessory who puts that will into effect. If I 
decide for heaven, God must put me there; if I decide for hell, he 
has to leave me there. … Free human beings forge their own 
happiness and are their own executioners. They do not just dispose 
over their lives here; they decide on their eternal destinies as well. 
So they have no need of any God at all.126  
Scholars who supplement basic issuantism with some form of Extra Chance 
Thesis deal with the question of finality in various ways, as we shall see in 
chapter five. As Kvanvig mentions, some scholars supplement basic 
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issuantism with what I call the Fixed Character Thesis. Kvanvig himself 
supplements his basic issuantism with a version of the Middle Knowledge 
Thesis.  
Issuantism developed within late twentieth-century Anglo-American 
theology because of the perceived failure of non-issuant views – in particular 
ECT and conditionalism – to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of 
hell.  
As we have seen, the problem of hell arises in the perceived inconsistency 
between the following premises:  
1. An omnipotent God could create a world in which all moral 
agents freely choose life with God.  
2. An omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the 
foreknowledge that some (perhaps a significant proportion) of 
God’s creatures would end up in hell. 
3. An omniscient God would know which people will end up in 
hell. 
4. Some people will end up forever in hell.  
A satisfactory answer to the problem of hell must seek to harmonize these 
premises. Through its insistence on libertarianism, basic issuantism defines 
what it means for a person to make a free choice, but does not address the 
question of which worlds it is logically possible or feasible for God to create. 
Through its insistence on love as God’s dominant attribute even towards 
people who will end up in hell, basic issuantism affirms God’s 
omnibenevolence, but says nothing about divine omniscience or 
foreknowledge.  
It has not been my desire to create a straw man which I have now swiftly 
destroyed. Basic issuantism by itself does not harmonize the ostensibly 
inconsistent premises of the problem of hell. But as a rarefied construction, 
maybe it was never intended to fulfill this purpose. Because of its failure at 
solving the problem of hell, most (if not all) issuantists seek to strengthen 
basic issuantism with the addition of one or more supplements. I shall turn to 
these supplements in the next chapter.  
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SUPPLEMENTS TO BASIC ISSUANTISM 
The capacity to eternally act against all of my motives would 
introduce into my life a potential for profound irrationality that I 
would rather do without. And if I exercise my libertarian freedom 
as described above, dooming myself to the outer darkness without 
reason, I sincerely hope that God would act to stop me – just as I 
hope a friend would stop me if I decided to leap from a rooftop for 
no reason. I would not regard the actions of that friend as a 
violation of any valuable freedom, but would see it as a welcome 
antidote to arbitrary stupidity.1  
First, if the fundamental problem of Hell cannot be answered, it is 
pointless to add to the description of Hell in any way at all. It is 
simply an untenable doctrine, for the same reason that adding 
further information to a contradiction doesn’t make the 
inconsistency disappear. Second, if we find an acceptable answer to 
the fundamental problem of Hell, that answer may inform us as to 
what additional language can be allowed and how it should be 
interpreted.2 
Issuant views of hell only succeed in rescuing God from the charges of being 
unloving and/or unjust if people in hell are there of their free wills – precisely 
the claim implicit in issuantism’s libertarianism and rejection of the 
Retribution Thesis. Yet by itself metaphysical libertarianism may be 
susceptible to the critique in chapter four that freedom and moral 
responsibility are dependent upon rationality. In this section, I shall examine 
a number of theses that some issuantists propose as supplements to basic 
issuantism for the purpose of reconciling human freedom with hell and 
thereby providing an answer to the problem of hell. The three trademarks are 
necessary aspects of an issuantist solution to the problem of hell. As I have 
shown in chapter four, however, basic issuantism is not adequate as an 
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answer to the problem of hell. That’s where the supplementary theses come 
into the picture. None of the supplementary theses is necessary, but in 
combination with the three trademarks of basic issuantism, they may form a 
coherent answer to the problem of hell.  
The Not-so-Nasty Thesis: People end up in hell because of their free 
choices. The people in hell are content with their situation since 
they have received what they genuinely want.  
The Less-than-Human Thesis: One natural consequence of a 
person’s rejection of God is the loss of the goods with which God 
endows people. The loss of these goods means the ultimate loss of 
humanity for the formerly human denizens of hell. 
The Nearly-Empty Thesis: Hell will be populated by only a small 
number of irredeemably evil beings. 
The Extra Chance Theses: In order to counteract the possible 
disadvantages of religious luck, God provides people with one or 
more postmortem opportunities to be saved. 
The Fixed Character Thesis: The formation of an evil character 
explains how people can chose to remain in hell.  
The Irrationality Thesis: Because of libertarian human freedom, 
God must allow people to make irrational choices even if those 
irrational choices entail that they end up in hell. 
The Middle Knowledge Thesis: Based on God’s middle knowledge 
of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God actualizes a world 
in which the optimal ratio of saved to lost is realized.  
The Openness Thesis: God’s character and actions in creating the 
world are vindicated by the fact that God did not know prior to the 
creative act which if any free moral agents would end up in hell.  
Of these theses, the Middle Knowledge Thesis and the Openness Thesis are 
perhaps not supplements to basic issuantism in the strict sense in that they 
are not expendable features whose purpose is to shore up basic issuantism. 
They are rather competing metaphysical assumptions about the nature of 
divine foreknowledge. I include them here because of their implications for 
the solutions to the problem of hell presented by molinist issuantists and 
openness issuantists respectively. 
I shall now examine these theses with a view to see how well they succeed 
in helping issuantism reconcile belief in an omnibenevolent, omniscient, 
omnipotent God with the possibility that at least some people may end up in 
hell.  
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The Not-so-Nasty Thesis 
A key component of the problem of hell is the difficulty in reconciling the 
loving God of Christian tradition and theology with the idea that this God 
would torment people for millions of years in an everlasting hell. As we have 
seen in chapter four, issuantists deal with this problem by maintaining that 
hell is not a retributive punishment meted out by a wrathful God, but the 
natural consequences of a person’s free choice when a loving God respects 
that choice and leaves people to their own devices.  
Bertrand Russell famously wrote that “Hell is neither so certain nor so hot 
as it used to be.”3 For some issuantists, hell may not be as hot as it used to be, 
but not for the reasons Russell had in mind. It is not because threats of hell 
are no longer effective in controlling people’s behavior, but because Christian 
theologians are turning down the thermostat to make things more 
comfortable for God!   
This is an idea hinted at by C.S. Lewis in his claim that the doors of hell 
are locked from the inside, and that the residents of hell are “successful rebels 
to the end.”4 On Lewis’ conception, the denizens of hell may be objectively 
unhappy while subjectively believing themselves to be happy. Lewis’ “ghosts” 
in The Great Divorce who return to hell after their excursion to the outskirts 
of heaven illustrate this warped sense of well-being.  
Among contemporary issuantists, the Not-so-Nasty Thesis is expressed in 
several ways. Stephen Davis writes for instance, “Having lived their lives apart 
from God, they will choose – eternally – to go on doing so. So it is not a bad 
thing that they do not spend eternity in the presence of God.” He believes that 
the ungodly will nonetheless be aware of the consequences of their choices. 
“Though they freely choose hell and could not be happy in paradise, I believe 
they will clearly understand what they have chosen to miss.”5  
Buckareff and Plug also speculate that existence in hell may not be all that 
bad.  
But we are sceptical that the well-being of any denizens of hell is 
negative. This is because we have endorsed an issuant view of hell. 
On such a view, hell is not retributive in nature but rather it is a 
place God has provided for those who do not wish to be with Him. 
Such persons are where they prefer to be and it is also a place they 
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have the option of leaving. On escapism, one enjoys some positive 
well-being in hell. There is one set of goods that a denizen of hell 
lacks, and it is of infinite value, viz. full-communion with God and 
the attendant benefits that it affords an agent.6   
Walls rejects the images of a medieval torture chamber that the church has 
inherited from the pseudepigraphical books of Enoch, Dante’s Inferno and 
Paradise Lost. “[H]ell is a place of misery. It is not, admittedly, as gruesome 
an account of hell as that held by some notable classical theologians. If it 
were, I could not plausibly hold that some persons may freely choose it.”7 In 
other words, if hell is really as bad as it’s always been made out to be, then it is 
inconceivable that anyone would freely choose it. He writes that the free 
choice for hell is only credible if the people in hell experience (or believe they 
will experience) some form of pleasure. For Walls, hell “holds no genuine 
happiness, but those who prefer it to heaven may savor a deformed sense of 
satisfaction which faintly resembles real happiness.”8 Walls thus settles on a 
hell that is objectively bad, but where people may be happy enough to get 
what they’ve always wanted and to enjoy some semblance of beauty, 
friendship and music even though they have a limited ability to enjoy these 
gifts of God.  
Walls maintains that it would be unloving of God to force people into 
unbearable suffering in hell even if the purpose is to lead a person to 
repentance. “If it is objectionable to compel repentance by the sword, it is 
objectionable to compel repentance by forcibly imposing misery, whether 
physical, psychological or spiritual.”9  
Walls responds to Talbott’s accusation that Walls “takes the hell out of 
hell”10 by saying that people in hell lack full insight into the true nature of 
their condition.  
Only one who is fully informed in the ultimate sense I distinguished 
above and fully formed by the truth about God could truly 
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understand the horror of being separated from Him. Only one who 
fully understood the goodness of God, and had a deep sense of His 
beauty, as well the joy of living in His presence, could truly grasp 
the horror of being separated from Him forever. Only someone 
who had responded in trust and love to God’s grace and had been 
deeply formed by it could see with full clarity what would be lost for 
those who rejected it.11 
This is the essential dividing line between issuantist Walls and universalist 
Talbott. Both agree on the three trademarks of basic issuantism, but come to 
differing conclusions on the relationship between God’s love and human 
rationality.12  
In light of Talbott’s critique, Walls reconsiders his earlier statements that 
hell might not be so nasty.  
I must confess that I overstated the case somewhat in my earlier 
book when I said those in hell get what they want. What the 
damned want is to be happy on their own terms. However, that is 
impossible. The only possible way we can truly be happy is on 
God’s terms. So the damned choose what they can have on their 
own terms, namely, a distorted sense of satisfaction that is a 
perverted mirror image of the real thing.13  
In spite of the warped perspectives like those of fun-house mirrors where one 
appears to be excessively tall or excessively fat or lacking in a torso or head, 
the people in hell are indeed in “a place of misery but not unbearable 
misery.”14 
For Swinburne, the totally corrupt who end up in hell do not have the 
good character necessary for entrance to heaven. Without this sanctified 
character, they do not desire the good of heaven, and thus end up in hell. He 
reasons that if people do not want the good of heaven, it cannot be a bad 
thing for them not to have it. Moreover, the beatific vision could even be 
understood to be a bad state, “if those deprived of that vision desire it all the 
same. If some do not desire it, it would not be a bad thing if they do not have 
it.”15 Since the people who have not developed a good character do not desire 
the beatific vision, it will be no great loss for them to be excluded from 
heaven. 
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If someone does form their character in such a way as to be 
unalterably bad and if that involved their having no residual desire 
for the good which they cannot choose, they do not then desire the 
Vision of God; and so it is not a bad thing that they do not get it.16  
Elsewhere he reiterates that “one account of the state of the incorrigibly bad is 
that they have lost any desire for the good; and so for them the poena damni 
will be in no way a bad thing.”17 
One possible advantage of the Not-so-Nasty Thesis is in providing an 
answer to the objection commonly raised against the Free Will Defense 
(FWD) that the FWD only succeeds in explaining why God would allow some 
evil – for the good of preserving human freedom. The FWD is seemingly 
impotent when it comes to explaining why God would allow the great 
amount of horrendous evil that is in the world today.18 Nor does the FWD 
provide satisfactory answers as to how God would be justified in prioritizing 
the good of human freedom over the infinite suffering of hell as conceived by 
ECT. The Not-so-Nasty Thesis may provide an answer to this objection by 
showing how God can be justified in allowing people to make the free choice 
for hell if what they are choosing is not all that bad and the people in hell are 
content with it.  
In light of the Not-so-Nasty Thesis’ turning down the thermostat of hell to 
make things more comfortable for God, one can legitimately wonder why one 
should view hell as a worse alternative than heaven. If people in hell are 
totally lacking the beatific vision and have only gotten what they want, how 
could they know what they’re missing?  
After all, it would appear that the only plausible reasons for giving the 
ungodly a glimpse of the beatific vision would be retribution or some sense of 
truth – that it would be important for people in hell to see the whole picture. 
What would be the reason for this full disclosure if not for the purpose of 
causing suffering? Unless the pains of hell serve as means to some end such as 
leading a person to repentance and release from hell, then they remain a form 
of retribution, an idea at odds with the tenets of basic issuantism.  
One possibility would be to say that even though people in hell may 
interpret their situation as reasonably tolerable (albeit objectively bad), they 
would still have cause to understand that existence in hell is worse than other 
                                                
16 Swinburne 1998, 121. 
17 Swinburne 1998, 197. 
18 This is an objection raised by Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the 
Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000) and Gregory A. Boyd in Boyd 
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modes of existence, since they may remember common grace from their lives 
on earth. This memory alone could be enough to help them understand that 
their condition in hell is much worse than their condition was on earth, even 
if they lack knowledge that it is infinitely worse than eternal life. 
Despite a prima facie mitigating of hell for both the ungodly and for God, 
it would seem that the Not-so-Nasty Thesis does little to aid basic issuantism 
in providing a satisfactory answer to the problem of hell. It is indeed a hell 
that according to conditionalist Fudge makes Christ’s words “Depart from 
me” begin “to sound less like a decree of banishment and more like an answer 
to the question, ‘May I be excused?’”19 
The Less-than-Human Thesis 
Another approach to harmonizing God’s goodness with the possibility of hell 
is found in the Less-than-Human Thesis proposed by several scholars. People 
who reject God also experience the loss of the goods with which God endows 
people. The loss of these goods means the ultimate loss of humanity for the 
formerly human denizens of hell. 
In my discussion of C.S. Lewis in chapter three, I explained how Lewis 
conceived of the people in hell as remains of what once were humans. To 
recap briefly, Lewis believed that one’s ultimate rejection of God is also a step 
away from God’s design for humanity. When one rejects God, one also rejects 
all the blessings that God wishes to give to created beings. The only things 
that remain are one’s vices. As one moves further away from God and God’s 
plan for humanity, one also moves down the ontological scale so that one 
becomes both somewhat less than human and ultimately less real.  
N.T. Wright is an issuantist who borrows heavily from C.S. Lewis. For 
Wright the suffering of hell is the loss of the image of God. He sees the image 
of God as a gift given to humanity. However, when people worship other 
gods (i.e., commit any kind of sin), there is a certain atrophy of the image of 
God. 
It is dangerously possible to start reflecting gods other than the true 
God in whose image we were made. But the other gods are not life-
giving. To worship them, and to reflect their image, is to court 
death: the eventual utter destruction of all that it means to be truly 
human.20   
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Like Lewis, Wright speculates that it must be possible for people who 
persistently choose to reflect the image of their false gods rather than the 
image of God to finally cease to bear the image of God altogether.  
Those who persistently refuse to follow Jesus, the true Image of 
God, will by their own choice become less and less like him, that is, 
less and less truly human. … Nor do I see anything to make me 
suppose that God, who gave his human creatures the risky gift of 
freedom and choice, will not honour that choice, albeit through the 
deep sorrow and sense of loss that any God we can truly imagine 
must carry at his heart, a sorrow lived out fully on Calvary. This, I 
think, is the way in which something like the traditional doctrine of 
hell can be restated in the present day.21  
Although Wright does not deny the prospect of individuals losing the image 
of God in an eschatological hell, it is not the main point.  
Maybe what we are faced with in our own day is a similar challenge: 
to focus not on the question of which human beings God is going to 
take to heaven and how he is going to do it but on the question of 
how God is going to redeem and renew his creation through human 
beings and how he is going to rescue those humans themselves as 
part of the process but not as the point of it all.22 
The task of the Christian believer is not primarily to evangelize individuals so 
they don’t go to hell, but to fight against the types of systemic evil that cause 
people to worship false gods rather than reflect the true image of God.  
The Less-than-Human Thesis holds that the natural consequences of a 
person’s free rejection of God is that one also rejects the image of God in 
humanity with the result that the inhabitants of hell become somewhat less 
than human. This thesis succeeds in satisfying Kvanvig’s objection that basic 
issuantism by itself does not account for the finality of a person’s “eternal” 
fate in that the deterioration of the former-human in hell is irrevocable.   
Yet the Less-than-Human Thesis seemingly adds little of value in 
providing a solution to the problem of hell. One objection commonly raised 
against hell (at least as conceived in ECT) is the disproportionality between 
wrongdoing and punishment. According to issuantism, hell is viewed as the 
natural consequence of a person’s choice to reject God. The Less-than-
Human Thesis does nothing to vindicate God’s action in allowing people to 
make this kind of disproportionate choice, especially if the choice entails the 
permanent, irrevocable loss of personhood. Even if one presupposes both that 
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moral responsibility is transitive and that the choices and character 
development that led to hell took place at a time when people were fully 
human and thus morally responsible, the Less-than-Human Thesis does 
nothing to explain how it can be apposite for a former human to be bound for 
millions of years for the choices made during a lifetime of at most 100 years 
unless one also supplements basic issuantism and the Less-than-Human 
Thesis with the Not-so-Nasty Thesis, the Irrationality Thesis and possibly the 
Fixed Character Thesis.  
Just because the people in hell cease to be fully human does not mean that 
they will not suffer (unless one also posits the Not-so-Nasty Thesis). If hell is 
the eternal equivalent of a person having himself committed to solitary 
confinement to the point where he loses all grasp of reality and becomes 
something less than human, then God must still somehow be culpable for 
setting up such a system since the suffering is out of proportion to whatever 
wrongdoing for which the person may be responsible. 
The Nearly-Empty Thesis 
According to the Nearly-Empty Thesis, hell will be populated by only a small 
number of irredeemably evil beings. Although the Nearly-Empty Thesis is 
neither a necessary nor an adequate supplement to issuantism, it is 
sometimes added as a way of showing that God is not to blame if a small 
number of people choose to reject God forever. Stump comments, “So long as 
some such speculation is not incompatible with Christian doctrine, it is not at 
all clear that the majority of people end in hell.”23  
Without explicitly embracing the Nearly-Empty Thesis, Walls comments 
that “it is not enough for a perfectly good God to minimize the number of the 
damned; he would also have limits as to the proportion of persons damned.”24 
Walls maintains that the analogy of a military leader who can expect (and 
accept) a certain percentage of battlefield casualties does not work when it 
comes to the infinite loss of the ungodly in hell.  
I do not see any prospects for our determining by our own lights 
what proportion of persons a perfectly good God would judge it 
tolerable to lose. If there is such a specific proportion or number 
                                                
23 Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil” Faith and Philosophy 2/4 (1985): 412. 
24 Walls 1992, 102. Walls makes this comment in regards to William Lane Craig who 
maintains that it is preferable for God to create a world with a larger overall number of people 
who will be saved than a world in which a larger percentage of the world’s population will be 
saved, but which is only populated with a handful of people. See the section on William Lane 
Craig in chapter six below. 
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beyond which a perfectly good God would not go, only God could 
know it unless he chose to reveal it.25 
The strength of the Nearly-Empty Thesis (particularly when combined with 
the Not-so-Nasty Thesis) is in showing how God could be justified in 
allowing some suffering in hell without being culpable for allowing the great 
amount of suffering in hell entailed in versions of ECT that do not also accept 
the Nearly-Empty Thesis.26 The Nearly-Empty Thesis can also be combined 
with various forms of Extra Chance Theses where the vast majority of people 
in the postmortem state will gradually turn to God, leaving only a relatively 
small number of recalcitrant sinners in hell.  
In this sense, the Nearly-Empty Thesis may make an important 
contribution to the Free Will Defense. The FWD shows how God could be 
justified in condemning some people (or allowing people to exile themselves) 
to hell in the name of preserving human freedom and moral responsibility. 
By itself, however, the FWD does not explain how the preservation of human 
freedom could justify the inordinate numbers of people who will end up in 
hell if one assumes a traditional reading of verses like Matthew 7:13 where the 
ungodly greatly outnumber the godly. With the addition of the Nearly-Empty 
Thesis, the amount of suffering in hell can more plausibly be defended. 
While the Nearly-Empty Thesis may have some benefit in explaining the 
amount of suffering God allows in hell, it does not provide a solution to the 
problem of hell itself. If God condemns even one person to everlasting 
torment in hell (or allows even one person to suffer that horrendous natural 
consequence), then the problem of hell remains. It would be like saying of a 
suspected mass-murderer, “Well, as it turns out, he only killed two people after 
all.”  
The Extra Chance Theses 
Another means by which some issuantists seek to supplement basic 
issuantism is through positing at least one – and possibly an infinite number 
of – postmortem opportunities for a person to be saved. There are several 
forms of Extra Chance Theses, including the possibility of escape or release 
                                                
25 Walls 1992, 103. 
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even staunch defender of ECT Charles Hodge concludes his three-volume Systematic Theology 
with the words, “We have reason to believe, … that the number of the finally lost in 
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from hell itself, some form of purgatory, or a restorative justice in which a 
person is purified through a personal encounter with God on judgment day.  
One Postmortem Chance 
Many people live and die under circumstances in which they have not had 
access to accurate knowledge about God or a fair opportunity to respond 
positively to the gospel. It would seemingly be unfair for God to allow these 
people to suffer the eternal consequences of their failure to respond positively 
to the gospel if their failure to respond was due to circumstances beyond their 
control. For this reason a number of issuantists posit the idea that God will 
provide everyone with a chance to make a decisive choice.27 
Eleonore Stump suggests that such a chance is compatible with the 
Christian belief in a loving God.  
As for those who live and die without the religious knowledge 
necessary for redemption from evil, it is not incompatible with 
Christian doctrine to speculate that in the process of their dying 
God acquaints them with what they need to know and offers them a 
last chance to choose.28 
Walls goes one step further by insisting that such an offering of what he calls 
optimal grace becomes necessary given the Christian belief in the goodness of 
God. He defines optimal grace as the optimal amount of influence toward 
good that God can exercise on a person’s will without destroying the person’s 
freedom.29  
Walls builds his doctrine of optimal grace on a conviction that a choice to 
reject God is not decisive unless the person has rejected God under the most 
favorable circumstances. “God … could bring about the appropriate favorable 
circumstances during the passage of death, thereby making up for his 
previous deprivation.”30 In other words, due to the effects of bad religious 
luck, many people have not had the opportunity to make a decisive choice for 
or against God.31 As such, they cannot be held morally responsible for their 
failure to accept God’s gift. In order to provide the necessary basis for a 
person to respond positively to God, God provides optimal grace. The 
                                                
27 For a related theory where God presents many (or even an infinite number of) 
postmortem opportunities to be saved, see the section on escapism below.  
28 Stump 1985, 412. 
29 Walls 1992, 88. 
30 Walls 1992, 90. 
31 For a discussion of religious luck, see the section on the Fixed Character Thesis 
below. 
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amount of grace necessary differs from one person to another and is granted 
on a case-by-case basis, as God knows the amount of grace each person 
would need to respond both positively and freely.  
Although he focuses more on the principle than on the mechanics of 
optimal grace, Walls seems to believe that optimal grace is God’s means of 
providing people with one postmortem chance (though possibly extended in 
time) to respond positively to God’s gift. 
The provision of optimal grace does not however stack the deck in favor of 
belief in God.  
[T]hose who may be given further chance after death to receive 
salvation are given no more than the opportunity to make a decisive 
choice either to accept or to reject God’s will. It is not as if God 
turns the tables by finally giving them more than is given to 
others.32 
Indeed, any person who after death would respond to God purely in response 
to God’s overwhelming self-revelation would respond out of fear, not out of 
faith and love. Such a choice would thus not count as a genuine acceptance of 
grace and commitment to God’s will. Walls does not believe we have to 
equate optimal grace with God’s overwhelming self-revelation. “I see no 
reason to assume God’s existence must be more evident after death than it is 
now.”33  
Religious luck is not a problem for people who accept God’s grace in this 
lifetime; they have presumably both received and responded positively to 
optimal grace. While it is not logically problematic to state that the amount of 
grace a person receives in life is optimal for that person and that a person’s 
rejection of optimal grace in this lifetime is a decisive rejection of God, Walls 
does not believe that everyone does receive optimal grace in this lifetime. Our 
empirical observation of people shows that some people (particularly the 
young) die before their moral convictions and life trajectory have taken 
definitive shape.34 When God sees that people have not had the chance to 
make a decisive choice, God gives them an extra chance.  
Why is death viewed as such an absolute limit on the opportunity 
to repent? Many people apparently have multiple opportunities to 
repent in this life, many of which they may spurn, before they 
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33 Walls 1992, 100. 
34 Jerry L. Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 144. 
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finally repent. So why should there be no further chance to repent 
after death, if numerous opportunities are extended before death, 
and indeed right up to the very point of death itself?35  
One possible objection that may be raised against Walls’ theory of optimal 
grace is that for God to know how much grace would be optimal for each 
person, one must presuppose that God would know either that a person will 
respond positively to the gospel at a certain point or at least know how a 
person would freely respond in any given set of circumstances in which she 
may find herself. This would seem to presuppose either simple foreknowledge 
or middle knowledge – two views that Walls rejects.36 Walls could answer this 
objection by saying that God sees how a person responds to the amount of 
grace available at any given moment. As a person responds positively, God 
provides more grace until the point at which the person makes a free and 
decisive choice for God.  
It is nonetheless difficult to see how on Walls’ account God could know 
how much grace would be “too much” (and thus violate a person’s freedom) 
without some form of middle knowledge, an idea that Walls rejects. Likewise, 
how could God know that a person who has not responded positively to x 
amount of grace would respond positively if she were given x+1 amount of 
grace?   
Sharon Baker posits a chance for people to repent and be restored to 
fellowship with God in the day of judgment. For her, the love of God is the 
burning fire that all people encounter on judgment day. The fire of God 
burns up all the impurities of life. Baker suggests that in judgment people 
may encounter all those whom they have wronged in life, including Jesus 
Christ.37 The purpose of this tête-à-tête is not retribution but restoration – to 
help the wrongdoer understand the gravity of his sin with the purpose of 
restoring a broken relationship through forgiveness and repentance. For 
those who respond positively to God’s forgiveness the fire acts as a purifying 
agent. For those who refuse to respond to forgiveness by repentance, the fire 
has the effect of finally incinerating everything that once was a person.    
Stephen Davis is an issuantist who also believes in what he calls 
postmortem evangelism. Davis writes that there is a long tradition in the 
Christian church of belief that at least some categories of people may have the 
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opportunity to make a postmortem response to the gospel. He admits, 
however, that much of this tradition of the harrowing of hell and Christ’s 
descent to hades after the crucifixion is based on rather dubious 
interpretations of biblical passages like John 5:28-29; Ephesians 4:8-10; 1 
Peter 3:18-20 and 1 Peter 4:5-6.  
According to Davis, Clement of Alexandria believed that Christ’s descent 
to hades had the purpose of rescuing not only the faithful from the Old 
Testament, but righteous pagans. With unmistakable influence from 
Hellenistic philosophy Clement suggested that “souls, although darkened by 
passions, when released from their bodies, are able to perceive more clearly, 
because of their being no longer obstructed by the paltry flesh.”38 That is, only 
after death can the soul see things clearly enough to make a positive response. 
Clement intimated that Jesus was not the only one to preach to the dead; 
Jesus’ disciples followed the example of their master even in this area.  
Davis admits that the possibility of postmortem evangelism is a loosely 
held belief and that it is largely based on conjecture, but he suggests that “if 
the gospel was once preached to the dead, maybe this practice continues.”39 
In keeping with basic issuantism, Davis claims “that the denizens of hell 
are in hell because they freely choose to be there.”40 It should here be noted 
that Davis writes in the present tense – the people in hell freely choose to be 
there; they are not there because they at some point in the past made certain 
choices that led to a certain evil character. This is important for Davis, since 
he believes that “sin will continue in the afterlife.”41 This version of the 
Continuing Sin Defense seems to be one of the best means of answering the 
problem of proportionality in hell. For God to be justified in continuing to 
punish a person in hell for an infinite period of time (or in Davis’ case, for a 
person to continue to suffer the negative consequences of sin for an infinite 
period of time), the person must continue to commit an infinite number of 
finite sins. One problem we have seen with other formulations of the 
Continuing Sin Defense is that they do not include the possibility of 
repentance and release from hell.42 If people are still free and morally 
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41 Davis 2010, 95. 
42 Especially in Carson and possibly in Craig. See the section on ECT in chapter two of 
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responsible in hell then they must also be free to stop sinning and be released 
from hell.  
Be that as it may, Davis states that not every person or class of people may 
receive a postmortem chance to respond to the gospel. “The opportunities for 
promotion may not be endless – perhaps there is only one per person. Once 
one has heard and understood the invitation of heaven and turned it down, 
there are no more opportunities.”43 He continues, “Nor do I see any need of a 
‘second chance’ for those who have freely and knowingly chosen in this life to 
live apart from God.”44 Davis thus believes in only one postmortem chance to 
be saved, presumably to overcome the effects of bad religious luck.  
It would seem that Davis’ theory is somewhat inconsistent at this point. If 
people will continue to commit an infinite number of sins in hell, then they 
must be given an infinite number of opportunities to repent and be released 
from hell. If only certain classes of people receive an opportunity to respond 
to the gospel after death (and only one opportunity at that), then Davis’ 
theory loses its explanatory power in answering the problem of 
proportionality. This is particularly true as it relates to people who made a 
definitive choice against God in this life who are then not granted a 
postmortem chance to be saved. They will suffer eternally for the finite 
choices made in this lifetime. An alternative interpretation is that the ungodly 
will suffer eternally because they continue to sin in hell, but without the 
opportunity to repent and be released from hell. Davis would be both more 
consistent and more effective in answering the problem of hell if he adopted 
escapism with its endless opportunities for people to be released from hell.   
Escapism 
Escapism is a variation of Extra Chance Theses whereby people in hell receive 
a possibly endless number of opportunities to repent and be released from 
hell.  
Buckareff and Plug reject the idea that the inhabitants of hell are wantons. 
In their escapist version of issuantism, a person must maintain both freedom 
and moral responsibility in hell with the possibility of the person coming to a 
point of repentance and being released from hell.  
It would be odd if the inhabitants of hell were like the wanton. The 
wanton is not an autonomous agent. … If they only reflected on 
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their desires, over time, they would realize that a more desirable 
state of affairs awaits those who enter into communion with God.45  
Any diminution of the essentially human traits of freedom of will and 
freedom of action would work against this possibility. 
God’s motivation in dealing with humanity is love. “So if God longs for 
reunion with us this side of the eschaton, then it would be arbitrary and out 
of character for God to cut off any opportunity for reconciliation and 
forgiveness at the time of death.”46 In love God continues to offer an endless 
number of opportunities for people to give a positive response to the love of 
God. 
According to Buckareff and Plug, a person may enter hell due to bad 
religious luck. Since God’s dealings even with people in hell is motivated by 
love, God will not allow negative religious luck to be the determining factor 
for a person’s eternal destiny.  
[I]n hell the unlucky environmental circumstances would 
presumably be absent. So, if a person continues possessing the same 
character traits it would be entirely due to that person cultivating 
those particular traits. And, since we are dealing with eternity, the 
amount of luck involved would slowly decrease towards 0. So if a 
person is in hell for eternity, that continued choice would not be 
due to luck.47 
If a person continues to make choices against God, it would not be due to 
luck but to free choices. 
Buckareff and Plug’s escapism does not automatically lead to universalism. 
Indeed, they refuse to speculate on whether all, most, many, some, few or no 
people will respond positively to God’s love and be released from hell.  
So escapism is compatible with a species of hopeful or weak 
universalism, and it is compatible with the view that no one in hell 
will be saved. But we will only argue for there being a divine 
provision for post-mortem conversion and that persons will have 
the ability to convert in the afterlife and remain quiet on whether or 
not anyone actually does accept the offer of salvation after death.48 
Buckareff and Plug’s escapism is not to be regarded as a form of purgatory 
since it involves neither moral preparation for people who have already 
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begun a trajectory towards sanctification nor a purgatorial or purifying pain 
that rectifies whatever wrongs a person has done in life. 
Purgatory  
Some issuantists have begun supplementing basic issuantism with the idea of 
purgatory. Walls discerns two foci in classical expressions of the doctrine of 
purgatory: a sanctification view that sees purgatory as closer to heaven and a 
satisfaction view that sees it as closer to hell. Those who view purgatory in 
terms of satisfaction often emphasize the pain and terror experienced there at 
the hand of Satan and the demons, while those who see purgatory as closer to 
heaven emphasize the purifying aspects and the hope of eventual salvation.49 
For issuantists who supplement basic issuantism with some form of 
purgatory, the purpose of purgatory is clearly sanctification. It is neither the 
punishment of unshriven sins nor the burning off of the temporal effects of 
forgiven sins. Since Walls rejects the Retribution Thesis, he is also consistent 
in maintaining that purgatory is non-retributive. Even though he is a 
Protestant, Walls sees purgatory as a necessary step in the process of 
sanctification for the vast majority of people who have not at the time of 
death developed the holy character requisite for standing in the presence of 
God.  
According to Walls, the person who has not made a decisive choice for or 
against God in this life will receive optimal grace after death in which to 
decide. Those who decide against God go to hell, while those who display 
some initial movement towards God will continue to purgatory where the 
process of sanctification can continue. Purgatory is also a step in the 
sanctification process of people who have made a decisive choice for God in 
this life, but whose character is not yet fully formed.  
It is only by initial positive responses to God’s grace that people in 
purgatory have perspicuity and a fuller degree of knowledge as to the 
implications of their decisions. The decision is however not merely a matter 
of intellectual insight; it is a matter of moral character development.  
And it is because of this character that the saints in heaven 
spontaneously love God and want to do his will. Those who have 
responded to God in this fashion and achieved this character can be 
said to have perfected their moral freedom.  
 But on the other hand, those who have not achieved this 
character can resist God’s grace. At this stage of moral and spiritual 
development, knowledge of the connection between God and 
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happiness must be relatively unformed. This knowledge must be 
fully adequate to encourage pursuit of God and the resulting 
character growth, but limited enough to allow us to deceive 
ourselves, resist God’s grace, and derail our character 
development.50 
Human freedom allows for the possibility of self-deception, which Walls 
defines as “not merely a lack of information, but rather a matter of not 
attending to what one knows, or of suppressing it and refusing to act on it.”51 
For Walls, human freedom entails that one has the ability either to respond 
positively to the grace of God and develop a moral character or to refuse to 
respond to God’s grace and thus pervert one’s moral freedom.  
So in the end, one either perfects his moral freedom or he perverts 
it. In the former case, one has lost all motivation to do evil, whereas 
in the latter, one has lost all motivation to love God. But initially, I 
want to stress, moral freedom requires both the ability to respond 
to God’s grace as well as the ability to resist it. And the latter 
requires the ability to deceive oneself, which entails the ability to 
avoid clear perception of God’s relation to happiness.52 
When one develops a moral character one is logically free to do evil, even if 
one is practically less likely to do so. When one’s character has become 
perverted one has lost all motivation to love God.  
Swinburne sees purgatory as an option for people whose characters are 
neither sufficiently godly as to gain admittance into heaven, nor so totally 
corrupt as to warrant hell. The totally corrupt (those who have “lost their 
soul” or developed a fixed evil character) will go to hell. The vast majority of 
people who have ever lived on earth, however, have an admixture of good and 
evil actions and character traits. If a person has shown even the slightest 
inclination towards good in this life, she will find herself in purgatory after 
death. “Once you get to Purgatory, you cannot finally lose the possibility of 
Heaven, but it is up to you how long it takes you to get there.”53 There is, 
however, the possibility of a person entering purgatory but never attaining 
the fixed character for good that is necessary for achieving the beatific vision. 
For such people, purgatory could remain their eternal state.  
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Evaluation of Extra Chances Theses 
By way of general comment on the various forms of the Extra Chance Theses, 
it should be pointed out that the possibility of postmortem repentance is 
seemingly incompatible with certain perspectives on philosophical 
anthropology where the “soul” for whatever reason is unable to act 
autonomously after the death of the body, unless the postmortem chance for 
repentance comes after the reconstitution of the person at the resurrection of 
the dead. This does not, however, appear to be a problem for any of the 
issuantist scholars highlighted in this section.  
There are nonetheless two other areas where issuantists who propose 
some form of Extra Chance Thesis may be open to critique. The first has to 
do with the question of finality. If people retain libertarian free will even after 
death such that they can repent and turn to God, why would it not be possible 
for a person in heaven to fall away and reject God and be cast into hell (or 
choose to place oneself in hell)? In a worse case scenario, one could imagine 
elevators eternally shuttling people up and down between heaven and hell.  
Kvanvig writes:  
[Second chance views] fail to be truly eschatological accounts of 
heaven and hell. Eschatology is the doctrine of the last things, and 
one feature of this idea of culmination or consummation is that 
there is a finality to it. In Christian thought, this idea is expressed 
vividly in the idea of a final judgment, and any conception of the 
afterlife that treats residence in heaven and hell in the geographic 
way in which we think of residence in, say, Texas or California, 
simply does not fall into the category of an eschatological doctrine 
at all. If heaven and hell are conceived of as mere extensions of an 
earthly life, where people can pack up and move at will, such a 
conception has more affinity to religious perspectives that espouse 
endless cycles of rebirth than to religions including an 
eschatological dimension.54 
One could answer, as does Walls in defending his view of purgatory, that a 
positive decision for God is of a different nature than the rejection of God. 
Since a decisive choice for God is profoundly rational and the rejection of 
God fundamentally irrational, there would be little if any motivation for a 
person in heaven to change her mind and fall away.  
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There are far deeper and more intelligible motivations for choosing 
God than for choosing against him, and these make the former 
choice far more stable in the long run. Indeed, the radical 
asymmetries between the two choices are such that there is good 
reason to think the choice for God is not reversible in the same 
sense that the choice against him is.55  
A second possible objection to some forms of Extra Chance Theses is that the 
prospect of a possibly endless number of postmortem chances to be saved 
belittles the significance of this present life. Failure to make a decisive choice 
for God in this life has as little consequences as a failure to land a plane safely 
in a flight-simulator computer game. If a postmortem chance for salvation is 
all one needs, and if these will be freely given to those who due to bad 
religious luck have not had the opportunity to make a decisive choice for God 
in this life, then why should one bother with this life at all?  
This objection does not apply directly to Walls or Davis, who do not admit 
an endless number of postmortem opportunities to repent. One may wonder, 
however, why a loving God would want to limit the number of opportunities 
given for a person to repent. Walls answers the charge that the choices of this 
life become morally insignificant in light of postmortem opportunities to be 
saved by pointing out that they affect a person and have serious implications 
for character development and the overall shape of one’s life. Moreover, he 
maintains that the doctrine of purgatory serves to underline the serious 
implications of the choices made in this life – the farther one has wandered 
from God through sinful actions, the longer it will take to make one’s way 
back to God in purgatory. “It is precisely the logic of the doctrine of 
purgatory that it allows the hope of return but does not trivialize the time and 
process necessary to do so.”56 With a strong sense of continuity between this 
life and the next, Walls reasons that “if deathbed repentance is possible, it 
seems rather artificial to think that such late reversals do not trivialize this 
life, while repentance two minutes after death would.”57  
On the whole, it may be said that the Extra Chance Theses present 
valuable supplements to basic issuantism and do much to strengthen the 
answers presented by some issuantists to the problem of hell.  
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The Fixed Character Thesis 
Both libertarians and compatibilists can agree that moral responsibility is a 
primary issue in deciding a person’s eternal fate. If people are not morally 
responsible for their actions and choices, it would be unjust for God to 
condemn them to hell. With this common ground, some scholars want to 
move beyond the impasse of compatibilism and libertarianism and focus 
instead on the cultivation of virtues and the formation of a virtuous character.  
As I have briefly mentioned, Kvanvig holds that basic issuantism does not 
provide the sense of finality that is incumbent upon Christian eschatology.  
If being in hell is a result of a choice, then a natural view to hold 
would be that residence in Hell is no more permanent than one’s 
choices are, and those are open to change. In order to avoid this 
result, the Choice Model must be supplemented in some way or 
other, and one way to supplement it is in terms of the idea of losing 
one’s soul.58  
Thus Kvanvig and some other issuantists propose a form of the Fixed 
Character Thesis as a supplement to basic issuantism to show how the 
formation of an evil character can explain how people can chose to remain in 
hell.59 In this section I shall examine the implications of character formation 
for issuant views of hell and assess the value of the Fixed Character Thesis in 
providing a solution to the problem of hell.     
Character formation, freedom and responsibility 
How character is formed 
Issuantists believe that a person’s character is developed not determined. A 
person makes many decisions in life that may become patterns of behavior. 
These patterns of behavior or habits become more and more regular. 
Gradually they solidify into a person’s character. The process of forming 
one’s character involves many difficult decisions between alternative courses 
of action and desires on various levels. As one’s character becomes more 
clearly defined, the process of making decisions in each case becomes 
relatively easier since a certain precedent has been established. Swinburne 
writes that “the truly subjectively good agent seeks to make the good come so 
naturally that he has little opportunity for conscientious action in future 
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[sic].”60 Although a person’s character is fairly consistent and predictable, a 
fixed character does not determine a person’s course of actions; it is merely 
probabilistic. There is always the possibility of a person acting in ways that 
are atypical, akratic or “out of character.” 
According to Swinburne, all people have both the freedom and the natural 
capacity to develop a good character. Because of this freedom people are able 
to make bad choices. This leads to a cognitive dissonance between what one 
knows to be right and what one actually does. This will inevitably lead to 
several possible responses. First, a person may try to justify his actions. He 
does this by showing that his actions are not really all that bad, that his 
actions relate in some positive way to other, good actions, that there is a 
dissimilarity between his actions and other, bad actions, or that this particular 
set of circumstances allow that he behave in such a way. A second possible 
response is to admit that the action is bad, but to reconcile himself with the 
idea that he will be a bad person.61  
Although Swinburne does not admit a third possibility in this context, a 
person could admit that her actions were bad, but show regret and learn from 
her mistakes. It is tempting to assume that only virtuous actions contribute to 
the formation of a good character. Even though a person in moments of 
akrasia may make bad or sinful choices, the wise person will reflect on her 
past actions and will benefit from the lessons she learns, perhaps with greater 
resolve not to allow herself to repeat the mistakes of the past.  
Character formation and finality 
According to Kvanvig, one major problem with many proposed solutions to 
the problem of hell is their failure to provide some kind of finality. This is 
particularly true of issuantist views that include some form of Extra Chance 
Thesis, but is also true to some extent of other issuant views of hell.62  
The issue of finality is not a problem for views of hell where one’s destiny 
is determined by God or where the choices people make in this lifetime are 
definitive. These views face their own challenges in reconciling human 
freedom with the finality of choice, regardless of whether the choice is divine 
or human.  
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The stronger claim that it is metaphysically impossible to leave 
heaven or escape hell presents greater challenges, however, for such 
a position is harder to reconcile with the presence of freedom and 
autonomy so central to our conception of survival of death as 
persons; and yet, such metaphysical impossibility is the most 
natural position to endorse when one's conception of the afterlife is 
a truly eschatological perspective involving the ideas of finality and 
culmination.63 
The task the issuantist faces is in explaining how the choice for hell can be 
final while truly remaining an issuant view of hell. 
Moreover, any version of the choice model will need either to 
jettison the eschatological ideas of finality and consummation or 
offer some explanation of how these ideas can be affirmed in the 
absence of the kind of finality that rests ultimately on a divine 
decree.64 
A fixed character can provide the finality Kvanvig calls for. A fixed character 
entails that a person no longer has the same range of free choices that is 
available to someone without a fixed character, but since it is self-imposed, 
the fixed character can provide both the finality and the moral responsibility 
necessary in a solution to the problem of hell.  
Since this incapacity is self-imposed, a solution to the problem of 
Hell in terms of what people freely choose might be able to be 
combined with an account of Hell that involves suitable finality, 
thus blocking one of the deepest difficulties facing approaches to 
the problem of Hell that focus on free choice.65  
Kvanvig argues that just because a person can be on a certain trajectory 
towards the development of a fixed character, there is no guarantee that he or 
she will finally arrive at the state in which the character becomes fixed. 
Without the fixation of character, there is still no finality in the choice for 
hell. “Merely describing a process that has as its logical end point the loss of 
soul doesn’t properly explain the finality of Hell unless those in Hell have 
actually lost their souls.”66 The finality only comes when the person judges 
himself.  
In keeping with his rejection of the Retribution Thesis, Kvanvig writes that 
the final judgment is “final in terms of something persons do to 
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themselves.”67 There is finality and judgment, but they don’t come from God; 
both judgment and finality are immanent.  
Character formation and freedom 
Issuantists maintain that people must have libertarian freedom in order to be 
morally responsible. Swinburne is also clear that the character one forms in 
life is a direct result of the person’s free will. Be that as it may, he is less clear 
as to how much freedom people have once their character has been freely 
formed. He does write of the saints that “[a]lthough the inhabitants of 
Heaven retain their free will, the range of choices open to them changes. 
Having no desires for the bad, they inevitably pursue only what they 
(correctly) believe to be good.”68 
As such, it would seem that a person has the freedom to form her 
character, but once the character is fixed, she is no longer free in a libertarian 
sense if one defines libertarian freedom in terms of PAP. Once a person’s 
character has been fixed, her sense of freedom is no different than that of the 
compatibilist; she is free to act according to her desires, but her good 
character dictates that she only desire the good. 
Likewise, the person who is in the process of forming a totally corrupt 
character is also in danger of losing his freedom.  
The man who has blinded himself to the goodness of things is no 
longer an agent, one who chooses what to do in the light of beliefs 
about its worth. He has become, as well as a passive subject of 
sensation and thought, merely an arena of conflicting desires of 
which the strongest dictates his bodily movements. He no longer 
chooses between desires. If we think of the soul in its active capacity 
as the choosing agent, there is no soul left. The man has ‘lost his 
soul’. Although there is no maximum to human goodness, there is a 
minimum; and this is it.69 
According to Swinburne, the person who has lost his soul will either become 
a wanton with a collection of loose and often conflicting desires, the strongest 
of which at any time determines his course of action, or he will become an 
obsessive whose actions are almost wholly guided by one overarching desire.  
Kvanvig drives home the implications of the Fixed Character Thesis for 
freedom: “… through a series of choices, one can get oneself in a position 
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where one no longer has choices, where all options but one are impossible.”70 
He describes it as a contraction of options.  
A fixed character represents a loss of will, not a loss of physical ability. For 
instance, a let’s say that a certain middle-aged theologian lacks the physical 
condition necessary to be able to run a marathon. He could begin a training 
regimen to improve his physical condition and ability so that he might be 
able to run a marathon in a year or two. This will never happen, however, as 
long as he lacks the will to do so. This is how it is with people who have a 
fixed evil character; while they may in theory have the freedom to do good, 
they lack the necessary will.  
Character formation and moral responsibility 
If a person with a fixed character is no longer free in the libertarian sense, 
how can she be morally responsible for her actions? Libertarians maintain 
that moral responsibility presupposes libertarian freedom.  
One possible solution to this problem is by positing that moral 
responsibility is transitive. That is, a person who is not free in the libertarian 
sense can still be morally responsible for her actions if she is also responsible 
for her state of not being free.  
An example may help explain this point. Suppose that Fabian is a 
successful businessman. On Monday he will fly to London to negotiate an 
important deal that could mean millions of euros in profit for his company. 
Sunday afternoon Fabian receives a call from an old university buddy whom 
he hasn’t seen in years. The friend is only in town for the day, so they decide 
to meet up. One thing leads to another and by the time Fabian crawls into 
bed at 3:30 a.m., he is in a drunken stupor. When he awakens at 9:30 Monday 
morning, he discovers that not only has he missed his early morning flight to 
London, but the important meeting is about to start in half an hour. In this 
case Fabian is not free to attend the meeting; even if he wants to be there, it is 
not physically possible. Regardless of whether one is a compatibilist or 
libertarian, Fabian is not free. He is neither able to be at the meeting nor to 
act according to his desires to be at the meeting.  
According to the transitivity of moral responsibility, Fabian is morally 
responsible for what does or does not happen as a result of his not attending 
the meeting. Although he is not free, he is still morally responsible since he 
not only placed himself in a situation whereby he could not attend the 
meeting, but was in a position where he could reasonably have predicted the 
outcome of his actions.     
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In relation to character formation and moral responsibility, an issuantist 
could claim that even though a person with a fixed character may no longer 
be free in a libertarian sense, he is nonetheless morally responsible since he is 
responsible for the fixed character he has developed. Although one could 
debate the question of what possibility the person in hell had to reasonably 
predict the results of the formation of a fixed evil character, he was at least 
responsible for its formation.  
Character formation and issuantism 
Universalism can provide the dimension of finality that Kvanvig deems 
necessary for a Christian eschatology, but Kvanvig rejects universalism on 
other grounds.71 Basic issuantism can account for libertarian human freedom, 
but does not provide finality. He sees the Fixed Character Thesis as a 
necessary supplement to basic issuantism to provide for both libertarian 
freedom and finality.  
Issuantists reason that a person who through his free choices has formed a 
consistent, evil character would be neither suitable for an eternity in heaven 
nor happy there. As such, the only appropriate dwelling place for a person 
with an evil character is in hell.72 Michael J. Murray writes: 
We might then think of those in heaven and hell as those who are 
maximally set in their ways. That is, they are disposed to act as 
lovers of God or lovers of self without fail. The result is that those 
who are in heaven are no longer able to break the hold of the 
dispositions which they have acquired and likewise for those in 
hell.73  
For Swinburne, “Human free will is not just free will; it involves what I may 
call a choice of destiny.”74 According to Swinburne, people use their 
libertarian freedom to make choices that gradually solidify into good or bad 
characters. God assists people who have shown an openness or proclivity 
towards the good by giving them ample opportunity, possibly in a purgatorial 
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postmortem state, to develop the godly character requisite for achieving the 
beatific vision.  
Regarding “men of good will” Swinburne writes:  
Despite his lack of good desires and important true beliefs, he 
deserves reward for the firmness of his good will. And the most 
appropriate and best reward would be to allow him to acquire the 
true moral beliefs and right unfrustrated desires which will give full 
blessedness.75  
God does not, however, do anything to prevent the hell-bent sinner from 
developing a totally corrupt character, since God’s necessarily overwhelming 
interference would violate a person’s freedom.  
Swinburne recognizes that when a person’s character has become totally 
corrupt, he is no longer either completely free nor fully human.  
[I]t is a possibility that a man will let himself be so mastered by his 
desires that he will lose all ability to resist them. It is the extreme 
case of what we have all too often seen: people increasingly 
mastered by desires, so that they lose some of their ability to resist 
them. The less we impose our order on our desires, the more they 
impose their order on us. 
 We may describe a man in this situation of having lost his 
capacity to overrule his desires as having ‘lost his soul.’76 
For Swinburne, the Fixed Character Thesis is closely related to the Less-than-
Human Thesis. Swinburne’s sense of having lost one’s soul is similar to Lewis’ 
idea that the denizens of hell are the remnants of what once were human 
beings.  
Evaluation of the Fixed Character Thesis 
The Fixed Character Thesis is a prominent feature in many issuant views of 
hell. There are nonetheless a few things that should be said in evaluating the 
contributions of the Fixed Character Thesis to basic issuantism’s ability to 
answer the problem of hell. In this section, I shall look at four issues raised by 
the lack of libertarian freedom: the lack of moral responsibility that comes 
from a concomitant Less-than-Human Thesis, the problem of people who die 
before their character is fully developed for either evil or good, God’s role in 
character development and the inequity of religious luck for character 
formation.   
                                                
75 Swinburne 1989, 191. 
76 Swinburne 1983, 48-49. 
Issuant Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
150 
Lack of freedom and moral responsibility 
Scholars who supplement basic issuantism with the Fixed Character Thesis 
face a difficult situation: if the soul with a fixed evil character has finality, 
there is no longer libertarian freedom. In this case, one could legitimately 
raise the same objections that are commonly raised against compatibilism 
about why God just doesn’t fix everyone’s character for the good. Issuantists 
could answer this objection that the decisive difference is that according to 
the Fixed Character Thesis the individual bears the responsibility for the fixed 
character one has developed through one’s free choices, whereas the 
individual would not be free or morally responsible in any transitive sense if 
God were unilaterally to fix a person’s character for good or evil.  
Another solution to the difficulty would be to agree with Kvanvig’s 
speculation that there are no guarantees that a person finally achieves this 
kind of fixed character. Without a fixed character, however, there is no 
finality. This may not be a problem in itself; some issuant views of hell that 
include some form of Extra Chance Thesis readily acknowledge the lack of 
finality, while others maintain that a fixed good character is final since it is 
rational.  
Ex-men and moral responsibility 
There are two means for issuantists to preserve moral responsibility for 
people in hell. First, one can reject the Fixed Character Thesis. As Buckareff 
and Plug exemplify, it is not necessary or even desirable to postulate that the 
denizens of hell have developed a fixed character that has made them 
something less than human. For Buckareff and Plug, the possibility of 
repentance and release from hell entails both full libertarian freedom and full 
moral responsibility.77 Moreover, it would be consistent with issuantism to 
posit a form of the Continuing Sin Defense whereby a person in hell chooses 
to use her libertarian freedom to continue in her rebellion against God for all 
eternity. As a result, she will continue to experience the negative natural 
consequences of an afterlife separated from God and all the good things that 
God wants to give to human creatures.  
A second means of affirming moral responsibility in a person with a fixed 
character is by positing the transitivity of moral responsibility. This is to say, 
that a person is morally responsible even for situations in which she could not 
have done otherwise if she is morally responsible for being in that situation in 
the first place. One can, however, debate whether moral responsibility is 
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transitive if a fixed character also means that a person becomes less than 
human.  
Characters that are not fully formed 
Another difficulty facing the Fixed Character Thesis is the question of people 
who die without a fixed character. If heaven is only granted to those who have 
a godly character and hell is reserved for those who have a totally corrupt 
character, what can one say about the great majority of people who die before 
their character is totally fixed? Not only those who die in infancy or 
childhood, but also the akratic? What can one say about people who 
experience death-bed conversions? 
One problem is that people’s characters are rarely so consistent that they 
are either wholly virtuous or wholly vicious. People are an admixture of good 
and evil. As we have seen, Swinburne postulates that perhaps most people 
have at some time expressed some movement, albeit incomplete, towards the 
good. He posits a purgatory where people whose good character is not yet 
fully fixed can continue in the process of sanctification before finally being 
granted the beatific vision. He is not clear, however, regarding those who are 
on a trajectory towards evil, but whose character at the point of physical 
death is not yet totally corrupt. If hell is only for the “totally corrupt” who 
have destroyed their “God-given capacity for moral awareness”, then the 
population of hell must be very small, while perhaps the greater part of 
humanity faces either an eventual admittance to heaven, an eternal purgatory 
or an eventual cessation of existence. While this is not necessarily a problem 
for Swinburne’s view, it is a question about which he is not totally clear.   
God’s role in character development 
Moltmann’s critique that basic issuantism is essentially atheistic is perhaps 
particularly apposite to the Fixed Character Thesis.78 What role does God 
play in the formation of a fixed character? Talbott challenges the common 
assumption among issuantists that on the basis of libertarian human freedom 
a person is responsible for his virtuous character.79 For Talbott, one cannot 
take personal credit for the development of a good character; a good 
character is a result of the grace of God in a person’s life. As a universalist, 
Talbott believes that God’s grace is both irresistible and that every person will 
eventually receive God’s grace and be saved.  
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Notwithstanding, some issuantists like Walls and Swinburne include 
God’s role in character development as part of their systems.80 God must be 
actively involved in the perfecting of each human being, otherwise God 
would be either unconcerned about human moral imperfection or 
unmotivated to help correct human moral defects. Both options are 
inconsistent with an adequate view of God within Christian theism. If God is 
both concerned about human moral imperfection and motivated to help 
humans correct their moral defects, then Talbott’s question becomes all the 
more pertinent: Why doesn’t God extend that irresistible grace to everyone? 
In particular, why doesn’t God do something (or more) to stop those who are 
in the process of developing an evil character? 
Pawl and Timpe provide a possible answer by maintaining that God’s 
grace is a logical necessity for salvation, even though it is causally insufficient 
condition for final salvation.81 It is also necessary for a person to freely 
cooperate with God in the development of a virtuous or holy character. But 
how does this save issuantism from the objection raised against retributive 
theories of hell that God could have shown grace to everyone? Maybe God 
does extend grace to everyone, but not everyone responds positively. Even if 
the internal constraints of a fixed character mean that one is not free to 
commit sin, it does not mean that one is determined in all areas, since the 
ability to sin is accidental, not essential to free will.  
The Fixed Character Thesis also raises the question of whether whatever 
freedom that remains in heaven is only trivial, or if it is indeed a “significant” 
free will. Plantinga defines significant free will as the freedom a person has 
who is “free with respect to an action that is morally significant for him.”82 
According to this definition, the choice between two morally neutral options 
could be considered free, but not morally significant. That is, the choice 
between giving money to the Red Cross or to the local homeless shelter would 
be morally insignificant since the choice does not stand between a good 
option and a bad one. Instead of morally significant freedom, Pawl and 
Timpe suggest that one only needs morally relevant freedom, which they 
define as a free choice that is morally relevant to the person making the 
choice. 
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[A] choice is morally relative iff the person is free to choose among 
at least two options, and at least two of the options, say, A and B, 
are related to each other such that either A is better than B or B is 
better than A. Similarly, we say that a person has morally relevant 
freedom if she is free with respect to a choice that is morally relevant 
to her.83 
Pawl and Timpe reason that not even God would have morally significant 
freedom according to Plantinga’s definition and that it would thus be 
unreasonable to expect that people would have a kind of freedom that God 
does not have.  
Religious luck 
The question of God’s active role in character development raises further 
questions about religious luck. Religious luck is when a person’s degree of 
personal responsibility for her religious faith or lack thereof goes beyond the 
degree to which she controls it. That is to say, a person is held morally 
responsible for believing or not believing even though the preconditions for 
belief lie at least partly outside the person’s control.  
On issuantism, people are ultimately responsible for the character they 
develop, yet the conditions for character development often lie beyond the 
realm of a person’s control. If one cannot ultimately take personal credit for 
the formation of a virtuous character, then to what extent is the individual 
responsible for its development? The problem of religious luck is not limited 
to the inequities that exist between various individuals, but also between the 
person’s circumstances in the actual world and what she would have done or 
what character she would have developed in a different set of counterfactual 
circumstances. Simple variables such as the parents one grows up with – 
whether they were believers or not, loving or abusive – show the wide-
ranging implications of luck for religious belief and moral character 
development.  
Religious luck raises several questions about God’s putative interest in 
human character development. If the formation of a virtuous character is 
ultimately attributable to the grace of God, then how can the person be 
responsible for its formation? When the possibly eternal destinies of heaven 
or hell are at stake, then why does it seem that God gives some people a 
distinct advantage that other people do not enjoy?  
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Linda Zagzebski summarizes and ultimately rejects five possible solutions 
to the question of religious luck as it relates to the issue of heaven and hell.84 
The first solution is that God judges people on the overall balance of what 
they would have done in every set of possible worlds. The problem with this 
solution, according to Zagzebski, is that the real world would then have no 
greater moral significance for the individual than other merely possible 
worlds. The second solution is that God only judges people for what is in 
their control, a proposal that Zagzebski rejects on the grounds that it is 
doubtful that there is a determinate degree of control that makes a person 
morally responsible. A third proposal is that one could admit that luck makes 
it easier for some people to develop a virtuous character, and that inequities 
in luck are compensated by inversely proportional inequities in reward or 
punishment. That is, the more “bad luck” one must overcome in becoming 
virtuous, the greater the reward. Zagzebski rejects this idea on similar 
grounds to her rejection of the second solution, viz., that there is no 
determinate degree of how difficult it is for a person to achieve a virtuous 
character. Moreover, the inequities of luck still entail that the risks one takes 
in life are of uneven balance. The fourth solution to the problem of religious 
luck is to posit that God gives extra grace to balance out any bad luck a 
person has encountered.85 Zagzebski writes that this solution is 
counterintuitive since we do not assume that people who have experienced 
bad luck have received extra grace from God. Likewise, this view would lead 
to the tendency to judge people more harshly since those who have failed 
have also received extra grace from God. Finally, Zagzebski rejects 
universalism as a solution to the inequities of religious luck on the grounds 
that it divorces salvation from moral considerations and stands outside the 
dominant views of the Western Christian tradition. 
Issuantist Russell E. Jones proposes a solution to the problem of religious 
luck by combining Zagzebski’s fourth solution with a version of escapism. 
According to Jones, Buckareff and Plug’s escapism by itself “simply pushes 
the problem forward into the afterlife.”86 The inequities of religious luck in 
this life continue in the next unless God does something to counterbalance 
them in the form of grace. On Jones’ solution, after death people receive some 
degree of grace such as is necessary to counteract whatever bad religious luck 
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they may have encountered in life. Even in hell it is possible for these free 
moral agents to make the necessary decisions to be released from hell. He 
believes this solution avoids the pitfalls of Zagzebski’s fourth proposal since it 
makes no empirically verifiable claims about what might happen in this life. 
Likewise, it avoids Zagzebski’s second objection since people in the afterlife 
will not be tempted to judge other people unjustly.  
Jones’ proposal is somewhat similar to Walls. Walls posits that God gives 
every person the optimal grace she needs to make a positive decision for faith 
in God. Whereas Jones believes the open-ended opportunities to be 
reconciled to God also extend to those in hell, Walls appears to limit the 
possibility of repentance to some indefinite period of time after death until a 
person either makes a decisive choice against God (thus consigning oneself to 
hell) or takes initial steps towards faith in God, at which time the person 
enters purgatory where the process of sanctification can continue until such a 
time as the person has a character that would warrant heaven. 
In this section I have explored some of the implications of the Fixed 
Character Thesis for issuantism. In particular it should be noted that 
according to most versions of the Fixed Character Thesis, a person with a 
fixed character is no longer free in a libertarian sense. Rather than solving the 
problem of hell, this supplement to basic issuantism only succeeds in 
postponing it by making issuantism with the Fixed Character Thesis 
susceptible to the same objections raised against compatibilism: the question 
of moral responsibility in the absence of libertarian freedom and the question 
of God’s putative culpability in not aiding more (or all) people in the 
development of a virtuous character. Furthermore, I have shown that 
religious luck has implications for both personal moral responsibility in 
character development and God’s role in the development of a virtuous 
character.  
The Irrationality Thesis 
Libertarian freedom entails that people could freely choose to reject God 
forever. On issuantism, people must have this freedom even with full 
knowledge that the effects of their choices will be harmful to themselves 
(unless one also posits the Not-so-Nasty Thesis). Moreover, people must 
make the choice to reject God even when they have no motivation to do so, 
and every motivation not to do so. This is an irrational choice that, on some 
accounts of issuantism where extra chances are granted, a person must 
continue to make forever. According to the Irrationality Thesis, because of 
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libertarian human freedom, God must allow people to make irrational 
choices even if those irrational choices entail that they end up in hell.87  
The Irrationality Thesis may shed light on two related questions: why God 
would allow anyone to make the irrational choice for hell, and why any 
person would make the irrational choice for hell if the person were truly free.  
Concerning the first question, both Swinburne and Walls claim that there 
is a certain epistemic distance between God and human creatures. Without 
this epistemic distance, God’s self-revelation could easily nullify human 
freedom.   
Swinburne writes, 
We will be in the situation of the child in the nursery who knows 
that mother is looking in at the door, and for whom, in view of the 
child’s desire for mother’s approval, the temptation to wrongdoing 
is simply overborne. We need ‘epistemic distance’ in order to have 
free choice between good and evil.88 
Walls develops a similar line of thought: 
Those who have not achieved this character [a character of spiritual 
and moral maturity] can resist God’s grace. At this stage of moral 
and spiritual development, knowledge of the connection between 
God and happiness must be relatively unformed. This knowledge 
must be fully adequate to encourage pursuit of God and the 
resulting character growth, but limited enough to allow us to 
deceive ourselves, resist God’s grace, and derail our character 
development.”89  
If God were to give people full disclosure, it would violate people’s ability to 
make a free choice. Furthermore, Walls claims that full disclosure is only 
made available to people who have responded positively to God’s grace. “In 
my view, the knowledge that God is the source of happiness, whereas sin is 
the source of misery, is acquired in its full clarity only through free response 
to God’s grace.”90 In fact, faith means that a person makes a positive response 
to God’s grace before a person has achieved full knowledge of God’s nature. 
That is, only a person who has shown some inchoate positive response to God 
can begin to understand the implications of her choice. “Such absolute clarity 
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of vision is only achieved as we progressively respond with trust and love to 
God’s self-revelation.”91 Indeed, this is the very nature of trust, “that it is 
exercised in a context of less than full disclosure.”92 The choice for hell is 
indeed irrational, but a loving God is not willing to interfere with that free 
choice regardless of how irrational or self-destructive it may be. 
The second question deals with why anyone would choose to go to hell if 
the person were truly free to decide. In other words, is it an intelligible notion 
to believe that some people could freely choose to do evil or to damn 
themselves if they really knew what they were doing? What could possibly 
motivate anyone to make such a choice?  
The reasons that lead people to commit individual sins against their better 
judgment – temporary pleasure, a sense of control or power, desire for 
vindication or the belief that sin will go undetected – provide a possible 
explanation as to how a definitive choice for damnation could be 
psychologically possible.  
[T]he choice of evil is ultimately irrational, although it has its own 
twisted sort of logic. The heart of this perverse logic is famously 
stated by Milton in words attributed to Satan: ‘Better to reign in hell 
than serve in heaven’. The damned are not, then, altogether 
irrational. The [sic] have certain preferences and they make choices 
that make sense in light of those preferences. In short, the damned 
find a certain distorted sort of satisfaction in evil and they 
perversely prefer that satisfaction to the true happiness of heaven.93 
Some people, by force of continuing in sin, begin to view evil as good and 
good as evil, so that “good” becomes a despicable, horrifying thought to them. 
People in hell could even be considered happy if one defines “happy” as 
getting what one wants.  
This twisted sense of logic may help explain how self-deception could be 
fully compatible with being sufficiently informed about the nature of God 
and the nature of sin. “Self-deception is not a matter of lacking information, 
but rather a matter of not attending to what one knows, or of suppressing it 
and refusing to act on it.94 For Walls, it must be psychologically possible for 
people to deceive themselves regardless of the amount of information or 
revelation available to them. There are several possible reasons why a person 
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may perceive the choice for hell to be better than the choice for God: the 
desire to pleasure, the desire to exert control over one’s own fate or the desire 
for vindication.95  
Regarding the desire for vindication, Walls writes that some people just 
want to be “right” regardless of the cost. He cites the story of the rich man 
and Lazarus, where the rich man is not repentant; he seems to be more 
concerned about justifying himself. When he makes a plea for a messenger to 
be sent to warn his brothers, the underlying idea is that the rich man thought 
he’d not been sufficiently warned. If only he’d been warned, he wouldn’t have 
ended up in hell. Even though he felt wronged by not having been sufficiently 
warned, he wanted his brothers to have a proper warning.  
In this example, and others like it, hell seems to afford its inhabitants “a 
kind of gratification which motivates the choice to go there. … That belief is 
what finally justifies and makes intelligible the choice of hell.”96  
Talbott’s main objection to Walls’ view of hell is that a loving God would 
see to it that everyone receives full disclosure of all the information needed 
about God and the consequences of human choices to be able to make a fully 
rational choice. No fully rational person would ever choose an eternal hell. He 
sees a distinction between what is within the power of a person to do and 
what is psychologically possible for the person to do. He contends that even 
in heaven, where people will have a clearer, more unobstructed view of God, 
they will have the power to rebel against God. They remain free, but the 
choice to rebel is psychologically impossible.97 Talbott rejects the idea that 
freedom must also entail the psychological possibility of acting irrationally. 
“For if that were true, then God Himself would never do the right thing (or 
act in a loving, as opposed to a hateful, way) freely.”98 For this reason Talbott 
claims that it is psychologically impossible for people to choose damnation 
even if they have full insight into the destructive nature of sin.  
In defending the Irrationality Thesis, Walls maintains that Talbott’s 
thinking is a seemingly reasonable conclusion in a perfect world. Yet in the 
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real world, one must apply his thinking even to small, sinful choices – not 
simply the large, destiny-sealing choice for damnation. If we understand the 
destructive nature of sin, why do we sin at all? The truth is that we do in fact 
understand the destructive nature of sin, but choose for whatever reason to 
sin anyway.  
Talbott claims that it is conceivable that a loving person would do 
anything in his power to prevent someone he loves from inflicting irreparable 
harm to herself or others. For example, a loving father would do everything 
possible to prevent his daughter from committing suicide, even if it means 
violating her freedom to harm herself. Walls counters that there is a major 
difference between Talbott’s example and the definitive choice for hell. In the 
case of a daughter who wants to commit suicide, the father can reasonably 
conclude that the daughter is suffering from a temporary loss of perspective 
due to depression or various circumstances that may very well heal with a 
little time and therapy. At first glance this appears to be similar to Talbott’s 
idea that if people are only given sufficient information, they could not 
reasonably choose damnation. Walls doesn’t think it’s the same thing, 
however, since the choice for hell is not a rash impulse that one will later 
regret, but rather a long-lasting series of chronic choices. 
The Irrationality Thesis would seem to be an important supplement to any 
doctrine of hell that rejects universalism. One possible corollary for 
issuantists who posit both the Irrationality Thesis and the Not-so-Nasty 
Thesis is that the denizens of hell would be kept in the dark of ignorance 
about the blessings they’re missing through their rejection of God. Because of 
the limited insight a person has in hell, it is “impossible for anyone fully to 
experience the horror of being separated from God.”99  
Full disclosure is incompatible with the Not-so-Nasty Thesis. This does 
not, however, present a major concern for either Walls or Swinburne. For 
Walls, full disclosure is only given to those who respond positively to God’s 
grace. For Swinburne, full disclosure is only given in the beatific vision since 
full disclosure to people in this lifetime would nullify a person’s freedom. 
By itself, however, the Irrationality Thesis leaves open the possibility that 
even people in heaven could make the irrational choice to rebel against God 
and thus forfeit one’s eternal life. The finality of one’s status would thereby be 
jeopardized and one’s salvation would never be assured. One way around this 
problem would be to posit – as do both Swinburne and Walls – the Fixed 
Character Thesis as an explanation of how a person in heaven could be secure 
                                                
99 Walls 2004a, 214. 
Issuant Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
160 
in her salvation while a person in hell could continue to make the irrational 
choice to reject God.  
The Middle Knowledge Thesis 
The question of divine foreknowledge has been hotly debated in Anglo-
American evangelical circles since the end of the twentieth century. The 
debate has not been limited to academic circles, but has also been featured in 
popular magazines and engaged many active lay people within the church. 
The issue of divine foreknowledge has implications for other areas of 
theology, including the nature of divine sovereignty and the nature of human 
freedom. All of these issues of course relate to the broader question of the 
problem of evil and the specific soteriological problem of evil, the problem of 
hell. 
In this section and the following I shall examine two main perspectives on 
divine foreknowledge as they relate to issuant views of hell. Neither the 
Middle Knowledge Thesis nor the Openness Thesis is in the strict sense a 
supplement to basic issuantism. That is, they are not expendable features 
whose purpose is to shore up basic issuantism. Rather, they can both be seen 
as competing metaphysical starting points about the nature of divine 
foreknowledge that have implications for the doctrine of hell.   
Some scholars supplement basic issuantism with a form of molinism 
whereby God has middle knowledge of how people would act should they be 
found in a certain set of circumstances. Molinism (after Spanish Jesuit Luis de 
Molina, 1535-1600) claims that God has middle knowledge (scientia media) 
of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. This middle knowledge stands 
logically between God’s natural knowledge and God’s free knowledge. God’s 
natural knowledge is God’s pre-volitional knowledge of necessary truths. 
God’s free knowledge is God’s post-volitional knowledge of facts that are true 
in virtue of God’s creative choice. Middle knowledge of the truth value of 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is both pre-volitional (like God’s 
natural knowledge) and knowledge of contingent truths (like God’s free 
knowledge).100 That is, God knows logically prior to the decision to actualize a 
possible world which propositions about what any person would freely do in 
a given set of circumstances can be said to be true or false.  
The Middle Knowledge Thesis is the idea that God, on the basis of middle 
knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, actualizes a world in 
which the optimal ratio of saved to lost is realized.  
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By way of contrast, one may compare molinism with two other 
perspectives on divine foreknowledge. Simple foreknowledge is the view that 
an omniscient God infallibly knows everything that will happen. According 
to open theism on the other hand, God is still omniscient, but only knows 
everything that is logically possible for God to know. On this view, however, 
the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom do not have a truth value and God 
does not know what a person will do in a given set of circumstances until the 
person actually makes those choices.  
Going back to an earlier example, if the CEO of a company had known that 
Fabian would lose a multimillion euro contract in London due to his drinking 
binge with an old college buddy, she would not have hired him. According to 
simple foreknowledge, God knew that Fabian would go drinking and lose the 
contract. Open theists, by contrast, would say that not only did the CEO not 
know what would happen; God had no way of knowing it either. Molinists 
would say that God’s middle knowledge entails that God not only knows 
whether Fabian would lose the contract if he should happen to miss his flight, 
but also whether he would go drinking with his friend if the friend should 
happen to call, and whether the CEO would hire Fabian in the first place if she 
had had the middle knowledge of what Fabian would freely do in this set of 
circumstances. 
One objection against Christian faith initially raised by J.L. Mackie was 
that an omnipotent and omniscient God could have created a world such that 
free moral agents would only ever choose to do good.101 Plantinga argued that 
if the truth value of future contingents or counterfactuals is not dependent on 
God’s will (that is, God does not cause people to act in certain ways), then 
there is no way that even an omnipotent God could cause a person to act 
freely in one way or another. Apart from creating a deterministic world, the 
best God can do is to create a world in which the proper conditions obtain for 
God’s plan for the world to be best served by an optimal balance of good and 
evil free choices humans make.102 Following Plantinga’s lead, this molinist 
line of reasoning has become a standard argument among Christian 
apologists.  
The issuantist who has most explicitly emphasized the Middle Knowledge 
Thesis is Jonathan Kvanvig. In The Possibility of an All-knowing God (1986), 
Kvanvig defended a classic form of molinism. In The Problem of Hell (1992), 
Kvanvig applied the Middle Knowledge Thesis to basic issuantism. In 
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subsequent texts, however, Kvanvig calls into question some of the basic 
assumptions in classic molinism as having more in common with deism than 
with historical Christian theism.103 Kvanvig ultimately rejects the Middle 
Knowledge Thesis as a supplement to basic issuantism. I shall nonetheless 
include it here because of the role it plays in Kvanvig’s classic work The 
Problem of Hell. 
In The Problem of Hell, Kvanvig examines and ultimately rejects 
Plantinga’s argument that there are certain logically possible worlds that God 
could not feasibly create. This comes in the context of critiquing Talbott’s 
claim (echoing Mackie) that God could have created a world in which every 
person freely chooses salvation. The intricacies of Kvanvig’s critique of 
Plantinga’s argument are more detailed than we need concern ourselves with 
in this current discussion. The important point is that Kvanvig goes on to 
apply the Middle Knowledge Thesis in arguing that there are certain states of 
affairs that a God possessing middle knowledge would know to be true which 
would justify God’s decision not to override a person’s choice for hell.  
Talbott argues that a loving God should interfere with a person’s freedom 
if that person uses her freedom to make the self-destructive choice for hell. 
For Talbott, love is more important than freedom. Using Talbott’s example of 
interfering with a person who wants to commit suicide, Kvanvig agrees that 
there may be circumstances under which it would be legitimate to interfere: if 
the desire to end one’s life were due to temporary depression and the person 
would not wish to end her life in less trying circumstances, if a medical 
condition or physical pain is clouding the person’s judgment, when the 
person underestimates her prospects for the future, or if she would one day 
thank us for having intervened.  
What justifies our intervention is the fact that the person will come, 
or will likely come, to see that [her] choice of death was not what 
[she] really wanted or would have wanted if [she] had reflected 
carefully. Alternatively, if we are fully convinced and it is true that 
the person is competent to choose, is rational in choosing suicide, 
and cannot be persuaded otherwise, then, from a purely moral 
point of view, interference is not justified….104  
We may be justified in erring on the side of caution (and intervening) simply 
because we do not have infallible knowledge of a person’s present and future 
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mental states and because the effects of a suicide are irrevocable. That cannot 
be said of God, who knows the truth value of all counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom. Kvanvig writes, “My argument that God should not always override 
the freedom of rebellious individuals to secure their presence in heaven 
depends on the assumption that God foreknows what free individuals will 
want, desire, and choose in the future.”105 
So rather than using molinism to argue for which possible worlds it would 
be feasible for God to create (as do Plantinga and Craig), Kvanvig uses it to 
explain how God could be justified in not overriding a person’s free choice – 
God knows that the person would choose to reject God in any given set of 
circumstances.  
In recent years Kvanvig has begun to call into question the existence of 
true counterfactuals on the basis of what he calls the grounding objection. In 
two almost identical worlds, Kvanvig writes his book Destiny and 
Deliberation. On molinism, God knows it to be true that if Kvanvig were 
offered $100,000 he would write Destiny and Deliberation. God also knows it 
to be true that in a world that in every respect is the same as the first example 
except that Kvanvig is not offered $100,000, he would still write Destiny and 
Deliberation. In a non-deterministic world it is possible that in either of those 
situations Kvanvig could choose to sit and watch TV all those hours instead of 
writing Destiny and Deliberation. In a deterministic world, there are grounds 
for the truth of both counterfactual statements. In a non-deterministic world, 
however, it would be more accurate to regard counterfactuals as probabilistic. 
Kvanvig sees this as a problem for classic molinism as it undermines finality.  
Here’s what we’re left with if we stick with the Choice Model. Either 
some other intermediate position must be found – a position that 
retains full providence and libertarian freedom, and does so in a 
way that avoids whatever difficulties arise for Molinism because of 
the grounding objection – or full omniscience has to be abandoned, 
since exhaustive foreknowledge of the future will no longer be 
within God’s reach.106  
He thus concludes that molinists must either abandon molinism in favor of a 
“truncated” view of divine omniscience or find other means of grounding the 
truth value of counterfactuals.  
Kvanvig doesn’t believe that the truncated view of omniscience found in 
open theism provides the kind of finality he seeks.  
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One’s presence in Heaven or Hell might initially be something we 
choose, but the inability to leave will not. One might imagine a 
position where the option of leaving Hell is closed off, but it is hard 
to see how any point chosen will make the position better at dealing 
with the problem of Hell than the traditional retributivist 
understanding for which an alternative is thought to be needed.107 
Be that as it may, Kvanvig seeks to develop a theory that has a grounding for 
finality and not a mere accidental generalization. He does this through a 
combination of basic issuantism with a modified form of molinism where 
there is a better grounding for the truth value of counterfactuals together with 
annihilationism. Otherwise,  
the unending separation would never, at any point, be final in any 
modally strong way. Finality results only when union with God is 
achieved or annihilation occurs; short of that is the intermediate 
state of, to put it a bit misleadingly, never-ending uncertainty.108  
Kvanvig calls this a destiny, but one that in the name of libertarian freedom is 
not imposed by some outside force.  
He maintains that the truth of counterfactuals of freedom is better 
defended by descending from the metaphysical mountaintop to the quotidian 
experience of epistemic inference. By this means the molinist can come closer 
to accounting for finality and destiny in a person’s free choices.  
This is where the Fixed Character Thesis comes in. When a person 
develops a fixed evil character (or “loses his soul”), he is both psychologically 
unable to act against his fixed character and responsible for placing himself in 
that state.  
Yet Kvanvig questions whether the addition of the Fixed Character Thesis 
succeeds in rescuing the Middle Knowledge Thesis from the grounding 
objection that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are only contingently 
true. For there to be a sense of finality, the issuantist who also affirms the 
Fixed Character Thesis must show how the fixed character results in the loss 
of libertarian freedom – something that Kvanvig says they have failed to do. 
Without the loss of libertarian freedom, there is no finality. The Fixed 
Character Thesis is thus faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, if there is 
finality, there is no longer libertarian freedom. Then one could legitimately 
raise the same objection that is directed against compatibilists about why God 
doesn’t just fix everyone’s character for the good. The other option would be 
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to capitulate to Kvanvig’s critique that even with the Fixed Character Thesis 
there are no guarantees that a person actually achieves the kind of fixed 
character that would rule out the possibility of acting out of character. 
Without this type of fixed character, there is still no finality.  
As his own worst critic, Kvanvig moves on to propose a “maverick” 
molinism in which the truth values of counterfactuals exists logically prior to 
God’s acts of will (pre-volitional), but where in contrast to classic molinism, 
they are under God’s control. Kvanvig argues that they are under God’s 
control because there may be a world in which God could do something to 
make a false counterfactual true.  
Ultimately, however, Kvanvig rejects all attempts at supplementing basic 
issuantism with the Middle Knowledge Thesis on the grounds that the 
molinist fails in showing how the truth value of counterfactuals can provide 
the sense of finality needed in a Christian doctrine of hell. It is his considered 
conclusion that the Middle Knowledge Thesis adds nothing to basic 
issuantism’s ability to answer the problem of hell.  
The Openness Thesis 
Open theism is an arminian view of divine foreknowledge whereby God is 
said to have complete and infallible knowledge of the past, exhaustive and 
accurate knowledge of the present, and even some knowledge of future 
events. What God does not know, however, according to open theists, are the 
future choices and actions of free moral agents.  
This does not mean that God cannot be considered omniscient. Just as 
divine omnipotence does not mean God can do anything, divine omniscience 
does not mean God knows everything. Even an omnipotent God cannot act in 
ways that are contradictory God’s perfect nature or do things that are 
logically impossible. By the same token, an omniscient God cannot know 
those things that are logically impossible to know. Stated more positively, an 
omniscient God knows everything that is logically possible for God to know.  
For open theists, the future is partially settled and partially open. Some 
aspects of the future are settled, such as divine prophecies of future events – 
where God declares his eternal purposes and will for humanity. These future 
events are those that are not dependent on the actions of free human beings. 
There is a category of statements about the future about which God has 
infallible knowledge – prophecies of events that God determines to be true.  
Openness theologians maintain that the counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom have no truth value. Let us take two related statements as examples: 
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1. If Johannes were to be hired as a waiter for the Nobel Prize 
dinner, he would poison the King of Sweden.  
2. Next year on December 10, Johannes will poison the King of 
Sweden at the Nobel Prize dinner. 
A counterfactual statement like (1) has no truth value according to open 
theism. Since Johannes has not been hired as a waiter for the Nobel Prize 
dinner, the statement is neither true nor false. Even if Johannes were hired as 
a waiter for the Nobel Prize dinner, God would not know what Johannes will 
do in the future. Nor do future-tense statements like (2) concerning the free 
actions of creatures have any truth value. They are also impossible for God to 
know. The truth value of future-tense statements is only known when the 
future becomes the present – on December 10 both we and God will know 
whether the statement is true that Johannes will poison the King of Sweden. 
With this introduction to open theism, let us now see the implications of 
the Openness Thesis for the problem of hell.  
On the Openness Thesis, God’s character and actions in creating the 
world are vindicated by the fact that God did not know prior to the creative 
act which if any free moral agents would end up in hell.  
If the molinist is correct in believing that God possesses middle 
knowledge, then God took very little risk in creating the world, since God 
knew how people would freely act in the set of circumstances they would face 
in the actual world. Although the creative act meant little risk, a God who has 
middle knowledge would appear to bear a greater moral responsibility for the 
world.  
If the open theist is correct in believing that God could not know what 
choices free creatures would make, then God took a greater risk in choosing 
to create the actual world, but bears less moral responsibility for what 
happens in it. Openness theologian David Basinger recognizes that the 
potential negative results of the risk that God takes in creating the world 
present at least as great a problem as that faced by molinists who believe in 
ECT.  
[T]o posit that an all-loving God – especially one who has an a 
priori commitment to allowing individuals to go to hell under 
certain conditions – would gamble in this way seems to me to be no 
less serious a problem than any faced by a Traditionalist who 
believes God possesses middle knowledge and on this basis affirms 
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a soteriological theodicy based on something such as [the 
transworld damnation theory].109  
In spite of the risk that God takes in creating this world, Basinger concludes 
that the potential benefit of creating this world is better than creating a world 
in which people do not possess libertarian freedom.110  
Although Basinger claims that the actual world is better than a less-risky 
alternative where God knows that some people will end up in hell, one may 
question these conclusions on the grounds that one may never know how this 
world would compare to any other possible world. Basinger understands this 
objection, but maintains that it is nonetheless within the epistemic rights of a 
person to make this claim.  
If God has no middle knowledge of the truth value of counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom and no simple foreknowledge of what free people will do 
in the future, then God takes a risk in creation that the world may turn out to 
be a place where no one would be saved at all. Walls asks whether a good God 
would create a world in which this is even a possibility.111 This raises the 
related question of proportions – what percentage of people must be saved in 
order maintain God’s goodness?  
Let’s say that at least 50 percent of all people who ever live on earth must 
be saved in order for God’s goodness to be preserved in light of God’s choice 
to create a world populated by free human beings. Let’s say further that on 
average only 30 percent of the world’s population ever responds positively to 
God’s grace and is saved. Does this mean that in the generation leading up to 
the telos of world history that God must override the freedom of some people 
in order to bring the average up to an acceptable level of 50 percent? Without 
overriding some people’s freedom, one could call into question the goodness 
of God. If God could be justified in overriding the freedom of some people 
for the sake of preserving the goodness of God, then why couldn’t God be 
                                                
109 Basinger 1992, 17. 
110 Basinger 1992, 1-18. Some other perspectives on divine foreknowledge do not 
automatically exclude the possibility of libertarian freedom. Many molinists, for example, 
would consider themselves libertarians. 
111 Although Walls seems to argue from the viewpoint that God only has general 
foreknowledge (i.e., no knowledge of the future actions of free moral agents), it is far from 
clear that he actually embraces open theism. He writes that the general foreknowledge view 
(what I call the Openness Thesis) “cannot claim to be exempt from moral problems.” Walls 
1992, 53. I include his line of reasoning here because he does indeed show some positive 
implications of general foreknowledge for the problem of hell, even though it may simply be an 
experiment in thought. He has not responded to my requests for clarification. 
Issuant Views of Hell in Contemporary Anglo-American Theology 
168 
justified in overriding the freedom of all people to create the optimal balance 
between saved and lost – 100% saved; 0% lost?  
Walls answers that rather than setting a specific number on the percentage 
of people who must be saved in order to preserve God’s goodness, it is 
enough to say that God will give everyone the optimal grace needed to make a 
positive response to God, and that God will save all who respond positively to 
this offer of optimal grace.  
His perfect goodness consists essentially in the fact that he saves the 
highest number or proportion he can, while giving all persons an 
optimal measure of grace. … God’s goodness is in no way 
dependent upon his ability to save a particular percentage of free 
persons.112  
Because God has infallible knowledge of a person and his needs, God can 
ensure that every person is given optimal grace at some stage of existence.  
Swinburne rejects both simple foreknowledge and molinism in favor of a 
form of the Openness Thesis.113 In the case of simple foreknowledge, can God 
foreknow anything without determining that which God foreknows? Simple 
foreknowledge and human freedom are seemingly at odds. If God knows for 
instance that I will eat soup for lunch tomorrow, am I really free to eat a salad 
instead? If I eat a salad, then does my free choice mean that God had a false 
belief in “knowing” that I would eat soup? If God infallibly foreknows what I 
will eat, is my choice of what to eat for lunch determined?  
[T]here do seem to be substantial philosophical difficulties in 
supposing that God can have now complete foreknowledge of that 
which is not yet determined. For if I am freely (i.e. not 
determinedly) to choose tomorrow what I shall do then, I shall then 
have it in my power to make false anyone’s beliefs of today about 
what I will do tomorrow. So how can anyone, even God, already 
know what I will do?114 
One possible way around this would be to say that God is timeless. This is not 
completely without complications. Swinburne admits, however, that if one 
can make sense of God’s timelessness, then the doctrine of predestination 
post praevisa merita will thereby also be rendered coherent. Swinburne does 
                                                
112 Walls 1992, 104. 
113 See the chapter entitled “Omniscient” in Swinburne 1995, 167-183.  
114 Swinburne 1989, 194. 
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not, however, believe the doctrine of divine timelessness can be rendered 
coherent.115 
Likewise, Swinburne rejects molinism because of what he believes to be 
insufficient grounding of the truth-value of the counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom.116   
Middle knowledge, however, would still be impossible. For if there 
is to be a necessary correlation between what agents do and what 
God believes about what agents do, it must be sustained either by 
the actions of agents causing God’s beliefs, or by God causing the 
actions of agents, or by God’s beliefs and the actions of agents 
having a common cause.117 
Reverting to an earlier example of the (potential) waiter Johannes at the 
Nobel Prize dinner, what makes a counterfactual statement like (1) true? If 
the world were deterministic, then the laws of nature and the state of affairs 
in the world up to that point would make it true. But then it would not be a 
counterfactual of freedom. Nor can Johannes be the guarantor of the truth of 
(1), since he is not in a position to make it true because he is not in a position 
to hire himself as waiter for the Nobel Prize dinner. Yet if it is not Johannes 
who makes the counterfactual true, then what or who does? After all, it must 
ultimately be Johannes’ action that determines whether the statement is true 
or false. If it is God who makes it true by virtue of creating the world in such a 
way that if Johannes were to be hired as a waiter for the Nobel Prize dinner, 
he would poison the King of Sweden, then God would in effect be 
determining that Johannes would poison the king – but only if God were to 
create the world such that Martin would hire Johannes as a waiter if Johannes 
were to apply for the job, which he would only do if he were to be fired from 
his previous job as a waiter at the royal palace, which would only happen if 
Johannes were caught stealing wine from the king’s wine cellar, which would 
only happen if…. Regardless of how many steps back in time one traces the 
chain of events leading to the Nobel Prize dinner, God’s knowledge of the 
truth-value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom must be contingent upon 
the free choice of the person or people in question.  
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Swinburne concludes that “God cannot have incorrigible middle 
knowledge, and so ever be in a position to choose to create a world in which, 
be knows incorrigibly, free agents will always choose the good.”118 
In rejecting both simple foreknowledge and molinism, Swinburne 
advances a view of divine foreknowledge and omniscience that is in keeping 
with open theism.  
An omniscient being is one who knows everything logically 
possible for him to know, anything the description of his knowing 
which does not involve a contradiction. He would know everything 
that has happened, everything that is happening or could happen. 
But, in my view … he will not necessarily know everything that will 
happen unless it is already predetermined that it will happen. For 
there is a logical inconsistency in supposing that any being knows 
necessarily what is yet to happen when that has yet to be 
determined (i.e. when it is not already fixed by its causes). But if the 
omniscient being is God and so also omnipotent, it will be through 
his own choice that there is anything not already predetermined 
and so that there is any limit to his knowledge.119  
He reaffirms this belief later in the same work.  
Since Christian tradition has on the whole affirmed that humans 
have free will ... God’s omniscience must, I suggest, be understood 
... as knowledge at every time of all that is logically possible for God 
to know at that time. This knowledge does not include knowledge 
of the true propositions about the future actions of free agents.120 
Since God could not possibly have known how the world would turn out or 
how people would use the freedom God granted them, God cannot be blamed 
for either the evil that takes place in the world or the regrettable fact that 
some people will use their freedom to develop a totally corrupt character, 
thus making themselves fit only for existence in hell.  
It is difficult to evaluate the contributions of the Openness Thesis for the 
issuantist understanding of hell without critiquing open theism as a basis for 
understanding divine foreknowledge.121 It is beyond the scope of the present 
work to give a full-fledged presentation and critique of open theism. My 
purpose has simply been to highlight the possible contributions of open 
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121 The same was true of Kvanvig’s critique (and ultimate rejection) of molinism. 
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theism to a solution to the problem of hell. Notwithstanding, a few comments 
may be in order. 
First, an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God could and would 
do something about evil unless there were overriding reasons for God not to 
do so. On open theism there are certain things God cannot know (not 
because of a limitation in God’s omniscience, but due to the very nature of 
much of the future as unknowable). As such, God does not know what evil 
morally free beings will cause. This would seemingly set limits for God’s 
knowledge of how divine omnipotence could be used to stop such potential 
evil. If God will not interfere with human freedom to stop evil now, what 
guarantee do we have that there will in the end ever be a final triumph of 
good over evil? Open theists must answer that it stands within God’s power to 
judge the free choices of people and the devil, but this answer leads directly 
back to the original question – if it is within God’s power to secure a final 
victory of good over evil, why doesn’t God use that power to defeat evil on a 
small scale now? 
Second, Walls says that God had no way of knowing before the creative act 
how many people would respond positively to his grace, but “based on his 
knowledge of human nature” God could know what percentage of people 
would likely be saved.122 One may question whether God could even know 
this prior to the creative act. If Adam and Eve’s free choice to sin lay in the 
future and God couldn’t foreknow this event, then God could not have 
known what human nature would become as a result of sin.  
Third, since God does not know the future as it relates to the free choices 
of humans, then God cannot know which course of events would be for the 
greatest good of his people. This has implications not only for the soul-
building and greater-good theodicies, but even for pastoral theology. It would 
become meaningless to pray that a person would have a safe trip since the 
safety of that trip can be jeopardized by the free actions of a drunk driver. We 
can’t pray for peace in Syria because the civil war there lies completely in the 
hands of the various factions. I can’t pray that my brother will get the job he 
is applying for, since that decision is the free choice of a human resources 
director.   
Finally, although open theists claim that God is omniscient, sometimes the 
writings of open theists present what to some may be a less than favorable 
portrait of God. Open theists claim that God cannot reach into a situation to 
stop evil because the future is unknowable. Yet that must make God stupid – 
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or at least irresponsible. If God has complete and perfect knowledge of the 
past and the present, then God must have known what lay in the hearts of the 
terrorists who hijacked four airliners on September 11, 2001. If God heard 
their conspiratorial conversations and saw their behavior, then God must be 
either stupid or irresponsible for not doing anything to stop their acts of 
terrorism. God doesn’t need exhaustive or infallible knowledge of the future 
to be able to do something about evil; God only needs to be a good guesser – 
an answer that is sometimes presented as an explanation of Jesus’ predictions 
of Judas’ betrayal and Peter’s denials.123 To me then, open theism does not 
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. 
It would appear that in the absence of a deterministic universe, any world 
God could have created involved a certain amount of risk. The Openness 
Thesis offers a defeasible explanation as to why God is not culpable for 
allowing evil in the world, but, despite the claims made by openness 
theologians to the opposite, would seem to leave us with a deistic god that 
does not interfere with human affairs when it really matters. All Christians 
believe that in the end God will triumph over evil, but how many people will 
be lost in the process? This, along with the truncated view of God offered by 
open theism, would appear to be a Pyrrhic victory. 
Conclusion on Supplemented Forms of Issuantism 
By itself basic issuantism doesn’t solve the problem of hell because God must 
still by all reasonable accounts be held responsible for setting up a system 
whereby people who reject God will suffer some sort of horrible eternal fate. 
In recent decades issuantists have presented a wide range of supplements to 
basic issuantism whose purpose is to strengthen the tenets of basic issuantism 
in providing satisfactory solutions to the problem of hell.   
Most combinations of these supplements are possible (thus explaining the 
wide array of views present among scholars who could broadly be construed 
as issuantist). However, not all combinations are helpful. For instance, a 
combination of the Not-so-Nasty Thesis and escapism is logically possible, 
but what would be the point? Why would anyone want to leave a hell where 
one gets exactly what one wants?  
The Less-than-Human Thesis is a supplement to metaphysical 
libertarianism that has much potential at helping issuantism answer the 
problem of hell, but it is not compatible with escapism. The Less-than-
                                                
123 Gregory A. Boyd, “The Open-Theism View” in James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy 
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Human Thesis may be applied to the inhabitants of hell, but does not work 
with purgatory; why would God make people (or allow people to become) 
less than human if they are only to be restored to full humanity through the 
sanctifying processes of purgatory?  
The Fixed Character Thesis is compatible with the possibility of one extra 
chance after death (in particular as a counterbalance to bad religious luck) 
and may explain how a person can make a persistent choice to reject God, but 
at the possible expense of losing true libertarian freedom. This, however, need 
not be an insurmountable problem if one also posits the transitivity of moral 
responsibility.  
The Middle Knowledge Thesis is logically compatible with the Extra 
Chance Theses, but one may ask what benefit would come from extra chances 
if one also posits the idea of transworld damnation.   
The Extra Chance Thesis is perhaps one of the most helpful supplements 
to basic issuantism. In its escapist version, it is nonetheless incompatible with 
the Less-than-Human Thesis and the Fixed Character Thesis.  
In the next chapter I shall show that although some versions of basic 
issuantism provide possible or even plausible answers to the problem of hell, 
much of the same result can be gained by adding the same supplements to 
non-issuant views of hell advanced by some traditionalists and 
conditionalists.  
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NON-ISSUANT VIEWS OF HELL  
WITH SUPPLEMENTARY THESES 
While it is true that any account of Hell can be supplemented with 
the idea of loss of soul, the theory I am concerned with here 
attempts to use the idea of loss of soul to shore up a difficulty faced 
by the Choice Model when universalism is rejected.1 
In previous chapters I have distilled from the works of many issuantist 
scholars what I believe to be the essence of issuantism – a concept of hell that 
does not end in universal salvation, where hell is seen as an expression of the 
love of God, where human freedom is defined in libertarian terms, and where 
the purpose of hell is interpreted along non-retributive lines. I have also 
shown that by itself, this “basic issuantism” is unable to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the problem of hell. This should not, however, be taken as sufficient 
reason for an outright rejection of issuantism’s ability to explain the duration, 
quality, purpose and finality of hell in ways that provide an adequate solution 
to the problem of hell. Issuantists themselves, as I have shown in chapter five, 
supplement basic issuantism with a number of theses whose purpose is to 
fortify the prospects of answering the problem of hell from an issuantist 
perspective – with the result that some augmented versions of issuantism 
present plausible solutions to the problem of hell.  
In this present chapter I shall show that some non-issuantist scholars also 
present accounts of the duration, quality, purpose and finality of hell such 
that classic formulations of ECT and conditionalism are shored up with some 
of the same supplements as are used to strengthen basic issuantism – also 
with the result that some augmented non-issuantist accounts of hell present 
coherent, possible solutions to the problem of hell.  
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In particular, I shall look at the work of William Lane Craig, Charles 
Seymour, Michael Murray and Clark Pinnock.2 Craig supplements his ECT 
with the Middle Knowledge Thesis, the Fixed Character Thesis and the 
Continuing Sin Defense.3 Seymour and Murray both present views of hell 
that come close to being issuant views – with the exception that they do not 
completely reject the Retribution Thesis. Seymour adds the Extra Chance 
Thesis, the Middle Knowledge Thesis, the Continuing Sin Defense, the Not-
so-Nasty Thesis and possibly the Fixed Character Thesis. Murray 
supplements his version of hell as a hybrid between issuantism and ECT with 
the Fixed Character Thesis (and, with the help of Justin Barnard, the Less-
than-Human Thesis). Finally, Pinnock supplements his conditionalism with 
the Extra Chance Thesis, the Nearly Empty Thesis and the Openness Thesis. 
Although I included universalism as a non-issuantist view of hell in 
chapter two, I shall not directly address the contributions of universalists in 
this chapter. Whereas the rejection of the No Escape Thesis is central to 
universalism, it is only a possible supplement to ECT, conditionalism and 
issuantism. As such, the universalist solution to the problem of hell does not 
rely upon supplements to some basic form of universalism, as is the case with 
basic issuantism or classic formulations of ECT and conditionalism. Hell, to 
the extent that it exists at all within universalism, fills more of a rehabilitative 
or purgatorial function.  
William Lane Craig 
One well-known defense of ECT with the addition of the Middle Knowledge 
Thesis is found in a now classic text by William Lane Craig.4 In this defense of 
Christian particularism, Craig tackles several difficult questions that arise in 
response to the exclusive claims of Christ and of the church on behalf of 
Christ. These questions include: Why doesn’t God supply special revelation to 
people who reject general revelation but who would respond positively to the 
                                                
2 Whereas my presentation of basic issuantism and its supplements in chapters four 
and five has been thematic, in this chapter I shall present the work of each scholar as a separate 
unit. My purpose is to show how the supplements highlighted in chapter five can be integrated 
into theological frameworks that do not necessarily share the starting points of basic 
issuantism.   
3 The Continuing Sin Defense is not to my knowledge used by any issuantist to 
supplement basic issuantism. It is, however, a common supplement used by traditionalists. 
4 Craig 1989, 172-188. Craig has also presented a similar line of reasoning in somewhat 
more popular form in chapter 8 “Christ, the Only Way” in Hard Questions, Real Answers 
(Wheaton: Crossway, 2003) and chapter 10 “Is Jesus the Only Way to God?” in On Guard 
(Colorado Springs: David C. Cook, 2010).  
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gospel of Jesus Christ if they were sufficiently well-informed about it? Why did 
God create this world when God knew that so many people would not receive 
Christ and would therefore be consigned to an everlasting hell? Why did God 
not create a world in which everyone freely receives Christ and so is saved?5  
Craig makes several preliminary statements, including an affirmation of 
Jesus’ belief that “most of mankind would be damned, while a minority of 
mankind would be saved.”6 For Craig, however, the primary issue is not how 
much knowledge people have of God, but what kind of knowledge God has 
about people. Indeed, if lack of information (or misinformation) about God 
were the main problem, then one could legitimately criticize God for 
condemning someone to hell who through the fortuities of bad religious luck 
lacked the necessary information to place her faith in Jesus Christ. Craig 
leaves open the possibility that a person who has never heard of Christ may 
nonetheless be saved by Christ’s atoning work by giving a positive response to 
the limited amount of revelation available. He concludes however that this is 
an unlikely scenario since the “testimony of Scripture is that the mass of 
humanity do not [sic] even respond to the light that they do have...”7  
The soteriological problem of evil or problem of hell entails an 
inconsistency between propositions (1) and (2): 
1. God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. 
2. Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned.  
Craig proceeds to posit a number of additional propositions that would seek 
to harmonize the two propositions. He states for instance that it is logically 
possible for God to create any possible world (including a world in which all 
people freely place their faith in Christ), but not every possible world is 
feasible. “A world is feasible for God to actualize if and only if it is a member 
of that proper subset of all possible worlds determined by the counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom which God knows to be true.”8 That is, if God knew 
that it were counterfactually true that in some possible world every person 
would freely be saved, then God would actualize such a world. The problem is 
that even if God knows that there is some possible world in which any 
individual person would be saved, God knows the counterfactuals to be such 
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that there is no world in which all people will be saved. Thus, a world in 
which every person is freely saved is not a feasible world.  
Hence, even if it were the case that for any individual He might 
create, God could actualize a world in which that person is freely 
saved, it does not follow that there are worlds which are feasible for 
God in which all individuals are saved.9  
Craig calls into question the proposition that there is some feasible world in 
which each person could be saved. Even granting the possibility that for any 
individual there is a world in which he or she will freely be saved, Craig 
maintains that there is no feasible world in which the counterfactuals are true 
that person P would freely be saved while the counterfactuals are also true 
that every other person who exists in that world would also freely be saved. 
For Craig, the only feasible worlds in which every person who exists will 
be saved would only contain a handful of people. If the world is populated 
with a total of one person, there is a 50% chance that the person will be 
saved.10 With a world population of two, the chances fall to 25% or 1:4 that 
both will choose salvation. In a world with a population of five, the chances 
fall to 3.1% or 1:31 that all would freely be saved. The chances that every 
person in a world of 100 inhabitants would freely be saved are 7.88860905 × 
10-31. In layman’s terms, a snowball’s chance in hell. Craig thus insists that a 
world with only a few inhabitants in which all will be saved “is less preferable 
to God than a world in which great multitudes come to experience His 
salvation and a few are damned because they freely reject Christ.”11 Craig 
then goes beyond the claim that God would prefer a world in which there is 
collateral damage for the sake of the greater good to the claim that the actual 
world represents the optimal balance between saved and lost.  
We have seen that it is possible that some persons would not freely 
receive Christ under any circumstances. Suppose, then, that God 
has so ordered the world that all persons who are actually lost are 
                                                
9 Craig 1989, 182. 
10 Although the chance that any individual would freely choose salvation is 50% 
regardless of the number of inhabitants on earth, the chance that every person that exists 
would freely choose salvation decreases exponentially as the population increases. For the sake 
of calculation, I am assuming that no other probabilistic causes would sway the person’s 
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such persons. In such a case, anyone who actually is lost would have 
been lost in any world in which God had created him.12 
This is an idea Craig calls transworld damnation. Although Craig’s article is 
written in the missiological context of those who have never heard of Jesus, 
he doesn’t see any reason why this should not be the case for any person who 
ends up in hell.13  
In summary, Craig answers his three introductory questions thus: Why 
doesn’t God supply special revelation to people who reject general revelation but 
who would respond positively to the gospel of Jesus Christ if they were 
sufficiently well-informed about it? Because “[t]here are no such persons. … 
Those who have only general revelation and do not respond to it would also 
not have responded to the gospel had they heard it.”14 Anyone who would 
respond positively to a higher level of (special) revelation will be granted it. 
Those who are not given additional revelation would not have responded 
positively in any feasible world in which they exist.  
Why did God create this world when God knew that so many people would 
not receive Christ and would therefore be consigned to an everlasting hell? 
Craig replies that God has in fact created the world with the optimal balance 
between the number of people saved and the number who are damned. 
“Given the truth of certain counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, it was not 
feasible for God to actualize a world having as many saved as but with no 
more damned than the actual world.”15  
Finally, in answer to the question Why did God not create a world in which 
everyone freely receives Christ and so is saved? Craig responds, 
[God] would have actualized such a world were this feasible, but in 
light of certain true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom every 
world realizable by God is a world in which some persons are lost. 
Given His will to create a world of free creatures, God must accept 
that some will be lost.16  
A world in which everyone is freely saved is simply not feasible. 
In this section I have presented William Lane Craig’s defense of ECT with 
the addition of the Middle Knowledge Thesis. It is not my purpose to critique 
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14 Craig 1989, 185. 
15 Craig 1989, 185. 
16 Craig 1989, 185. 
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his proposal to the problem of hell. Indeed, few academic articles have 
engendered so much discussion and critique over such a long period of time 
as has this one.17 Craig himself believes that his understanding of God’s 
middle knowledge as it relates to hell is probably true, but is willing to settle 
for the less stringent demands of possibility. In spite of some possible 
problems related to the rationality of the choice for hell, as raised by Craig’s 
critics, it would seem that Craig’s version of ECT with the addition of the 
Middle Knowledge Thesis plus a Continuing Sin Defense with the logical 
possibility of escape or release from hell constitutes at least a possible answer 
to the problem of hell.   
Charles Seymour 
Charles Seymour defends a “freedom view” of hell18 which bears striking 
similarities to that of William Lane Craig, including Craig’s molinism, 
metaphysical libertarianism and speculations on transworld damnation.19 The 
main difference is that the Extra Chance Thesis plays a much more central 
role in Seymour’s theodicy than it does in Craig, who only admits the 
possibility of release from hell as a metaphysical possibility.20   
                                                
17 Among others, one may name the following articles and texts: Thomas Talbott, 
“Craig on the Possibility of Eternal Damnation” Religious Studies 28/4 (1992): 495-510; 
Basinger 1992, 1-18; Walls 1992, 96-97; Adams 1993; Charles Seymour, “On Choosing Hell” 
Religious Studies 33/3 (1997): 249-66; Charles Seymour, “A Craigian Theodicy of Hell” Faith 
and Philosophy 17/1 (2000): 103-115; Seymour 2000; Raymond J. Van Arragon, “Transworld 
Damnation and Craig’s Contentious Suggestion” Faith and Philosophy 10/2 (2001): 241-259. 
David B. Myers, “Exclusivism, eternal damnation, and the problem of evil: a critique of Craig’s 
Molinist soteriological theodicy” Religious Studies 39/4 (2003): 407-419; Kershnar 2005, 103-
123; Gregory MacDonald, “A Reply to William Lane Craig’s Argument that Molinism is 
Compatible with Non-Universalism” in MacDonald 2008;  Moreland 2009; and Knight 2010. 
18 Kvanvig classifies Seymour as an issuantist alongside Adams, Kvanvig, Lewis, Stump, 
Swinburne and Walls in Kvanvig 2008, 425. Seymour states very clearly: “I will also reject … 
the strategy of contemporary authors who deny one of the crucial assumptions of the argument 
from justice – that hell is a punishment.” Seymour 2000a, 38. He further characterizes 
issuantism (which he calls separationism) as “too humane to be considered a serious 
alternative.” Seymour 2000a, 83 and affirms: “We must retain the traditional notion of hell as a 
place of punishment, while remedying the faults in this view which make it susceptible to the 
argument from justice.” Seymour 2000a, 84. 
19 Craig 1989, 172-188. For the main differences between Craig and Seymour, see 
Seymour’s critique of Craig in Seymour 2000b, 103-115. 
20 In a private conversation with the present author over lunch on April 20, 2012, 
William Lane Craig admitted that this account of the justice of everlasting punishment 
demands at least the theoretical possibility that someone in hell could cease to rebel against 
God and be released from hell, even if he doubts that anyone in fact ever will repent and be 
released. As far as I know, Craig has not committed this tentative rejection of the No Escape 
Thesis to writing. 
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Seymour rejects ECT because of what he perceives to be the problem of 
injustice inherent in traditional forms of ECT. He does not believe that the 
sins one commits in a lifetime of at most 100 years can warrant unending 
torment in hell. Seymour rejects attempts by traditionalists to defend ECT by 
analogies to the legal system where a criminal may be imprisoned for a much 
longer period of time than the time it took to commit the crime. For 
Seymour, the main issue is not the duration of either the wrongdoing or the 
punishment, but the seriousness of the wrongdoing – a factor that reaffirms 
the principle of proportionality. Moreover, Seymour dismisses the idea that 
because the reward for the godly in heaven is out of proportion to their merit, 
God could be defended for punishing the ungodly out of proportion to their 
desert. Seymour points out first that salvation is not something that one 
merits, and second, that one may always “err” on the side of grace. That is, 
God treating a person better than she deserves is not a violation of justice, 
whereas treating a person worse than he deserves is.  
Likewise, Seymour rejects issuantism as a view “too humane to be 
considered a serious alternative.”21 This is because many atheists seem to be 
happy to live their lives without God. For God to allow them to be separated 
from God forever seems to go against the basic definition of hell, which 
Seymour defines as “an everlasting existence, each of whose moments is on 
the whole bad.”22 An issuantist may respond to Seymour that even atheists are 
the beneficiaries of God’s common grace during their life on earth, but that 
God will totally remove all traces of beneficent activity from the ungodly in 
hell. Seymour retorts that God could only do this for a limited period of time 
commensurate with the evil done by the ungodly; for God to remove 
common grace permanently from the ungodly would once again be a 
violation of the same principle of proportionality that Seymour criticized in 
ECT. If not for the purpose of retribution (which issuantists reject), then it’s 
not completely clear to Seymour why God would remove common grace 
from the ungodly.   
In his freedom view of hell, Seymour creates a hybrid between ECT and 
issuantism supplemented with the Middle Knowledge Thesis,23 the 
Continuing Sin Defense, the Not-so-Nasty Thesis, the Extra Chance Thesis, 
and possibly the Fixed Character Thesis. 
                                                
21 Seymour 1998, 76; Seymour 2000a, 83. 
22 Seymour 1998, 70. 
23 Seymour 2000a, 12. 
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Hell is seen here partly as a natural consequence of a person’s free choice 
to live without God. The pains of hell are twofold: the pains of sense (poena 
sensus) and the pain of loss (poena damni). The pains of sense are imposed on 
the ungodly by God as a form of retribution. The pain of loss however is the 
natural consequence of a person’s free rejection of God.  
There are, on the one hand, punishments imposed on the damned 
for their sins; these have traditionally been called pains of sense. On 
the other hand, there is the pain of loss, which consists in the 
unhappiness necessarily resulting from the person’s separation 
from God. The pain of loss is not a punishment but is rather a 
natural consequence of sin, whereas the pains of sense are imposed 
by God in response to sin.24 
Seymour illustrates this distinction with the example of a man who regularly 
takes illegal drugs. He may be fined or imprisoned for breaking the law. He 
may also become addicted to the drugs. A fine or prison sentence is a 
punishment that is meted out on the man. It corresponds to the poena sensus. 
A possible addiction is a natural consequence of repeated and prolonged use. 
This undesirable state corresponds to the pain of loss or poena damni.  
In contrast to the ECT of traditionalists like Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm 
and Jonathan Edwards, Seymour asserts that not every sin is serious enough 
to warrant everlasting unhappiness in hell, but that an unending finite 
punishment for an unending series of sins may be warranted.25 With regard 
to this Continuing Sin Defense, Seymour writes, 
On the freedom view the pains of hell are a result of the continuing 
free choice of the damned. No single sin deserves eternal 
punishment, nor does any finite number of sins. Since our earthly 
existence is temporary, we can only commit a finite number of sins 
in this life, and none of them is infinite in seriousness. So we cannot 
come to deserve eternal punishment because of these sins. 
Therefore, the pains of sense can only be eternal if the damned 
continue to sin eternally; and this eternal sin can only deserve 
continued punishment if the sin is committed freely. … Likewise, 
the pain of loss is only eternal because the damned eternally choose 
to reject God through their sin.26 
Unlike Carson, however, Seymour adds the possibility of postmortem 
repentance and release from hell to his freedom view of hell. “[I]f the damned 
                                                
24 Seymour 2000a, 161. 
25 Seymour 1998, 82. 
26 Seymour 2000a, 161. 
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continue to sin freely, then they are free to cease sinning as well, and vice 
versa.”27 Seymour insists that for endless punishment to be warranted for 
endless sins, people must continue to possess free will even after death. The 
idea that one’s eternal fate is fixed upon death and that freedom is rescinded 
presupposes that the finite number of sins committed in a lifetime warrants 
eternal punishment, an argument that makes the traditionalist views of 
Carson and Craig susceptible to charges of injustice. If people in hell are not 
free to stop sinning, then it would be unjust to continue punishing them.  
Although it doesn’t play as prominent a role in Seymour’s theodicy, he 
does use a version of the Fixed Character Thesis to explain how there could 
still be some sense of finality in one’s destiny given the possibility of people in 
hell ceasing to sin and being released from hell (or for people in heaven to 
begin rebelling against God and be cast into hell).  
The force of habit, and the vision of God they [the godly in heaven] 
enjoy, powerfully combine to make sin an unappealing option … 
The power of bad habits that the wicked developed on earth and 
continue to develop in hell could explain why some people choose 
to remain in hell.28   
Seymour gives a synopsis of his freedom view: 
To summarize, the freedom view is essentially liberal. Since it 
claims that the damned freely continue to sin, it must also allow 
that some of the damned could freely cease their sinning and join 
the blessed. On the freedom view, the souls who remain in hell have 
had ample opportunity to know what hell is like. Furthermore, like 
other versions of hell, the freedom view need not claim that the 
punishments of hell are torturous. It only entails that they are 
strong enough to render justice for the sins committed by the 
damned, and (by the definition of hell) that they are strong enough 
to make life on the whole unhappy. It is reasonable to think that 
such punishments are no greater than sufferings we experience in 
this life.29 
Seymour himself recognizes the exegetical shortcomings of his freedom view. 
“I admit that there are scriptural passages inconvenient for my thesis; for 
example, the parable of the wise and foolish bridesmaids”, whereupon he 
quotes from Matthew 25:1-3 and comments, “Presumably the interpretation 
of the parable needs to be stretched a bit in order to accommodate the 
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28 Seymour 1998, 82. 
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freedom view.”30 Even so, Seymour has presented a rigorous philosophical 
defense whereby he strengthens a retributivist version of hell with some of the 
same supplements used by issuantists to fortify basic issuantism as a solution 
to the problem of hell.  
Michael J. Murray 
Although Michael J. Murray is not in the strict sense an issuantist since he 
does not reject the Retribution Thesis, he presents a hybrid view of the nature 
of hell where he combines the view of hell as the natural consequence of one’s 
choices and actions with the Retribution Thesis.31  
Murray believes that while traditionalists have provided satisfactory 
answers to the problem of proportions between the finite sins of a lifetime 
and the everlasting duration of punishment in hell in positing both the 
Continuing Sin Defense and the status principle, Murray nonetheless believes 
that issuantism (which he calls the natural consequence model) has greater 
overall explanatory power, with the exception of one main problem – the 
atonement.  
For Murray, if hell is a natural consequence of a person’s choice to love 
self rather than God, then it would make sense to conclude that heaven must 
be a natural consequence for those who love God rather than self. The 
problem is that no one has the good deeds necessary to warrant salvation; 
that’s where the atonement comes in, which Murray defines in terms of penal 
substitution.  
There is no reason why we could not append to the [natural 
consequence] model the claim that in addition to destroying our 
ability to become God-lovers (God’s intended purpose for us) sin 
also carries a penalty, a penalty which we could not pay on our own. 
Without the payment being made we cannot receive the grace 
necessary to cure the disease.32 
Murray is perhaps correct in his observation that most (if not all) issuantists 
reject the penal substitution theory of the atonement although it would be 
possible – and possibly more consistent – to say that because Jesus paid the 
penalty for the sins of the world on the cross, no individual would have to pay 
for his or her own sins in hell. Seen this way, rejection of penal substitution 
would not be a necessary part of issuantism. What the ungodly experience in 
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31 Murray 1999, 287-317.  
32 Murray 1999, 304. 
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hell is simply the natural consequence of a person’s choice to refuse 
fellowship with God.33  
Murray hints that a life of persistent choices for evil makes people so 
maximally set in their ways that they “are no longer able to break the hold of 
the dispositions which they have acquired.”34 He believes that people in hell 
will have an intellectual recognition of how bad things are in their separation 
from God, but because of their fixed character for evil, they will have no 
desire to do anything to change their situation.  
Murray likens the choice for hell to that of an addict who may recognize 
that his current, undesirable situation is a result of his choices, but who has 
the first-order desire to continue feeding his addiction at the same time as he 
has a second-order desire not to have the first-order desire to feed his 
addictions.  
Justin Barnard writes that taken by itself, Murray’s hybrid approach is 
inconsistent and fails to solve the moral problem of hell faced by other 
versions of ECT.35 The natural consequence model of hell is plausible only 
when the inhabitants of hell are there of their own free will. Yet Murray’s 
retention of the Retribution Thesis entails that the inhabitants of hell are 
there unwillingly.  
Barnard proposes that this impasse can be resolved by applying 
Frankfurt’s terminology. The inhabitants of hell are not there freely since 
their second-order volition (caused by the suffering of not fulfilling one’s 
final cause as a human created in God’s image, and in suffering the absence of 
                                                
33 Murray’s observations may actually be more problematic for traditionalists who hold 
to penal substitution than they are for issuantists who reject penal substitution. On the 
principle of ne bis in idem, an incident of wrongdoing should not be punished twice. If Christ 
bore the punishment for the world’s sins on the cross, then neither the godly nor the ungodly 
should be punished. Some traditionalists in the reformed tradition manage to circumvent this 
problem with the doctrine of limited atonement, whereby Christ only paid the penalty for 
those who will be saved; the ungodly will be left to pay for their own sins in hell. “In a sense, 
hell stands for everything the contemporary culture rejects – … that all sin will ultimately be 
punished either via Christ the substitute or by the sinner in hell.” Morgan and Peterson 2004, 
239. Louis Berkhof writes: “It should also be noted that the doctrine that Christ died for the 
purpose of saving all men, logically leads to absolute universalism, that is, to the doctrine that 
all men are actually saved. It is impossible that they for whom Christ paid the price, whose guilt 
he removed, should be lost on account of that guilt.” Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology 
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 395. Similar ideas are defended by Charles Hodge 
in Hodge 1873. See also Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1994), 577-578. 
34 Murray 1999, 298. 
35 Barnard 2010, 65-75. 
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all the goods to which God is author) does not align with the person’s first-
order desire to self-love.  
Wantons are beings who “have a first-order desires but who are not 
persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second order, they 
have no second-order volitions.”36 A wanton is something like an animal that 
has first-order desires (say to eat), but who lacks second-order desires or 
volitions related to what desires he does or does not have regarding the first-
order desires. “The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care 
about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being 
true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he 
prefers to be moved by other desires.”37  
Barnard suggests that the people in hell are wantons. They are there 
because they are maximally set in their ways of self-love without second-
order volitions one way or another. Thus, they are in hell neither against their 
wills nor are they there freely. This is similar in many ways to Lewis’ concept 
of people in hell as ex-humans. These wantons are the remains of what once 
were human beings with both first-order desires and second-order volitions.   
Clark H. Pinnock 
Clark H. Pinnock raises a number of important questions related to the 
doctrine of hell, including the fate of those who have never heard of Jesus, the 
necessity of explicit faith in Jesus Christ, the possibility of extra chances after 
death and the prospect that the number of people who will be condemned is 
relatively small. Like William Lane Craig, Pinnock raises these questions in 
the context of the theology of mission. Because Pinnock’s theological starting 
point differs from Craig’s on a number of points, Pinnock comes to a 
different set of conclusions. Perhaps the greatest difference between the 
theological starting points of Pinnock and Craig is Pinnock’s rejection of 
Craig’s molinism in favor of open theism. While Craig’s Continuing Sin 
Defense leads him to a defense of ECT supplemented with the Middle 
Knowledge Thesis and the Fixed Character Thesis, Pinnock lands on a 
defense of conditionalism with the supplements of the Extra Chance Thesis, 
the Openness Thesis, and the Nearly-Empty Thesis.  
Pinnock insists that he bases his conditionalism primarily on exegesis of 
the biblical texts. He writes that “scriptural backing is what I value most.”38 In 
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37 Frankfurt 1971, 11. 
38 Clark H. Pinnock, “The Nature of Hell” Ex Auditu 20 (2004): 54. 
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several texts, he examines what he believes to be biblical support for both the 
natural mortality of the soul and the ultimate destruction of the ungodly. I 
have already highlighted some of the main verses Pinnock uses in defense of 
his conditionalism in the section “Exegetical considerations for 
conditionalism” in chapter two above and will thus not devote further 
attention to them here.  
A second major consideration for Pinnock’s theology of hell is his 
rejection of the inherent immortality of the human soul. Pinnock admits that 
it is not necessary to reject the immortality of the soul in order to affirm the 
ultimate annihilation of the ungodly. Even if the soul were inherently 
immortal, God could still destroy the souls of the ungodly in hell. It is 
Pinnock’s conviction that belief in the immortality of the soul skews one’s 
interpretation of the biblical material. “I believe that the real basis of the 
traditional view of the nature of hell is not the Bible’s talk of the wicked 
perishing but an unbiblical anthropology that is read into the text.”39  
Furthermore, Pinnock sees a serious moral problem with ECT. “Christian 
theology simply cannot depict God acting like a bloodthirsty monster who 
maintains an everlasting Auschwitz for his enemies whom he will not even 
allow to die.”40 In light of the fact that even many traditionalists regard the 
idea of ECT as repugnant, Pinnock asks whether a Christian would really want 
to emulate a god who would act in such a way.   
Pinnock goes on to question the justice of ECT.  
Did a sinner ever visit everlasting suffering on God so as to justify 
unending pain? Did anyone ever cause God or his own neighbour 
everlasting pain and loss? Of course not. No human being has the 
power to do such harm. No finite set of misdeeds that the sinner 
has done can justify an infinite penalty.41  
Pinnock concludes that the disproportion between one’s finite sins and a 
putative infinite punishment in hell would ascribe to God a great injustice. It 
is his conviction that conditionalism preserves justice; people are punished in 
proportion to their wrongdoing, then pass out of existence.42 
                                                
39 Pinnock 1992a, 147. 
40 Pinnock 2004, 55. 
41 Pinnock 2004, 55. 
42  In Unbounded Love (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994) Pinnock writes (with 
co-author Robert C. Brow): “[H]ell cannot be viewed as a vindictive, retributive punishment. 
Since Jesus bore the sins of the world, we know that God is not in the business of punishing 
people. Jesus died so that he would not have to do that. Therefore, hell has to be more a matter 
of self-destruction, the logical result of final rejection of God. … Hell is not retributive 
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A final part of Pinnock’s critique of ECT is a metaphysical objection. It is 
his belief that the doctrine of ECT leads to a form of cosmological dualism 
where evil and rebellion continue forever in eternal opposition to the reign of 
God. “ 
Surely the biblical picture is that of Jesus completely victorious over 
sin and death, suffering and Satan, and all those enemies consumed 
in the lake of fire and second death. Only if evil, death, devils and 
the wicked go into oblivion does history issue in unqualified 
victory.43  
Without God’s final victory over all evil “destroying every rule and every 
authority and power” Pinnock questions how God could then be considered 
“all in all” (1 Corinthians 15:24-28).  
Pinnock’s conditionalism by itself may still fail at providing a satisfactory 
answer to the problem of hell. This may be why Pinnock supplements his 
basic conditionalism with the Openness Thesis, the Nearly-Empty Thesis and 
the Extra Chance Thesis.  
Regarding the Nearly-Empty Thesis, Pinnock argues for what he calls the 
optimism of salvation.44 Even though Pinnock rejects universal salvation,45 he 
is adamant that God’s desire for universal salvation must entail universal 
access to salvation. God is a God of love who does not sit passively by while 
large numbers of people perish. Rather, God is a God who patiently and 
tirelessly seeks reconciliation with people. This optimism of salvation is 
                                                                                                               
punishment.” Pinnock and Brow 1994, 88. This rejection of the Retribution Thesis would 
mean that Pinnock would actually be an issuantist who supplements basic issuantism with 
conditional immortality and ultimate annihilation. It is surprising that this rejection of the 
Retribution Thesis does not even warrant mention in any of his major works on the doctrine of 
hell. In Four Views on Hell he criticizes the traditionalist teaching of hell as everlasting 
conscious retribution (Pinnock 1992a, 153), but only for being out of proportion to a person’s 
wrongdoing in life, not for being retributive per se. A similar line of reasoning is found in “The 
Nature of Hell” where he writes: “A just God would not punish a sinner with a punishment 
beyond his deserving. And what purpose would be served by endless and totally unredemptive 
suffering?” (Pinnock 2004, 55). Given the absence of any rejection of the Retribution Thesis in 
any of Pinnock’s major works on hell and the fact that Unbounded Love was co-authored with 
Robert C. Brow, one may legitimately wonder whether the rejection of the Retribution Thesis 
in Unbounded Love was written by Pinnock or Brow. Since both authors are now deceased, it 
would be seemingly impossible to determine exactly who was behind this rejection of the 
Retribution Thesis. Fully cognizant of this ambiguity, I have nonetheless chosen to classify 
Pinnock as a conditionalist – a perspective for which he was a well-known defender – and not 
as an issuantist. 
43 Pinnock 1992a, 154-155. 
44 Pinnock 1992c, 17-47. 
45 Pinnock 1992a, 141-142; Pinnock and Brow 1994, 87-88. 
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rooted in a number of global covenants God establishes with people. In each 
case, God calls an individual or group of people for the purpose of relaying 
salvation to many others. Even the calling of Israel as God’s chosen people is 
not for the purpose of excluding all others, but so that the blessings of 
salvation may be conveyed to all humanity; they are called to a ministry of 
redemptive servanthood. Salvation does not come exclusively through a 
conscious confession of Jesus Christ; the important thing is faith in God that 
expresses itself in a proper response to whatever revelation one has accessible. 
Thus, a person with only knowledge of general revelation can make a positive 
response to God on the basis of that general revelation and be saved. The 
same is true for those who have access to more complete presentations of the 
gospel in various forms of special revelation. 
Pinnock rejects the Middle Knowledge Thesis on the grounds that God 
saving a person on the basis of a putative middle knowledge about how 
people would believe in other circumstances in which they had heard the 
gospel would mean that some people would be saved without any faith at all.46 
This need not be a problem for Pinnock, who believes in the Extra Chance 
Thesis, that people will be granted a postmortem opportunity to respond to 
the gospel.  
As to the Extra Chance Thesis, Pinnock reminds us that observation tells 
us that not everyone has access to the gospel in this life. Therefore Pinnock 
concludes that postmortem opportunities for salvation must be given to those 
who have lacked them in this life.47 He is careful to point out, however, that 
he believes that if a person has had a clear gospel presentation in this life, a 
clear confession of faith is necessary and no further opportunity will be given 
after death. Postmortem chances for salvation will be given to those who have 
never made a definitive rejection of faith in Christ – regardless of how much 
knowledge the person has had about Christ. For Pinnock there are several 
important considerations here: first, everyone will encounter Christ after 
death. Second, there is no reason to assume that God who is loving and 
gracious towards all before death would cease to be so once a person is dead. 
Third, the postmortem encounter with God will not signal a great change of 
mind; it will be a confirmation of the direction a person was already headed 
in life.  
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Conclusion on Non-Issuantist Views of Hell with 
Supplementary Theses 
In this chapter I have highlighted the work of three traditionalists and one 
conditionalist. None of these scholars rejects the Retribution Thesis, yet all 
seek to provide coherent solutions to the problem of hell by use of some of 
the same supplements also used by issuantists.  
I have chosen not to give detailed critiques of these four scholars. While 
there may be room for legitimate critique of some of the details in each of the 
theories presented, it would appear that any critique strong enough to render 
these theories of hell incoherent would have to attack key presuppositions of 
the system, not so much the coherence of the various elements of the system. 
For instance, one may have serious objections to molinism or open theism as 
explanations of divine foreknowledge on grounds that are extraneous to the 
theories of hell presented in this chapter. On that basis, a critic may reject the 
theories of Craig, Seymour or Pinnock. If for the sake of argument one 
accepts molinism or open theism, then the theology of hell presented by these 
scholars may be logically consistent and may constitute a reasonable answer 
to the problem of hell, or at least as good as any of the supplemented issuant 
conceptions of hell presented by Walls, Swinburne, Kvanvig or others.  
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CONCLUSION 
“To hell I thought we were returning.” – Dante Alighieri, Inferno 
34:81.  
Nobody likes the doctrine of hell. Even among traditionalists who defend 
ECT, there is a certain repulsion at the idea that God would condemn perhaps 
a large portion of the world’s population to everlasting torment in hell. 
Nonetheless, traditionalists, conditionalists, universalists and issuantists, 
although they all conceive of hell in very different terms, strive to show how 
belief in a loving, omnipotent God can be reconciled with the prospect of 
certain people ending up in hell.  
This problem of hell has been expressed in terms of a set of incompatible 
statements:  
1. An omnipotent God could create a world in which all moral 
agents freely choose life with God.  
2. An omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the 
foreknowledge that some (perhaps a significant proportion) of 
God’s creatures would end up in hell. 
3. An omniscient God would know which people will end up in 
hell. 
4. Some people will end up forever in hell.  
Scholars deal with this putative incompatibility by redefining one or more of 
these statements. Regarding divine omnipotence (1), some scholars have 
advanced what has come to be called the Free Will Defense, the idea that 
human freedom is such a great good that nothing – not even God – could 
rightfully violate it. Indeed, God’s refusal to violate human freedom is seen as 
an expression of divine goodness. It is, as we have seen, little consensus that 
our moral intuitions would value freedom higher than existence if that 
existence were characterized by the torments of an unending hell. 
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The definition of God’s goodness (2) is somewhat expanded by issuantists 
(inter alia) who maintain that even hell must be an expression of the love of 
God. God continues to love every person, but the experience of God’s love 
may be painful to those who reject it.1 Likewise, some defenders of ECT 
expand the definition of God’s goodness by stating that damnation to hell 
may at first appear to be something bad, but because of its roll in God’s 
greater victory over evil, it becomes something good. 
Regarding the third proposition above, it may be argued that open theists 
(regardless of view on hell) redefine divine omniscience as it has traditionally 
been understood, such that not even an omniscient God could know who (if 
any) will end up forever in hell. 
The claim that some people will end up forever in hell (4) has been called 
into question or redefined by universalists, conditionalists, annihilationists 
and issuantists on different grounds. Beginning with a definition of hell as 
eternal conscious torment, we see that hell consists of four possible theses:2  
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: some persons are consigned to 
hell. 
(H2) The Existence Thesis: hell is a place where people exist, if they 
are consigned there. 
(H3) The No Escape Thesis: there is no possibility of leaving hell, 
and nothing one can do, change, or become in order to get out of 
hell, once one is consigned there. 
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for and purpose of 
hell is retributive in nature, hell being constituted so as to mete out 
punishment to those whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. 
Conditionalists, annihilationists, universalists and issuantists all call into 
question at least one – and possibly several – of the basic tenets of ECT. 
Universalists reject at least H1 and possibly some combination of H2, H3 and 
H4 as well. Conditionalists and annihilationists challenge the temporal 
duration of hell as understood by H2 with a further possible rejection of H3. 
The focus of this dissertation has been on issuant views of hell presented 
in contemporary Anglo-American philosophical theology. Issuantists charge 
that as long as traditionalists and conditionalists retain the Retribution 
                                                
1 In this sense there appears to be a difference between thinkers like Kreeft and Tacelli, 
Ware and Bulgakov, who claim that God never ceases in expressing his love even to the 
ungodly, and Swinburne and Lewis, who see in poena damni the absence of all the blessings 
God wishes to give to people, including the love of God. 
2 Kvanvig 1993, 19. 
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Thesis, they fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of hell. 
Issuantists thus reject at a minimum H4 and possibly H3.3 
Inspired by C.S. Lewis, the first modern thinker to my knowledge to 
present what we today can call an issuant view of hell, a considerable number 
of contemporary scholars have done much to develop issuantism into a 
serious interpretation of the doctrine of hell.    
Distilling the essence of issuantism from the works of a wide range of 
issuantist scholars, I have shown in chapter four that basic issuantism by itself 
– with its rejection of the Retribution Thesis – does not provide an adequate 
answer to the problem of hell. The issuantist scholars themselves, however, 
recognize this weakness and add a wide range of possible supplements to 
their basic issuantism. Some of these supplemented versions of issuantism 
succeed in presenting coherent answers to the problem of hell through a 
redefinition of some elements of the duration, quality, purpose and finality of 
hell.  
One of the main objections issuantists have raised against ECT and 
conditionalism has been the charge that conceptions of hell that presuppose a 
retributive purpose for hell fail at providing satisfactory answers to the 
problem of hell. In this dissertation I have argued that the issue of retribution 
is not the main issue for determining whether an answer to the problem of 
hell is successful or not. Indeed, I concluded there that all non-retributive 
explanations of the purpose of hell – with the possible exception of 
restoration – appear to presuppose certain notions of desert and retributive 
justice that are inconsistent with the issuantist rejection of the Retribution 
Thesis.  
In chapter six I have highlighted the work of three traditionalists and one 
conditionalist who use some of the same supplements as issuantists to 
strengthen their theologies of hell in answering the problem of hell. My 
conclusion there was that with the addition of some of these supplements, in 
particular various versions of the Extra Chance Theses, Nearly-Empty Thesis, 
Irrationality Thesis and Fixed-Character Thesis (when combined with a 
compatibilist definition of human freedom), versions of ECT and 
conditionalism can be advanced that succeed just as well in presenting 
coherent answers to the problem of hell as those advanced by issuantists who 
make use of the same supplements. It would thus appear that it is the 
                                                
3 Both Swinburne and Kvanvig also call into question H2 in allowing for the possibility 
that people in hell may choose cessation of existence rather than perpetual existence in hell.  
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supplements and not the larger categories of ECT, conditionalism or 
issuantism that make or break the theory.  
The main question for all scholars seeking to provide a coherent answer to 
the problem of hell would seem to be whether God can be justified in 
condemning some people (or allowing some people to exile themselves) to 
hell. I believe that I have shown that issuantists, traditionalists and 
conditionalists can all present satisfactory justifications for God’s actions 
regardless of whether one conceives of these actions as retributive or not. 
Thus the issuantist critique of non-issuant views of hell is not warranted in 
every case, especially where ECT and conditionalism are supplemented along 
similar lines as supplemented issuantism.   
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GLOSSARY 
ANNIHILATIONISM. The view that the souls of the ungodly will eventually 
cease to exist. There may be a number of reasons for this: the natural 
mortality of the human soul, an act of divine judgment in which the 
immortal soul is destroyed, or the soul’s natural inability to survive the 
death of the body. The term annihilationism is sometimes used 
interchangeably with CONDITIONALISM.  
ANTI-UNIVERSALISM THESIS (H1). A key component of ETERNAL CONSCIOUS 
TORMENT (Kvanvig 1993) whereby some persons are consigned to hell. 
APOKATASTASIS (PANTŌN). The view closely related to UNIVERSALISM that all 
of creation will eventually be restored to fellowship with God. In the 
Greek New Testament the terms is found only in Acts 3:21. 
Apokatastasis is commonly associated with the thought of Origen (ca. 
185 – ca. 251 CE) and Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century CE), among 
others. 
BASIC ISSUANTISM. A category of non-universalistic views on hell 
characterized by three trademarks: the integration of divine 
motivations for heaven and hell in the love of God, LIBERTARIAN 
HUMAN FREEDOM and a rejection of the RETRIBUTION THESIS.  
CHOICE MODEL OF HELL. Another name for ISSUANTISM. Kvanvig uses this 
label in Destiny and Deliberation (Kvanvig 2011).  
COMPATIBILISM. The view of human freedom whereby a soft form of 
determinism is compatible with human freedom and moral 
responsibility. “[A] compatibilist contends that an agent is free (and 
morally responsible) just in case his actions are the result of his own 
desires and intentions exercised without external coercions or 
constraints.” (Cowan 2011: 417). 
CONDITIONALISM. The idea that human souls are not inherently immortal. 
The souls of those who do not receive eternal life as a gift of God 
through faith will eventually cease to exist, either as a consequence of 
the soul’s natural mortality or as an act of judgment from God. 
Sometimes used interchangeably with ANNIHILATIONISM.  
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CONDITIONALIST EVENTUAL EXTINCTIONISM. The view that “both the wicked 
and the good are resurrected, and that the wicked suffer God’s 
judgment until they are finally extinguished, the punishment being 
proportionate to their sin.” (Harmon 1992: 197). See 
CONDITIONALISM. 
CONDITIONALIST UNIRESURRECTIONISM. The view that “man is naturally 
mortal and immortality is given through the gospel only to the 
righteous in the next life; the wicked who do not respond to Christ are 
not resurrected since death is their judgment.” (Harmon 1992: 197). 
See ANNIHILATIONISM. 
CONSEQUENCE MODEL OF HELL. See ISSUANT VIEW / ISSUANTISM. 
CONTINUING SIN DEFENSE. The view sometimes held by advocates of the 
ETERNAL CONSCIOUS TORMENT model, that the ungodly deserve 
infinite punishment in hell because they continue to commit an infinite 
number of sins even while they are in hell. The Continuing Sin Defense 
was likely first developed by Thomas Aquinas. 
COUNTERFACTUALS (OF CREATURELY FREEDOM). Contingent propositions 
about what people would freely do given a particular set of 
circumstances. Counterfactuals often have the form ‘If subject S were 
in circumstances C, S would freely do action A.’ Sometime also known 
as contingent conditionals.  
ECT. See ETERNAL CONSCIOUS TORMENT. 
ESCAPISM. A supplement sometimes added to BASIC ISSUANTISM whereby the 
people in hell will have possibly endless opportunities to repent of their 
sin and escape (or be released) from hell. Escapism as a supplement to 
basic issuantism should not be confused with uses of the term escapism 
within psychology and literary criticism. 
ETERNAL CONSCIOUS TORMENT (ECT). A theory of hell with widespread 
acceptance in the history of Western Christian theology that the 
ungodly will be punished in a conscious state of mind in an everlasting 
hell. Sometimes called TRADITIONALISM. 
ETERNAL EXISTENCE THESIS. See EXISTENCE THESIS (H2). 
EXISTENCE THESIS (H2). A key component of ETERNAL CONSCIOUS TORMENT 
(Kvanvig 1993) whereby “hell is a place where people exist, if they are 
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consigned there.” In Kvanvig (1997) he calls this the ETERNAL 
EXISTENCE THESIS. 
EXTRA CHANCE THESES. A number of supplements sometimes added to 
BASIC ISSUANTISM whereby people receive at least one (and possibly an 
infinite number) of postmortem chances to be saved. The extra 
chance(s) may be granted immediately after death, at the time of 
judgment or even in hell itself. The Extra Chance Theses are posited as 
answers to the problems raised by bad RELIGIOUS LUCK. 
FIRST-ORDER DESIRE. As used by Harry Frankfurt (1971), a first-order desire 
is an immediate longing for something. For example, a person may 
have a first-order desire to eat a second piece of pie or a first-order 
desire to go shopping with friends. Compare with SECOND-ORDER 
DESIRE. 
FIXED CHARACTER THESIS. The view that the formation of an evil character 
explains how people can chose to remain in hell. 
FRANKFURT-STYLE COUNTEREXAMPLE. A type of hypothetical situation 
developed (or inspired) by Harry Frankfurt that seeks to disprove PAP 
by showing that a person may have freedom of the will and thus be 
morally responsible even though he may not have freedom of action 
due to possible external manipulation.  
FREE WILL DEFENSE (FWD). An argument developed by Plantinga (1974, 
1977) to explain a possible divine motivation for allowing evil. It is 
argued that free will is a great good; so great, in fact, that it justifies the 
existence of whatever moral evil may occur as a result of human 
freedom. Since God desires to bring about a world in which the greater 
good of human freedom obtains, God cannot create a world in which 
human creatures are both free and in which there is no evil. 
FREEDOM VIEW OF HELL. Charles Seymour’s name for his theodicy of hell 
which supplements ECT with the EXTRA-CHANCE THESIS. 
HEAVEN. A general term used to denote a state of bliss that the godly will 
enjoy after death in the presence of God. In this work I do not take a 
specific stance as to whether heaven is to be enjoyed in a recreated 
earth or in some non-physical state. Nor do I take a position on 
whether the godly will enjoy heaven in the intermediate state or only 
after the resurrection of the body. 
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HELL. Unless further precision is warranted by the context, I use the term hell 
in a general sense to denote a negative state experienced after death by 
the ungodly. 
INCOMPATIBILISM. The view that human freedom is incompatible with 
determinism. Incompatibilism takes two possible forms: 
LIBERTARIANISM that denies determinism and hard determinism that 
denies human freedom.  
IRRATIONALITY THESIS. Because of LIBERTARIAN HUMAN FREEDOM, God must 
allow people to make irrational choices even if those irrational choices 
entail that they end up in hell. 
ISSUANT VIEW / ISSUANTISM. A category of non-universalistic views of hell 
that distinguish themselves from non-issuant views of hell by the three 
sine qua non trademarks of BASIC ISSUANTISM with the possible 
addition of at least one of the following supplements: the NOT-SO-
NASTY THESIS, the LESS-THAN-HUMAN THESIS, the NEARLY-EMPTY 
THESIS, the EXTRA CHANCE THESES, the FIXED CHARACTER THESIS, the 
IRRATIONALITY THESIS, the MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE THESIS, or the 
OPENNESS THESIS. 
LESS-THAN-HUMAN THESIS. The view that one natural consequence of a 
person’s rejection of God is the loss of the goods with which God 
endows people. The loss of these goods means the ultimate loss of 
humanity for the formerly human denizens of hell. 
LIBERTARIAN HUMAN FREEDOM / LIBERTARIANISM. An INCOMPATIBILIST 
concept of human freedom where an action can only be said to be free 
if it was not determined by any prior causes. Definitions of 
libertarianism often include some concept of the PRINCIPLE OF 
ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES (PAP).  
LOSING ONE’S SOUL. A term used by Swinburne, Kvanvig and others to 
designate the process of developing a fixed evil character or becoming 
less than human.  
MCTAGGART’S DILEMMA. The argument proposed by John McTaggart (1906) 
that there is no good reason for a person to believe in hell. The only 
reasonable grounds for belief are empirical evidence or credible 
testimony. Since there is no empirical evidence for the existence of hell, 
any purported knowledge of it must come from revelation. If hell is a 
totally horrific state for those who are in hell and if God is the one 
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responsible both for the creation of hell and for damning some people 
to hell, then God must be very vile. The testimony of a very vile being is 
not credible. Thus there is no good reason for belief in hell.  
METAPHYSICAL LIBERTARIAN HUMAN FREEDOM. See LIBERTARIAN HUMAN 
FREEDOM. 
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE (SCIENTIA MEDIA). God’s knowledge of the truth value 
of the COUNTERFACTUALS OF CREATURELY FREEDOM. In other words, it 
is God’s knowledge of what anyone would freely do in any given set of 
circumstances in any possible world. It is called middle knowledge 
since it logically stands between God’s natural knowledge of things that 
are necessarily true and God’s free knowledge of contingent truths that 
come about as a result of God’s creative choice. Middle knowledge is 
pre-volitional like God’s natural knowledge, but knowledge of 
contingent truths like free knowledge. 
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE THESIS. Based on God’s MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE of the 
COUNTERFACTUALS OF CREATURELY FREEDOM, God actualizes a world 
in which the optimal ratio of saved to lost is realized. 
MOLINISM. The view developed by Luis de Molina (1535-1600) that seeks to 
harmonize divine providence with LIBERTARIAN HUMAN FREEDOM by 
positing that God has MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.  
NATURAL CONSEQUENCE MODEL OF HELL. See ISSUANT VIEW / ISSUANTISM. 
This term is used inter alia by Barnard 2010 and Murray 1998. 
NEARLY-EMPTY THESIS. Hell will be populated by only a small number of 
irredeemably evil beings. The dividing line between the Nearly-Empty 
Thesis and UNIVERSALISM is not always clearly defined. Many hopeful 
universalists would nonetheless ascribe to the possibility that if the 
ANTI-UNIVERSALISM THESIS (H1) ends up being true, that only a small 
number of people will be there. 
NO ESCAPE THESIS (H3). A key component of ETERNAL CONSCIOUS TORMENT 
(Kvanvig 1993) whereby “there is no possibility of leaving hell, and 
nothing one can do, change, or become in order to get out of hell, once 
one is consigned there.” 
NON-ISSUANT VIEWS OF HELL. Whereas ISSUANT VIEWS of hell are 
characterized by three necessary trademarks, the rejection of any one of 
these characteristics is sufficient to label a view as non-issuant. 
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UNIVERSALISM is also considered a non-issuant view of hell even when 
the universalist affirms the three trademarks of issuantism.  
NOT-SO-NASTY THESIS. The view that people end up in hell because of their 
free choices. The people in hell are content with their situation since 
they have received what they genuinely want.  
OPEN THEISM. An arminian view of divine foreknowledge whereby God can 
be said to be omniscient in that God knows everything that is logically 
possible for God to know. God does not know, however, what people 
will freely do in the future; that is COUNTERFACTUALS OF CREATURELY 
FREEDOM have no truth value.  
OPENNESS THESIS. The idea based on OPEN THEISM that God’s character and 
actions in creating the world are vindicated by the fact that God did 
not know prior to the creative act which if any free moral agents would 
end up in hell.  
OPTIMAL GRACE. A term used by Walls to designate the optimal amount of 
influence toward good that God can exercise on a person’s will without 
destroying the person’s freedom. If optimal grace is not given during 
this lifetime, it will be provided after death.  
PAP. See PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES. 
PARTICULARISM. A view within the theology of religions that salvation only 
comes through faith in Jesus Christ. This view is based on the exclusive 
claims of Christ in John 14:6 and on the claims by the apostles on 
behalf of Jesus in Acts 4:12. In some authors particularism is called 
Christian exclusivism.  
POENA DAMNI. The pain of loss. This is the existential suffering a person 
experiences in hell due to separation from God and the loss of the 
image of God. 
POENA SENSUS. The pain of the senses. This is the physical suffering a person 
experiences in hell that is related to the resurrection of the body. 
PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES (PAP). Part of a standard definition 
of libertarian free will. An agent is free if, ceteris paribus, one at the 
time of action has the possibility of doing otherwise in a particular 
situation. 
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PROBLEM OF HELL. A soteriological variation of the problem of evil whereby 
there is a perceived inconsistency between the following premises:  
An omnipotent God could create a world in which all moral 
agents freely choose life with God.  
An omnibenevolent God would not create a world with the 
foreknowledge that some (perhaps a significant proportion) of 
God’s creatures would end up in hell. 
An omniscient God would know which people will end up in hell. 
Some people will end up forever in hell.  
A satisfactory answer to the problem of hell must seek to harmonize 
these premises. The problem of hell is perhaps more problematic for 
Christian theology than the related problem of evil, since according to 
the problem of evil, suffering in this life can be justified by belief in a 
final justice after death. 
PROGRESSIVE VIEW OF HELL. A term used by Eric Reitan (2003) to designate 
the ISSUANT VIEW / ISSUANTISM.  
PUNISHMENT THESIS. See RETRIBUTION THESIS. 
PURGATORY. In some classical formulations, purgatory was seen as the 
postmortem state in which people who die in a state of grace are 
punished for unshriven sins and where one atones for the temporal 
effects of forgiven sins. Among some issuantists, however, purgatory 
becomes a step in the process of sanctification whereby a person 
develops the godly character requisite to enjoy eternal life in the 
presence of God.  
RELIGIOUS LUCK. The view that a person’s degree of responsibility for her 
religious faith or lack thereof goes beyond the degree to which she 
controls it. These circumstances make it easier or harder for a person 
to believe in God and develop a life of virtue. Religious luck is 
influenced by factors such as genetics, nurture and culture. Religious 
luck is closely related to the concept of moral luck, whereby the degree 
of a person’s moral responsibility is dependent upon factors over which 
a person has no control.  
RETRIBUTION THESIS (H4). A key component of the ETERNAL CONSCIOUS 
TORMENT (Kvanvig 1993) whereby the “justification for and purpose of 
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hell is retributive in nature, hell being constituted so as to mete out 
punishment to those whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it.” In 
Kvanvig (1997) he calls this the PUNISHMENT THESIS. 
SECOND-ORDER DESIRE. As used by Harry Frankfurt (1971), a second-order 
desire is a desire about a desire. Second-order desires are the results of 
reflections about FIRST-ORDER DESIRES. For example, a person may 
have conflicting first-order desires to eat a second piece of pie and to 
lose weight. A second-order desire would be a desire that one didn’t 
have the first-order desire to eat a second piece of pie. 
SECOND-ORDER VOLITION. As used by Harry Frankfurt, a second-order 
volition is the wish that a certain FIRST-ORDER DESIRE would be one’s 
will. For instance, the will that the desire to lose weight would be 
stronger than the desire for a second piece of pie.  
SELF-DETERMINATION THESIS. The view that a person ends up in hell as a 
result of a freely-chosen course of action, not because of external causes 
such as divine wrath or punishment. The Self-Determination Thesis is 
one alternative to the RETRIBUTION THESIS. 
SEPARATIONIST VIEW OF HELL. A term used by Charles Seymour (1998, 2000) 
to designate ISSUANTISM. 
SIMPLE FOREKNOWLEDGE. The idea that God knows everything that will 
happen in the future, regardless of whether God causes or foreordains 
such events.  
SOTERIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL. Another name for the PROBLEM OF HELL 
(Basinger 1992; Craig 1989). 
STATUS PRINCIPLE. The view that the grounds for judging one’s punishment 
in hell is not the severity of the sin itself, but the status of God, the one 
who is offended by all sin. Since God is an infinite being, all sins 
against the infinite being warrant an infinite punishment. 
STRONG VIEW OF HELL. A term used by Kvanvig (1993) for the ETERNAL 
CONSCIOUS TORMENT view of hell. The strong view of hell is 
characterized by a combination of the ANTI-UNIVERSALISM THESIS 
(H1), the ETERNAL EXISTENCE THESIS (H2), the NO ESCAPE THESIS 
(H3), and the RETRIBUTION THESIS (H4). 
TRADITIONALISM. A view of hell where the ungodly will suffer endless 
punishment in a conscious state of mind in hell. The term 
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traditionalism is often used by both defenders and critics of the view. 
See also ETERNAL CONSCIOUS TORMENT. 
TRANSITIVITY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. The idea that people are morally 
responsible for their actions even in the absence of LIBERTARIAN 
FREEDOM if their lack of freedom is caused by free choices for which 
they are morally responsible. For instance, a father is morally culpable 
for not keeping a promise to attend his daughter’s birthday party if the 
father is in jail for robbing a convenience store to get money to buy a 
birthday present for his daughter. The father is not free to attend the 
birthday party, but it is the father’s fault that he is not free.  
TRANSWORLD DAMNATION. A term introduced by William Lane Craig (1989) 
to designate the idea that the people who end up in hell would not be 
saved in any possible world in which they exist. Inspired by Alvin 
Plantinga’s theory of transworld depravity (Plantinga 1974, 1977). 
UNIVERSALISM. The view that all of creation will eventually enjoy the 
blessings of salvation and eternal fellowship with God.  
WANTON. A term introduced by Harry Frankfurt (1971) for a person who has 
no SECOND-ORDER VOLITIONS. Even though wantons may have 
rational faculties of a high order, but aren’t concerned with the 
desirability of their desires, or with what their wills ought to be. 
Wantons are consequently not persons. All animals, very young 
children and some adults are wantons.  
WEAK VIEW OF HELL. A term used by Lindsey Hall (2003) to designate 
ISSUANTISM. 
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Issuant Views of Hell in 
Contemporary  
Anglo-American Theology 
In Christian theology, the doctrine of hell as eternal 
punishment presents a real problem: How can one 
reconcile belief in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and 
omniscient God with the belief that some (perhaps a 
significant portion) of God’s creatures will end up in an 
eternal hell? 
Since the late twentieth century, a number of British 
and North American philosophical theologians, inspired 
by C.S. Lewis, have developed a new approach to 
 answering the problem of hell. This present work seeks to 
systematize these “issuant” views of hell by distilling the 
essence of issuantist perspectives on hell: the insistance 
that both heaven and hell must issue from the love of 
God, an affirmation of libertarian human freedom and 
a rejection of retributive interpretations of hell. An 
evaluation of the success of these issuant views of hell 
in providing satisfactory answers to the problem of hell 
is also presented.
